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Abstract 
‘Social development’ and ‘economic development’ are complex concepts, 
concepts that may be interpreted very differently in different contexts and at 
different times.  Not only may the processes involved be different in different 
contexts, so too may be the criteria by which success is judged.  It is argued here 
that successive Solomon Islands governments have striven for social and 
economic development without taking full account of the real nature of Solomon 
Islands society.  What is needed is national development policy, planning and 
implementation that arise out of, and take fully into account, the historical, 
geographic and cultural context of Solomon Islands.  
 
On the whole, the socio-economic structure of Solomon Islands society is 
currently underpinned by a tri-partite hierarchy in which, for the majority of 
Solomon Islanders, kastom (traditional beliefs and practices) and church (the 
beliefs and practices endorsed by the church) take precedence over the state as 
legitimate forms of authority.  This inevitably poses problems for state-led 
development.  If socio-economic development activities are to be successful in 
achieving a better quality of life for all Solomon Islanders, including those who 
live in rural areas, they must take full account of the role of kastom and church in 
the lives of the people.  This must include an understanding of the differing 
concepts of development of people in different areas of the country such as those 
of Ulawa islanders that are discussed here.   
 
The thesis begins with an introduction to the research (Chapter 1) in which the 
theoretical framework is located broadly within the postmodern paradigm.  In 
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Chapter 2 the essentially qualitative and interpretive nature of the methodology is 
outlined and explained.  Chapter 3 provides a critical review of international 
development literature in which it is argued that official definitions and 
descriptions of development are based on production and deficit models.  The 
need to accommodate an indigenous and organic concept of development, one that 
takes account of the diversity of human experience, is stressed.  Chapter 4 
provides an outline of Solomon Islands society. Here, the historical narrative is 
complemented by three metaphors - ‘island’, wantok and betelnut - which serve to 
reinforce and explain the nature of Solomon Islands society and the ways in which 
that society has been shaped by historical processes. Chapter 5 is devoted to a 
discussion of modern development activity in Solomon Islands, the main focus 
being on the period immediately preceding and following independence.  Chapter 
6 explores, with particular reference to Ulawa Island, indigenous concepts of 
development and the impact of national development activities on rural-dwelling 
islanders. It also engages the issue of state reform, proposing a model based on a 
two tier system, with central government in its current form dealing directly with 
the people at constituency rather than provincial level.  Finally, Chapter 7 
summarizes the main conclusions reached. It is noted that the failure of both pre- 
and post-independence governments to take full account of the nature of Solomon 
Islands society has been a major factor in the lack of effective development in the 
islands. 
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Chapter 2 the essentially qualitative and interpretive nature of the methodology is 
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islanders. It also engages the issue of state reform, proposing a model based on a 
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Chapter 1 
Establishing place and space 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The broad theoretical framework in which this thesis is located is drawn from that 
of a post-modern development discourse with a particular focus on the post-
independence context of Solomon Islands.  The overall aim is to describe and 
analyse the development process in Solomon Islands over the quarter century that 
begins with the gaining of political independence in 1978.   
 
Underlying the approach adopted here is the observation that despite more than 
two and a half decades of development effort and activity, Solomon Islands 
remains categorised in mainstream development discourse and official or 
government literature as either an under-developed or developing country.  Even 
so, the lives of Solomon Islanders have changed since political independence – 
and continue to do so.  The question is whether any of these changes have led to 
an improvement in the lives and socio-economic circumstances of the people.  
Can a detailed description and analysis of development aims and processes in the 
quarter of a century since independence throw some light on the issue of state 
reform which is the other pertinent issue in Solomon Islands since the Australian-
led intervention in July 2003?  What implications do such a description and 
analysis have for the future of Solomon Islands and, in particular, for the future of 
development initiatives in Solomon Islands, especially from the point of view of 
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the national or central government and in respect of national development policy 
and planning?  These are the critical questions that will be addressed here. 
1.2 Establishing local spaces in global places  
The study of development in the global context has traditionally centred on issues 
of economic growth.  More recently, however, it has widened its sphere of 
concern to include issues of social and gender inequality, poverty alleviation, 
environmental and ecological issues, issues relating to security, and issues relating 
to the relevance and utility of indigenous knowledge. The intentions have been 
noble ones.  Nevertheless, these intentions have not necessarily been translated 
into positive outcomes for the most disadvantaged.  For this reason, critical 
engagement with global development thinking and practices has seen the 
emergence of a post-modern critique of mainstream development discourse (for 
example, Arturo Escobar (1995)). Part of this critical agenda is what has also been 
termed a “cultural turn” in development studies (Schech & Haggis, 2000; 2002), 
something that has been inspired by the realisation that development thought and 
practices are not value-neutral.  Rather, they are embedded within a range of 
fundamental cultural values and presuppositions which emerge out of a Western 
or Anglo-American world view, a world-view that is embedded in the culture of 
such international and highly influential institutions as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
United Nations (UN), and multinational corporations.  For this reason, it has been 
argued that the apparent failure of past efforts to fully grasp, indeed fulfil 
adequately, the global development agenda is, in part at least, due to the presumed 
universalism inherent within the dominant discourses and institutions of 
development.  The hegemonic paradigm of mainstream development discourse 
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has given insufficient consideration to the contextualised experiences and peculiar 
understandings of development in different parts of the world.  Even so, this 
paradigm continues to shape mainstream global development agendas and 
practices although, as indicated above, serious questions are being asked about it 
(see, for example, Rist (1997)). 
1.3 Scope and focus of the study 
For the purposes of this study, development is broadly conceived of as involving 
social and cultural as well as economic factors.  Solomon Islands society is 
socially and culturally diverse and its people occupy a number of separate islands 
in a geographical sense.  These islands are, however, grouped (if not necessarily 
unified) into a single political entity, and this grouping is itself conceptualised 
metaphorically as an ‘island’, as, that is, an entity on its own, isolated, distinct and 
different, an entity to which mainstream development discourse cannot be applied 
meaningfully.  The Solomons as ‘island’ is an entity that has its own voice, a 
voice that is, however, too readily drowned out by the louder and more 
authoritative voices of  the `continental lands’ that represent mainstream 
development thinking and practices.  These `continental’ voices that define, 
indeed, frame mainstream development discourse in turn seek to define, to 
classify, and, ultimately, to stigmatise the nature and process of development in 
`island’ societies.1  My aim is to uncover ‘island’ voices, to let Solomon Islanders 
speak their own experiences and understanding of development, express their own 
                                                 
1 Britain is here included as one of these ‘continental’ voices although its physical status as an 
island, and the many ways in which it differs from continental Europe, is something to which 
reference is so often made.  Since Britain was the colonial power that occupied Solomon Islands, 
there is, of course, also a further irony involved in the fact that the British use an island metaphor 
powerfully – but in a very different way from the way in which it is used here.   
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views in their own way with reference to their own lives and aspirations.  It is, I 
believe, only when these voices have been heard that we can begin to understand 
what development means for Solomon Islanders and for Solomon Islands.  Only 
then will it be possible to formulate a development agenda that makes sense in 
‘island’ terms.   
 
It has been observed that Solomon Islands will be treated here as a political entity 
– an ‘island’ whose development discourse will necessarily be different and 
distinct from that of the ‘continental’.  However, notwithstanding its status as a 
political entity, Solomon Islands is made up, both literally and metaphorically, of 
many different islands. Within Solomon Islands, there are many different social 
and cultural entities, each of which may have a different voice.  Thus, although 
the overall focus of the thesis is Solomon Islands, there is also a more specific 
focus – a single island, the Island of Ulawa. It is primarily the voices of the people 
of Ulawa that will inform this study.   
 
The thesis begins with a description and analysis of the objectives and processes 
of development activity in Solomon Islands in the years between the gaining of 
political independence (July 1978) and the emergence of a national civil crisis 
relating to traumatic ethnic conflict (1998), a national crisis that lasted from 
December 1998 to July 2003. Today, a regional peacekeeping mission (RAMSI) 
led by Australia and New Zealand assisted by other Pacific Islands countries 
(including Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, Cook 
Islands, Kiribati and Nauru) helps maintain law and order in Solomon Islands and, 
thus, contributes to its economic recovery. 
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Although the focus of this study is post-independence development activity, the 
origins of this development activity lie in the activities of the British before 
independence.  For this reason, the effect of British colonial rule on post-
independence national development policy and planning will also be discussed. 
 
The thesis begins with an outline of the methodology of the thesis in (Chapter 2).  
In Chapter 3, coverage of dimensions of development in the international 
literature is undertaken. Chapter 4 provides a description of contemporary 
Solomon Islands society.  This is followed by a description and analysis of the 
process of development at both national (Chapter 5) and rural (Chapter 6) levels.  
The description of development processes at the national level focuses on the 
development plans and policies introduced by the national government.  The 
discussion of rural development focuses on the downward filtering of national 
development plans and policies in geographically scattered and culturally and 
linguistically diverse rural areas.  In order to provide a real sense of the impact (or 
otherwise) of national development policy and planning on rural areas, one such 
area - Ulawa Island – is examined in detail.  Ulawa Island was chosen for a 
number of reasons.  Firstly, it is an island society whose people (of whom I am 
one) share a common language and culture.  Secondly, it is some travelling 
distance away either by boat or by plane from both Honiara, Solomon Islands 
capital, and Kira Kira, the nearest urban centre which is located on the mainland 
of Makira or San Cristobal.  In common with many other rural areas of Solomon 
Islands, Ulawa Island has a communal land ownership tenure system and a 
predominantly semi-subsistence lifestyle.  There are, however, many differences 
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between rural Solomon Islanders living in different parts of the country although 
on the whole, there are aspects of Ulawa Island that are similar to many of the 
rural areas of the Solomons generally.  
1.4  Background to the study 
In order to provide readers with an initial understanding of the context in which 
this study is located, an attempt is made here to provide some insights into 
attitudes towards development activities in Solomon Islands. 
 
Everyone in Solomon Islands – from politicians to subsistence farmers – is 
interested in development. It is a subject that gives rise to heated debates in all 
sorts of formal and informal contexts.  Although there is, inevitably, a wide 
spectrum of opinion, one commonly held view is that one reason why significant 
development efforts have not been matched by significant improvements in living 
conditions is that the country was ill prepared by the British for the 
responsibilities that came with independence.  Sir Baddley Devesi2 (1992) is one 
strong advocate of that view.  He stated quite clearly a few years ago that from the 
point of view of human resources and localisation “Britain did not adequately 
prepare the Solomons for independence” (p. 5).  In fact, he maintained that it was 
only in 1971 (only seven years before independence) that Britain became serious 
about training local officers for senior positions in the public service “by giving 
them crash courses in senior Public Administration at the University of the South 
Pacific and other institutions, to prepare them for independence” (p. 5).  As he 
wryly commented: “Four years later some of those officers became Permanent 
                                                 
2 At independence, Sir Baddley Devesi was the first Governor-General of Solomon Islands.  
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Secretaries and two years later came independence.  These officers immediately 
assumed responsibilities which were a few months earlier performed by older and 
experienced expatriate officers, many of whom had up to forty years of 
administration experience here and elsewhere” (p. 5).3  
 
These sentiments were later reiterated in an article by Mary-Louise O’Callaghan 
which appeared in the New Zealand Herald (7 July, 2003): 
 
It should have been the climax of a history making day. 
 
As British officials and minor royals sweated in their suits, 25 years ago 
today, the crowd at Honiara’s main stadium swelled forward to see their 
new nation’s flag hoisted aloft for the first time. 
 
Seconds earlier the Union Jack had shot down the pole, keeping pace with 
the indecent haste of the British departure from one of their last colonial 
outposts in the South Pacific. 
 
Then, with an awkward pause so laden with portent it was to resonate for a 
quarter of a century, the bright green, blue and yellow flag of the world’s 
newest nation refused to open. 
 
‘It’s true, it didn’t unfurl smoothly’, recalls Sir Baddeley Devesi, who as 
the 36-year-old Governor-General-designate was watching the progress of 
the flag. 
 
                                                 
3 In his autobiography, Lloyd Maepeza Gina (2003), who was the first Speaker of Solomon Islands 
Parliament, shares some of his personal experiences as one of those first few local Solomon 
Islanders to pass through the Solomon’s British civil service and to eventually assume a prominent 
leadership position at independence. 
  
-8- 
‘And if you listen to my speech at Independence Day you will hear the 
uncertainty I harboured too; I was not sure what was going to be’. 
 
‘My doubts were based on a lack of proper preparation by the British 
Administration for economic development after independence’, says Sir 
Baddeley. 
 
Now retired after a distinguished career both as the Governor-General for 
two terms and then as a minister of the Crown he’d represented, Sir 
Baddeley say this lack of preparation is at the heart of his nation’s present 
woes. 
 
Today Solomon Islands might celebrate 25 years of independence but 
tomorrow the country’s parliamentarians will meet to debate and most 
likely endorse a request for outside intervention. 
 
Much attention has been placed on the military component of the planned 
operation, but perhaps the more ambitious element of Australian Prime 
Minister Howard’s Solomons plan is the civilian one designed to 
essentially do what the British never did. 
 
This will involve inserting expatriates directly into the Solomon’s 
moribund administration to try first to re-establish some of its functions 
and financial integrity, but also in the long term to help the islands to 
develop their own capacities to operate a modest but modern state. 
 
The Australian Institute of Strategic Studies estimated this as at least a 10-
year process. 
 
Armed with a British system of justice, a Westminster Parliament, four 
volcanoes and about 70 languages and scattered over a 1600km-long 
archipelago, the Solomons on July 7, 1978 were thrust out into the real 
world. 
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But vast social, economic and political changes were demanded of this 
island country in order to craft itself into a viable nation after just 85 years 
of British colonialism. 
 
But little in the way of guidance, education, resources or capital was 
provided to its 300,000 or so people. 
 
Augustine Manakako was one of just five graduates the British had 
managed to educate at the time of independence. 
 
At 34, the young administrator from the Weathercoast of Guadalcanal was 
already a permanent secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs and saw 
firsthand the capacity of his young nation. 
 
‘Solomon Islands was not prepared for independence’, he says bluntly 
now.  
 
A similar sentiment was expressed by the Governor of the Central Bank of 
Solomon Islands (Rick Houenipwela) in an article in Islands Business (August, 
2004): 
 
[Since] independence there has been expressed dissatisfaction over the 
distribution of government services and economic benefits and matters of 
internal migration. It is probably true that we were unprepared for 
independence. . . .  
 
[With] the onslaught of commercial and personal interests, government 
machinery was ill prepared to handle these pressures. This gave the 
opening for corruption, which has since taken hold of the country.  
 
Houenipwela’s opinions are taken seriously both in Solomon Islands and beyond.  
He was, after all, chosen as ‘Person of the Year’ (2004) by the Islands Business 
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magazine.  His view is that the lack of preparation for independence played a 
critical role in the inability of government machinery to handle the pressures of 
commercial and personal interests that inevitably followed independence when 
national/central government was the only legitimate institution (by virtue of 
legislative authority) tasked with the responsibility of overseeing, through national 
development policy and planning, the process of development in Solomon Islands. 
The inability of the government machinery to properly and effectively fulfil its 
legislative functions had, at the time when Houenipwela wrote, resulted in the 
emergence of “a small group of wealthy and politically powerful elite and a 
growing majority of poor, and still getting poorer, population” (Houenipwela, 
August, 2004). There can be no doubt that corruption played a significant role in 
the social and economic disparity among the people of Solomon Islands.  
However, the potential for corruption is present in all societies.  Only strong 
government, government that has institutionalised means of controlling, 
containing and countering that potential, is likely to succeed in protecting its 
citizens and encouraging productive development. Sir Baddley (1992, pp. 1-2) 
offers us some important insights regarding Britain’s hasty retreat from Solomon 
Islands:  
 
Britain was quietly preparing the Solomons for eventual constitutional 
independence from the 1960s to the early 1970s. It was important for 
Britain to do this because Solomon Islands derived little or no economic 
benefits as a country.  
 
Indeed, Sir Baddley (1992, p. 2) pointed out that the “quicker they gave 
independence to Solomon Islands, the better it would be for Britain”. From a 
Solomon Islands point of view, however, as far as social and economic 
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development was concerned, the “only new and worthwhile project that Britain 
encouraged during this period was the establishment of the Palm Oil Project by 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation. [In fact] there were no other really 
large investments other than the British associated investments which were merely 
giving assistance to what was already well established, such as Levers Brothers”4 
(Devesi, 1992, p. 2). The lack of any genuine sense of responsibility by the British 
in preparing for political independence is evident.    
 
In hindsight, the state of affairs that existed in Solomon Islands at the time of 
independence can be seen as a recipe for disaster. It is, in this context, not 
surprising that Solomon Islands was plunged into a state of ethnic civil conflict in 
December 1998 and that there was further conflict following the 2006 general 
election.  It is in this context, therefore, that development activities in Solomon 
Islands in the quarter of a century following independence must be viewed. 
Solomon Islands is a political entity.  It is, however, linguistically, culturally and 
socially diverse.  Unless the new post-independence government could succeed in 
uniting the people, in creating a sense of nationhood, problems were, as 
Houenipwela (Islands Business, August 2004, p. 34) observes, almost inevitable:  
 
One important reason for the country’s prevailing fragmentation is the 
inability of successive governments to cement Solomon Islands as one 
people and mould the country as a nation.  
 
Governments did not work in a logical manner to provide rural areas, 
where most of the population lives, with schools, hospitals, clinics, a 
functioning transport system and telecommunications.  
                                                 
4 Levers Brothers was more involved in the coconut plantation and cattle industries.  
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Although Houenipwela acknowledges that there may have been some good 
national leaders, he notes that the majority appear to have been corrupt, 
opportunistic or simply inept.  Sound management, good governance and strategic 
leadership – important prerequisites of effective national planning – were absent. 
John Garo, Leader of the Opposition, expressed a similar sentiment in parliament 
(in the context of RAMSI, the Australian-led intervention in Solomon Islands), 
saying: “sad as it may be, we have to accept that this has resulted from the fact 
that over the past 25 years successive leaderships of this country have failed at all 
levels to lead and serve our people” (as cited in Jon Fraenkel, 2004, p. 166).   
 
This is what Bennett (1987, p. xix) had to say about Solomon Islands leaders:  
 
In their interaction with one another, leadership has always been important 
to Solomon Islanders. The relationship of leaders to supporters has 
changed little over the years (barring recent national politics), though the 
means to leadership were transmuted as warfare and certain other practices 
became outlawed. Many old-style leaders lost authority, and were soon 
replaced by younger men who exploited new, government-sanctioned 
ways to power.     
 
Societal dysfunction is an important theme in the discourses of the social sciences 
and of development, particularly those that focus on deficit modelling (Mertens, 
2003, p. 144). Indeed, classical development theories – both modernization and 
dependency theories – are predicated on a deficit model whereby “the rest try to 
imitate and catch up with the West” (Desai & Potter, 2002, p. 2).  However, the 
process of development in Solomon Islands is discussed here not in terms of 
deficit, but in terms of difference (Mertens, 2003).  My intention is not to suggest 
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that indigenous knowledge and non-mainstream development thinking and 
practice are necessarily ‘better’, simply that they are different and that that 
difference (as indicated here with reference to Ulawa Island in the Solomons) is 
significant in the context of `island’ societies such as those in the South Pacific 
region.        
 
In this regard, the thesis takes as its point of departure the work of Potter (2001) 
who has argued that development should be understood as “a multifaceted series 
of processes that impact on people and places in different ways and at different 
times”, an approach that highlights the fact that “development is everywhere and 
is not synonymous with progress, which is normally conceptualised in a more 
positive manner as forward movement and advancement, with strong unilinear 
connotations” (Potter, 2001, p. 3). Also central to this study is the work of Gegeo 
(1994; 1998) who has identified thirty different development concepts in the local 
language of Kwara’ae on the island of Malaita in Solomon Islands, concepts that 
are of fundamental importance in any discussion of development as it impacts on 
the people of Kwara’ae. Similarly, based on a study conducted amongst the 
people of Are Are (also on the island of Malaita in Solomon Islands), Roughan 
(1986) insists that development should be a “transformation of consciousness 
which liberates people from feeling that they are victims of development to 
making them feel they control their own destiny (empowerment of people); 
people taking charge of their own lives, and planning for their own future; internal 
growth within people” (Roughan, 1986, p. 15). For Roughan, because 
development involves the “transformation of . . . consciousness” it is primarily a 
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“spiritual, cultural and political issue and only secondarily an economic question” 
(Roughan, 1986, p. iii) 
 
As an `island’ society, there are unique and peculiar geographical and historical 
events and processes at work that have contributed to making Solomon Islands 
what it is today. A social and historical perspective inevitably emphasises the fact 
that society is constructed and re-constructed, shaped and reshaped over time and 
space. Solomon Islands, like all human societies, is the product of social and 
historical processes, and therefore is itself a social and historical construct. In a 
sense, this broadly defined post-modern paradigm stands in contrast to 
Enlightenment rationalism which seeks to build future and better societies on the 
basis of rational principles. Enlightenment rationalism, as will be argued in 
Chapter 3, has, with its attendant universal pretensions, underpinned mainstream 
development discourses, those discourses which have shaped perceptions of 
imperialism and colonisation. Here, Solomon Islands people and Solomon Islands 
development activities will be conceived in post-modern rather than 
Enlightenment terms – not in terms of a stable society advancing towards an 
‘ideal’, but in terms of a fragmented political grouping that is constantly being 
shaped and reshaped by the pressures of internal and external forces. Of course, 
this way of understanding development is by no means uncontested given the 
debate over the terms ‘post-modern’ and ‘post-development’ and the links 
between them. 
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1.5 Conceptual framework: Of spaces and metaphors    
As already indicated, this study is located within the context of a post-modern 
conceptual and theoretical framework.  This presupposes that the approach taken 
will relate to development conceived in terms of culture (Hooper, 2000; Schech & 
Haggis, 2000; 2002) or of societal difference (Gegeo, 1994; Simon, 1999).  In 
fact, development is conceptualised here not only in economic terms, but in both 
social and cultural terms, in terms of both social and cultural difference. Within 
this context, Solomon Islands is conceptualised as a political entity that 
encompasses significant social and cultural differences.  Both the status of 
Solomon Islands as a distinct political entity (different in many ways from other 
political entities and, in particular, different from those political entities that have 
dominated development discourse epitomised by the metaphor of the `continent’) 
and the reality of internal social and political differences are seen as being 
fundamental to an adequate understanding of development activities in Solomon 
Islands in the years following political independence.  
 
Locating the discussion of development in post-modern terms, in terms of 
difference (rather than deficit), lends itself to an essentially ontological approach, 
that is, to an approach that focuses on describing Solomon Islands people and 
Solomon Islands development processes in their own terms rather than in 
comparative terms.  The focus will be on describing them as they are rather than 
on describing them in terms of, or in relation to, some concept of how they ‘ought 
to be’. Within the context of this essentially ontological perspective, the main 
conceptual framework employed is the notion of space (Elden, 2001) and that of 
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space as metaphor (Hans Blumenberg, as cited in Raman, 2002).  However, time 
is also considered to be relevant.  As Elden (2002, p. 3) observes: 
 
[Although] there has undoubtedly been a heavy bias in favour of history 
and time in the past, to swing too far the other way through a privileging 
of geography and space is no solution. Yet much recent work … does 
precisely that. Instead, we need to think of the two together: we need to 
both historicize space and spatialize history. In other words, rather than 
solely providing an analysis of how the meaning and use of the word 
`space’ has changed over time – a useful analysis to be sure – we need to 
recognize how space, place and location are crucial determining factors in 
any historical study. This is the project of spatial history.  
 
The project of the spatialisation of history has also been described by Elden 
(2000, p. 6) as a “mapping of the present” (p. 6). The concept of space as a major 
unifying element is emphasised in the works of Michel Foucault, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger.  Indeed, Heidegger’s tripartite conceptualisation 
of space is particularly relevant here.  For Heidegger (1967)5, space could be 
conceived in terms of what I shall refer to here as ‘world space’ (a ‘container’ for 
objects), ‘functional space’ (the spaces that are relevant to our everyday actions), 
and ‘self space’ (the way in which each individual ‘centres’ himself or herself, 
judging all other things relative to that centred self).  There is a sense in which 
mainstream development discourse both places others in ‘world space’ and judges 
them relative to its own ‘self space’, denying to them their own ‘functional space’ 
                                                 
5 In view of his political persuasions, it may seem paradoxical to make use of the ideas of 
Heidegger in a work of this nature.  However, I do not believe that Heidegger’s personal or 
political views are relevant. Also, I would like to acknowledge Associate Professor Winifred 
Crombie’s assistance in helping clarify Heidegger’s tripartite conception of space.  For that, see 
also, Yoko Arisaka, 1995, ‘On Heidegger’s theory of space: A critique of Dreyfus’, Inquiry 38(4), 
455-467.    
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and their own centred ‘self-space’.  My aim is to emphasise the fact that Solomon 
Islanders inevitably view development activities in terms of their own ‘functional 
spaces’ and their own ‘self spaces’.  What is relevant and important for Solomon 
Islands (as a political entity) in terms of development activities will not 
necessarily be what is relevant and important for other political entities.  What is 
relevant and important for some Solomon Islanders (as individuals) in terms of 
development activity will not necessarily be relevant and important for other 
Solomon Islanders.  
 
Injecting an awareness of ‘space’ into historical study is the point of purchase of 
this thesis as a description of the nature of contemporary Solomon Islands society 
and the process of development in Solomon Islands.  Both of the variables to 
which reference has been made (space and time) are considered against the 
backdrop of the social and the historical, including the colonial and the 
geographical context of Solomon Islands.  Thus, an essentially post-structuralist 
paradigm is reinforced by a more structuralist one, by a consideration of those 
social and historical factors that have contributed towards the shaping of Solomon 
Islands.  In this context, it is important to note that although Solomon Islands is 
treated as a political entity in its own right and although Solomon Islanders are 
treated as being culturally and socially diverse, it does not follow that the study 
will be irrelevant so far as other Pacific Islands and Pacific Islands peoples are 
concerned.  In fact, there will inevitably be points of contact with other peoples 
and other political entities.   In this regard, and in a wider context, when reviewing 
Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Chatterjee, 1986) and Traditions, 
Tyranny and Utopias (Nandy, 1987), Dossa (1992, p. 561) notes that, as 
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Chatterjee asserts, “collusion between Western Reason and Western Capital is 
unmistakeable in the domination of the Third World”, especially “the far-reaching 
sway of the European epistemic framework on intellectual life and social 
practice”. 
 
This thesis does not attempt to extricate Solomon Islands and Ulawa ways of 
thinking about development wholly from the European epistemic framework 
which underpins mainstream development discourse. Nevertheless, the process of 
stating and articulating Solomon Islands and Ulawa understanding of 
development implies resistance, a challenge to the mainstream and dominant 
forms of development discourse.  So to help augment the study, the other 
conceptual device employed in the thesis, a device that is consistent with the 
overall post-structuralist emphasis, is metaphor, a device that Raman (2002) has 
both used and justified as being a relevant tool of intellectual analysis.  The island 
metaphor that is fundamental to the discussion here is intended to both extend 
conceptual understanding and to relate concepts back to the historical processes 
underlying their formation.  As Raman (2002, p. 11) observes, a robust 
application of metaphor enables the researcher to critique, unmask, demystify and 
de-legitimize intellectually dominant discourses and paradigms and their attendant 
underlying philosophies and ideologies.  The theorisation of Solomon Islands 
development and society through the concept of `space’ and the metaphor of 
Island – island-space conceptualisation – is intended to signal a move away from 
a deficit model and an attempt to complement Hau’ofa’s (1993a; 1993b; 2000) 
now famous, thesis:  Oceania: Our Sea of Islands.  
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Underlying the island-space conceptualisation as applied here to Solomon Islands 
is the belief that there are realities that are common to other Pacific Islands 
countries’ contexts and experiences, especially the nearby Melanesian countries of 
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.  In the wider Pacific Islands context, however, 
whether there are `Islands in the far Seas’ or a `Sea of Islands’ – the Epeli Hau’ofa 
thesis – does not alter one fundamental reality: that is, what we have in the Pacific 
Islands region are essentially `islands’ as opposed to `continents’.  This stated 
contrast and juxtaposition between `island’ and `continent’ is fundamentally 
important when explaining social and historical processes as these occur against 
an empirical or geographical backdrop.  As Said (in Katz & Smith, 2003, p. 642) 
has emphasised: “geography is the expression of history”, or “history [is] 
expressed through geography”.   
 
The island–space concept that underlies this thesis is intended to act as a bridge 
between two important themes of the research - development in both Solomon 
Islands and Ulawa on the one hand and state reform in Solomon Islands on the 
other.  
1.6 Reaffirming Solomon Islanders’ views and voices  
The perspective in this thesis is that of an indigenous Solomon Islander. As such, 
it is, I believe, my responsibility to be part of that movement which aims to 
reconstruct and reaffirm the indigenous mind.  As Dossa (1992, p. 562), 
discussing the research of Nandy (1987), observes: 
 
Western development agendas are programmed to liquidate Third World 
cultures and values, [and] in the interest of sheer survival, [3rd World 
  
-20- 
countries have to] set limits to cultural and political globalism: [i.e., they 
need] the necessary distance to reinvent [their own] politics and life, and 
no less importantly, to reconstruct an . . .  independent mind.  
   
For Third World citizens, even though not all of the modern West is 
execrable, it is absolutely vital to break the chain of intellectual and 
psychological dependence on the visions and solutions of their colonial 
overlords, to reject the patterns of mastery that `distort the cultures and 
minds, especially the values and self-concepts, of the sufferers’.  
     
In “structuring their utopian vistas”, Third World intellectuals are “compelled to 
present their culture as their point of departure” (Dossa, 1992, p.562). This 
reference to culture as a critical point of departure in social thought is an 
important theme in contemporary post-modern development discourse.  Even so, 
for a country as culturally diverse as Solomon Islands, the problem involves not 
so much “presenting their culture” as presenting the cultures.  It is for this reason 
that one particular viewpoint – that of the inhabitants of Ulawa Island – is focused 
on in Chapter 6 as a case study.   It is not assumed that the views and experiences 
of the people of Ulawa Island will necessarily reflect those of other Solomon 
Islanders.  Rather, the assumption is that their views and experiences will provide 
some indication of the complexity of the context in which development activities 
take place in Solomon Islands.  Within the overall context of the island metaphor 
(applied to Solomon Islands as a whole), the study of Ulawa Island and Ulawa 
Islanders is both literally and metaphorically that of ‘an island within an island’. 
The voices of Ulawa Islanders are unique in one sense; in another sense, they are 
representative of the voices of other islanders – of other Solomon Islanders and of 
other indigenous peoples, more so, other Pacific Islanders because they too live on 
`islands’ rather than `continents’.    
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1.7 Approach and method  
The overall approach adopted in this thesis is largely qualitative rather than 
quantitative.  Furthermore, because the thesis deals with development and with 
Solomon Islands society as a dimension of human diversity and experience, the 
methodology employed is broadly interpretive, or, more specifically, it is located 
within the constructivist-interpretive paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 33):  
 
The constructivist paradigm assumes a relativist ontology (there are 
multiple realities), a subjectivist epistemology (knower and respondent 
concrete understanding), and a naturalistic (in the natural world) set of 
methodological procedures.  
 
The thesis itself is also a case study of development activities and their effects in 
one place (Solomon Islands) at one time (the period since independence), within 
which there is another case study, that of Ulawa Islanders. However, as Punch 
(1998, p. 150) observes, a case study “is more a strategy than a method”.  Just as 
there are “different types of cases”, so are there also “different types of case 
study” (p. 152).  The case study presented here is essentially instrumental in 
nature (Punch, 1998) in that in both cases, Solomon Islands generally and Ulawa 
in particular, what is attempted is to illustrate the same thing, the nature and 
process of development over a period of roughly quarter of a century. 
 
Methodology will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 but it is important to 
note here that Solomon Islands cultures and traditions are by nature oral:  
Solomon Islanders pass on information and knowledge through oral and non-
formal means, by way of narratives and stories, and through conversation and 
personal contact.  They do not readily pass on such information and knowledge to 
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strangers.  Furthermore, in some places, such as in Ulawa Island, people make a 
clear distinction, in passing on important and critical knowledge, between what 
they know and what they have been told or have heard.  Given the essentially oral 
nature of Solomon Islands culture, it was considered inappropriate to conduct 
formal interviews.  Indeed from the cultural point of view, getting people to 
participate in formal interviews would raise other issues such as compensating 
them for their time and the `knowledge’ they would be sharing with you.  
Understandably, there would be those who would be less than forthcoming to help 
you in your research.  There could be any number of reasons for this kind of 
reservation.  One, people may be jealous of what you are doing and feel they do 
not want you to be more successful than themselves.  Two, in Ulawa Island and 
Solomon Islands generally, reciprocity is an important part of life. This practice is 
intrinsically related to the island-space concept-metaphor explained earlier, in that 
the person you formally interview expects, in turn, some kind of gift or favour 
from you in recognition of their help.  This is where members of the extended 
family and close friends come into play.  With those you are closely related to and 
considered to be a friend - there is an implicit understanding that your success is 
also their success.  So this contextual reality had major implications for the 
methodology employed in the thesis.  Therefore, apart from information gained 
from written sources, the data were collected in semi-structured interviews with 
people with whom I had personal contact.  These interviews were conducted in 
informal settings and the emphasis was on personal/ individual experiences.  
1.8 Significance of the thesis  
Development continues to occupy the minds and imaginations of numerous 
Solomon Islanders and state reform has, in the post-ethnic conflict era of Solomon 
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Islands society, also emerged as the next most important concern aside from law 
and order, and the economy.  In fact as far as state reform6 is concerned, the 
Kemakeza government (December 2001 – March 2006) had hoped to introduce in 
parliament the state reform bill in 2005 but have had to defer it till after a new 
government was elected in the next general election which was held on 5 April 
2006. It is expected that the next government will take the matter further7.  In the 
meantime, the national government continues to extend to all Solomon Islanders 
an invitation to contribute to the ongoing discussions about state reform in 
Solomon Islands.  However, already there are calls by different provincial 
government leaders for the national government to speed up the process of state 
reform.  It is perhaps instructive to point out that in Solomon Islands the issue of 
state reform is not merely about good governance (Peter Larmour, 1996a; 1996b; 
1997; 1998; Futa Helu, 1997; Stephanie Lawson, 1997), nor is it a recent issue.  
As Mamaloni8 (1992, p. 17) points out:  
 
It would not be quite true to say that in Solomon Islands, only the elites 
were questioning the performance and presence of the British 
Administration. During the two Constitutional Reviews in the 1970s the 
majority of Solomon Islanders explicitly stated many disagreements with 
the Colonial government. They advocated a Home Rule System or system 
                                                 
6 The Kemakeza government had a `Public Awareness On the Draft Federal Constitution of 
Solomon Islands’ document posted on the internet (See 
http://www.peoplefirst.net.sb/Downloads/DraftConstitutionAwareness.pdf).  
7 The Grand Coalition government of Solomon Islands under Manasseh Sogavare has indicated 
that adopting a new federal constitution for the Solomon Islands remains one of its top priorities. 
(See Government Communication Unit, 25 May, 2006, `Grand Coalition Pursues Adopting New 
Constitution’. In http://www.commerce.govt.sb/COMUNIT/PR25thMay2006.htm).    
8 Before independence, Solomon Mamaloni was Solomon Islands first Chief Minister. After 
independence, he was the nation’s second Prime Minister.  
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of government that would not only recognise but entrench the systems of 
traditional laws and authorities. There was strong emphasis to involve 
traditional chiefs in the decision-making levels of the government.  
 
Mamaloni (1992, p. 17) also observed that the “same views were repeated over 
and over again and are now recorded in the Reports of the PGC (Provincial 
Government Review Committee) and the CRC (Constitutional Review 
Committee) of 1986/1987”. Despite the overwhelming support for decentralised 
government by Solomon Islanders, “our Constitutional authors for reasons 
unknown, always omitted these fundamental principles of our communities and 
indigenous people” (p. 17).  
 
In what would later become an unexpected reality9, Mamaloni (1992, p. 17) also 
made the following remarks:  
 
There has been an unanimous feeling amongst our people that the system 
of government in the Solomons is unsuitable in terms of general 
development programming and the recognition of traditional rights and 
customs. The delay in providing reforms wanted by our people has caused 
increased frustrations, so much so that during the 1970s, the Western 
Province campaigned to become a sovereign country of its own – 
secession. Such feelings persisted after independence and today the 
popular cry from our people is for a federal form of government.                 
 
                                                 
9 This became what is generally referred to as the ethnic conflict in Solomon Islands. In the latter 
part of 1998 a clandestine militia group emerged.  Consisting mainly of young men in organized 
bands, and calling themselves the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA), they began harassing 
settlers from other islands in rural northern Guadalcanal, both to the east and west of Honiara. A 
lot of these rural settlers were people from the island of Malaita. See Jon Fraenkel (2004) for a 
detailed coverage of the ethnic conflict between Guadalcanal and Malaita militia groups.      
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This thesis is therefore of particular significance to Solomon Islanders - both those 
who are directly involved in development and state reform processes, and those 
who are not. However, it is also relevant to other ‘island’ communities whose 
people are involved in development activities, and to those who are concerned 
that the theories and practices associated with mainstream development discourse 
have had so little positive impact in so many areas of the world. There are four 
main areas where I believe the thesis makes a contribution to existing knowledge 
and understanding:  
 
• Development initiatives have failed to enhance the standard or quality of 
life of people in many areas of the world. There is increasing recognition 
that this may be, in part at least, attributable to the fact that these initiatives 
have failed to take proper account of local circumstances, including the 
experiences and understandings of development that are associated with 
peoples, cultures and contemporary contexts that are very different from 
those of `development experts’ (see for example, Mawdsley & Rigg, 
2002). In considering development activities in the context of local 
circumstances in a particular area (Solomon Islands) over a specific time 
period (the years since the gaining of independence) and with reference to 
the experiences and understandings of the local people, this thesis aims to 
play a role in clarifying the issues involved and, therefore, in preparing the 
way for the creation of a better, more productive approach to development 
in the future.    
 
• Dependency and under-development theories may be intellectually 
satisfying as an academic activity.  However, in focusing on the social and 
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economic `condition’ of indigenous people rather than their social and 
cultural `nature’ in a contemporary context, they do nothing to improve 
their lot.  Nor do they have any real explanatory power in relation to the 
`dependency mentality’ that is said to beset many rural Pacific Islanders.  
In addressing issues relating to the process of development in a specific 
contemporary societal context, this thesis has the potential to assist in 
revealing and explaining the reasons why dependency theory, so 
persuasive at a surface level, provides so little genuine insight into the 
factors that have inhibited modern social and economic development in 
communities such as that of Solomon Islands. 
 
• Sir Nathaniel Waena, Governor-General of Solomon Islands, called for 
‘homegrown’ solutions to the problems of Solomon Islands when he was 
Minister of Provincial Government.  Thus far, only a handful of 
indigenous Solomon Islanders have a doctorate in the area of the social 
sciences. Indeed, the first indigenous Solomon Islander to have been 
awarded a doctorate in the social sciences was David Gegeo (1994, p, 
xxiii)  who had this to say:  
 
I hope the [PhD] dissertation will serve as a model for aspiring 
Solomon students, that we Solomon Islanders can and should 
speak for ourselves rather than always being spoken of and for 
by others. It is we who must take the leadership in finding 
solutions to our own national problems and shaping the 
direction in which Solomon Islands is to develop.  
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• Research in the area of development is often conducted by those who have 
little personal knowledge or direct experience of the lives of those who 
have, as yet, received little benefit from development activities.  Although 
this thesis has been conducted in an academic context, it has, nevertheless, 
been conducted by a Solomon Islander with direct reference to the lives 
and views of other Solomon Islanders.  It represents, therefore, an 
‘insider’s view’ and is an attempt to make a personal contribution to the 
post-ethnic conflict phase of Solomon Islands society, a phase in which the 
rebuilding process that may lead to a better future for Solomon Islanders is 
already under way. In some respects, this same hope and aspiration was 
expressed by Ken Cole (2005, p. 334) when he observed that the “activity 
of professional intellectuals should be to facilitate creative thought by 
disadvantaged people, who, in fighting for the right to participate in the 
organization of their lives, create their social future.”    
 
• National development policy and planning in Solomon Islands has been, 
and continues to be, highly centralised. In questioning the value of such 
centralisation at a time when Solomon Islands is in a critical phase as it 
moves from a provincial to a state system, it is hoped that this thesis may 
effect a change of direction that will lead to positive outcomes in the area 
of development. 
1.9 Outline of the thesis  
In addition to this introductory chapter, there are a further six chapters as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the approach and methodology; 
  
-28- 
 
Chapter 3 provides a critical review of selected development literature, focusing 
on the value-laden nature of mainstream development literature; 
 
Chapter 4 provides a description of contemporary Solomon Islands society, 
making reference to the island-space concept/metaphor and using two other 
metaphors – that of the betel nut and that of the ‘wantok’ – to help clarify the 
description.  
 
Chapter 5 describes the process of development in Solomon Islands, focusing in 
particular on the development policies and action plans of national governments 
from 1978 to 1998 and on the impact (or otherwise) of these policies and action 
plans.  
 
Chapter 6 describes the process of development in Solomon Islands at the rural 
area level, with a particular focus on Ulawa Island. In addition, state reform is 
discussed in terms of its major implications for national development policy and 
planning in relation to Solomon Islands society.  In particular, the discussion of 
state reform centres on the changing nature of the role of the nation-state and its 
impact on the nature of contemporary Solomon Islands society and on the process 
of development in Solomon Islands.  
 
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, argues that although Solomon Islanders, 
particularly those who have occupied positions of power and authority, must 
accept some responsibility for the overall failure of development activities, it must 
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also be recognised that they, in common with Solomon Islanders generally, have 
been victims of imposed ways of thinking about, and engaging in, development 
activities that are simply not appropriate in the context in which they operate.  
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Chapter 2 
An outline of the research methodology  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Human beings undertake research primarily to help them to reach a better 
understanding of existing problems and, through the knowledge and 
understanding gained, overcome, or partially overcome, these problems.  The 
research problem here is that of explaining the process of development in 
Solomon Islands over the past quarter of a century. In order to better understand 
the problem of development in Solomon Islands, it is important also to understand 
the nature of Solomon Islands society itself.  In order to understand Solomon 
Islands society and the process of development in Solomon Islands over the 
period in question, it is also important to understand the overall process of state 
reform during that period.  Thus, Solomon Islands society, state reform and the 
process of development in Solomon Islands are all the subjects of investigation 
here.  In each case, it has been necessary to select appropriate research methods 
and to locate an appropriate ‘voice’ or perspective. 
2.2 Locating ‘space’ in qualitative research 
As Punch (1998) notes, it is the research topic and research question that 
determine the research approach. The decision to undertake qualitative research 
here related directly to the nature of the research (see Chapter 1) which required 
taking a “naturalistic approach to the world . . . [and studying] things in their 
natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, pp. 4 – 5).  
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Attempting to understand problems relating to development in the context of 
Solomon Islands necessarily involves paying careful attention to internal issues - 
issues relating to the nature of contemporary Solomon Islands society and issues 
relating to state reform.  External issues – issues relating to the external processes 
that impinge upon Solomon Islands – are focused on only where they are 
considered to be of direct relevance.  Thus, for example, in Chapter 3 the impact 
of global development discourse on development activities in Solomon Islands is 
discussed in the context of a critical review of the international development 
literature.  
 
Qualitative research is a situated activity, the observer/researcher being located in 
relation to the research data (rather than, for example, in a laboratory).  S/he is 
involved in the collection, presentation and representation of that data (data 
concerning social reality) using, for example, field notes, interviews, 
conversations, photographs and memos.  In this particular case, I have also used 
much of my own knowledge, including recollections and interpretations of things 
that I have either seen, heard and/or experienced.10  Because the overall aim of 
                                                 
10 Although I left home at an early age to attend formal education, I have never missed the 
opportunity to return to either Solomon Islands whenever I was overseas or to Ulawa when I was 
at secondary school on Guadalcanal.  The significance of personal experience was expressed one 
day by my uncle (my father’s only brother – the elder of the two – who shares with me the family 
name, Rohorua) when both he and my father were still alive. Once when I had returned home to 
Ulawa for Christmas holidays – I was at the University of the South Pacific then doing 
undergraduate studies – he expressed his delight and thankfulness that we (that is, his own sons 
and his nephews) were able to journey together with them (my father and uncle) for some 
considerable period of time.  He and my father had been raised by relatives (living both literally 
and metaphorically on crumbs)  having lost both their parents at quite early ages, only my uncle 
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qualitative research is to understand more about the ways in which people go 
about their daily lives, I believe that it is important to clarify my own position – to 
outline my own personal and contextual space – in relation to the research, 
something that is also relevant in a context where conducting formal interviews 
(in the case of Ulawa Island) would present considerable difficulties.  
 
As noted already, this research project involves Solomon Islands and is, therefore, 
of direct relevance to me as a Solomon Islander.  However, Taylor and Bogdan 
(1998) have claimed that it is not advisable for researchers to conduct research on 
subjects familiar to them in that this has the potential to compromise the rigour of 
the exercise.  Although I accept that there is a need for caution, I also believe it is 
important that researchers do involve themselves in matters of direct relevance to 
their own lives, thus providing insights and information to which an ‘outsider’ 
might lack access.  This particular point is especially important in the context of 
the transfer of knowledge in an oral cultural context (see Chapter 1).  In the case 
of Ulawa, knowledge which is being passed on orally is generally of two kinds: 
information that can be personally verified, and information that has been passed 
on by someone else.  The information about Ulawa Island that is discussed in 
Chapter 6 is of both kinds.           
                                                                                                                                     
having been old enough at the time to remember what his parents looked like. So my uncle, as the 
senior family member, always cherished the idea that we (the children), unlike the two of them, 
would not have to fend for ourselves as we grew up and journeyed with them through life. For us, 
both immediate and extended family represented an important resource, something that my uncle 
recognised as being potentially of very real significance. 
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2.3  Research principle 
As Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2001, p. 1) observe, “fitness for purpose” must 
be the guiding principle in research.  Thus, “ontological assumptions give rise to 
epistemological assumptions” which “give rise to methodological considerations” 
and these, in turn, “give rise to issues of instrumentation and data collection” 
(p.3).  In this case, the ontological consideration that acts as a driver for the 
research is my identity as a Solomon Islander working within a university context.  
Accommodating these two aspects of my identity (Solomon Islander and 
university-based researcher) inevitably leads to a questioning of certain 
perspectives and paradigms.  In fact, as Rist (1997, p. 247) notes: 
 
[Even] authors least inclined to question the Western premises of 
‘development’ are forced to admit that ‘the theorization of post-
development is probably the essential task today’.  Thus, in parallel to the 
proliferation of dissident experiences in the South, there is clearly an area 
of theory in which research needs to be organized.  But agreement is more 
difficult to reach when it comes to defining the framework for such 
research.  For either it is considered . . . that the seriousness of one’s 
conclusions must be guaranteed by the concepts and models of ‘normal 
science’, in which case there is a risk of not discovering anything new; or 
else one starts by attaching greater importance to history and 
anthropology, for example, and exposes oneself to the accusation of 
scientific light-mindedness.  
 
In attaching greater importance to history and anthropology than has sometimes 
been the case, researchers do not leave themselves open to charges of ‘scientific 
light-mindedness’.  In fact, as I hope is the case here, the redirection of focus can 
lead to new and significant insights.  Hence the relevance of the research principle 
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based upon my own identity as a Solomon Islander and university-based 
researcher. 
2.4  A constructivist-interpretive paradigm 
As Denzin and Lincoln (2003, p. 33) note, there is a sense in which all research is 
interpretive: 
 
All research is interpretive; it is guided by a set of beliefs and feelings 
about the world and how it should be understood and studied.  Some 
beliefs may be taken for granted, invisible, only assumed, whereas others 
are highly problematic and controversial.  Each interpretive paradigm 
makes particular demands on the researcher, including the questions he or 
she asks and the interpretations the researcher brings to them.  
 
The research reported here not only involves an interpretive paradigm but also, 
and more particularly, a constructivist interpretive paradigm, that, as noted earlier, 
“assumes a relativist ontology (there are multiple realities), a subjectivist 
epistemology (knower and respondent co create understanding), and a naturalistic 
(in the natural world) set of methodological procedures”, one in which terms such 
as “credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability replace the usual 
positivist criteria of internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 35). 
 
Replacing naturalistic interpretation is interpretation in terms of “inter-subjective 
meanings as constituted in culture, language, symbols, and so forth” (Schwandt, 
1993, p. 266).  Within the constructivist family of approaches, “at least three 
strands are evident – the ethnographic, the ontological, and the moral-political” (p. 
264). In this case, it is the ontological that is uppermost.  I see my role as being 
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primarily that of interpreter rather than legislator notwithstanding the fact that I do 
make recommendations and suggestions based upon my observations, particularly 
in Chapter 6 when issues of state reform in relation to national development 
policy and planning are discussed.    
 
I have, therefore, described my approach to this research project as interpretive, 
constructivist and ontological following Schwandt (1990, pp. 264 & 266-7). In 
using the term ‘ontological’, I take my cue also from Gadamar (1967, see 
especially the second part, pp. 151-341) who argues that interpretation and 
understanding are not, in fact, methodological problems but ontological ones (see 
also Richard Bernstein, 1983 (p. 34)). Following Bernstein (1983, p. 35), 
Schwandt notes, in the ontological context, hermeneutics is not “an intellectual 
stepsister to the methods of the social sciences” (Schwandt, 1990, p. 264). Rather, 
it is, in Heidegger’s terms (1967, pp. 78-90) a way of “being-in-the-world”.  The 
ontological strand of the constructivist family-of approaches, “appears to find 
greater affinity [than does the ethnographic strand] with the humanities than with 
the social sciences”, something that “reflects the German tradition of viewing the 
social disciplines as forms of moral sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) sharing 
characteristics with the humanistic disciplines” (Schwandt, 1990, pp. 264-7) (see 
also Richard Bernstein, 1983 (p. 35)).  
 
In this thesis, the moral underpinnings of the ontological strand are not explicitly 
discussed.  On the whole, the ontological interpretive methodology of the thesis is 
closely related to the conceptual framework, which is outlined and discussed 
further, below.  
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2.5  An emergent conceptual framework  
The conceptual framework within which this thesis is articulated, one in which 
metaphor plays a significant role, emerged over time as the research progressed 
and is, in this sense, a direct response to issues that emerged during fieldwork.  
The descriptive component aims at “making complicated things understandable” 
(Punch, 1998, p. 15) and is generally preferred to explanation in that the latter 
may involve over-simplification.  In effect, the descriptive approach which 
characterises the thesis is predicated on a ‘spatial turn’ in social theory and a 
‘cultural turn’ in development studies.  Above all, the primarily descriptive 
approach adopted here is intended to accommodate perspectives of Solomon 
Islanders located within their own cultural space.  Thus, if development can be 
defined as “the organized intervention in collective affairs according to a standard 
of improvement” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001, p. 3), then what constitutes 
improvement and what is appropriate intervention obviously vary according to 
class, culture, historical context and relations of power.  Hence, for Nederveen 
Pieterse (2001, p.3) also, “Development theory is [THUS] the negotiation of these 
issues”.11  
 
                                                 
11 Nederveen Pieterse (2001, p. 3) argues that: “The strength and the weakness of development 
thinking is its policy-oriented character.  This is part of its vitality and inventiveness.  It is problem 
driven rather than theory-driven.  It is worldly, grounded, streetwise, driven by field knowledge, 
not just book knowledge.  In part for the same reasons, development thinking ranks fairly low on 
the totem pole of social science. As applied social science, development thinking has a derivative 
status.  It has more often been a follower of frameworks developed in other sciences than a 
trendsetter.  It has been a net importer of social science theories and has been influenced by other 
social sciences more than it has influenced then”.  
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Nederveen Pieterse (2001, p. 3) has listed some of the social science paradigms 
imported by development theorists at different times.  These include evolutionism, 
Marxism, neomarxism, Keynesianism, structural functionalism, neoclassical 
economics and poststructuralism.  At the same time, he notes that there is at least 
one theory – dependency theory – which was developed within the discourse of 
development itself and which has had a global impact, inspiring, in fact, another 
theoretical development, world-system theory.  Thus, it is within the context of 
launching a challenge to a theory developed within development discourse, that is, 
dependency theory, that I have located this discourse, a discourse in which 
metaphor plays a significant role. 
2.6  Space and other metaphors  
2.6.1  Space  
Social reality is complex and is now sometimes conceptualised in spatial terms.  
Thus, for example, Crang and Thrift (2000, p. 1) note: “Space is everywhere in 
modern thought. It is the flesh that flatters the bones of theory.”  Space as a tool of 
academic enquiry “is . . . a representational strategy” (p. ).  It offers a type of 
flexibility that is entirely appropriate within a postmodern context (see, for 
example, Nederveen Pieterse (2001)). 
2.6.2  Other metaphors 
Along with space, there are three major metaphors used in this thesis: ‘island’, 
‘betel nut’, and ‘wantok’. 
 
The Solomons is a series of islands within a single political domain.  From a 
conceptual perspective, however, Solomon Islands is treated, metaphorically, as a 
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single island, that is, as an ‘area’ or ‘space’ separated from the ‘mainland’ or 
`continent’ of development theory and practice, an island space that will yield 
answers to its own questions in its own terms. 
 
Supporting the ‘island’ metaphor are those of the ‘betel nut’ and the ‘wantok’.  
The ‘betel nut’ metaphor is intended to help explain the sociology of Solomon 
Islands society, while the ‘wantok’ metaphor is intended to help explain the 
characteristics of the modern Solomon Islander.12
 
It is argued here (see Chapter 3) that if development is essentially a product of 
European modernity, then Solomon Islands development is essentially a product 
of Solomon Islands modernity.  In Chapter 4, the focus is on contemporary 
Solomon Islands society.  In Chapters 5 and 6, it is on the process of development 
itself.  Taken together, Chapters 4 – 6 provide both descriptive and explanatory 
approaches to the nature of Solomon Islands society in the context of Solomon 
Islands modernity. 
 
As Solomon Islands enters the twenty first century, the descriptions of Solomon 
Islands society and development offered here provide contextually-rooted 
conceptual and empirical data relevant to the articulation of a model of state 
reform in Solomon Islands that is developed further in Chapter 6.  However, 
within the context of the largely descriptive case study approach adopted in 
                                                 
12 Whether or not there also exists a postmodern Solomon Islands society and postmodern 
Solomon Islanders is an issue that is not addressed directly in this thesis. 
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Chapters 4 – 6, the metaphor, particularly the space-based metaphor, plays a 
significant role. 
2.7  An instrumental case study 
Initially, the intention was to carry out a critical ethnographic case study of 
development in Ulawa Island. Hence, the initial focus of the thesis was on the 
exploration and articulation of an indigenous concept of development within that 
context.  That intended research orientation was inspired by the work of Gegeo 
(1994; 1998) who conducted research on development in Kwara’ae in Malaita (his 
place of origin), identifying at least thirty words that express aspects of Kwara’ae 
understanding of development. 
 
The initial plans in relation to the conduct of an ethnographic study proved 
impossible to realise.  This became clear during the first of two planned research 
field trips to Solomon Islands in November and December 2002 (see Appendix A). 
The initial intention was to visit Honiara on the first of two field trips and Ulawa 
Island on the second.  The difficulties encountered on the first field trip meant that 
the second was not attempted.  Even so, the first field trip was useful to the extent 
that it demonstrated some of the dynamics of contemporary Solomon Islands 
society, dynamics that are also reflected in the country’s development processes 
and experiences.  The impact on research of this sort of contextual dynamic has 
been discussed by May (2001, p. 37) who observes that “the very objects that the 
social sciences are concerned with analysing are so often themselves the subjects 
of power struggles over who may control the rules, relations and resources that 
constitute them in the first instance”. 
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The social phenomena examined by researchers have already been given meaning 
by participants, participants who may themselves make use of the results of social 
science-based research in a number of ways. Thus, there will always be cross-
fertilisation between everyday language and everyday understandings on the one 
hand, and research-based language and understandings on the other.  May (2001, 
pp. 37 – 38) notes that: 
 
[The] results and practices of social research also feed back into social life; 
people engage in the interpretation of its findings and are co-participants 
in its process. . . .  Given this ‘feedback’ of research into social life, 
researchers have to make a connection between language which is used in 
social theory and the methods of interpretation which people already use 
in attributing meaning to their social environment.  Social theory, in other 
words, must take account of people’s everyday understandings.  Anthony 
Giddens (1984) refers to this process as the ‘double hermeneutic’.  He 
even suggests that it would not be unusual to find a coroner who has read 
Durkheim’s (1952) classic study on suicide (Giddens 1990: 42).  This 
acknowledges that there is a constant slippage between the language which 
we use as researchers to understand and explain social life and the 
meanings which people already employ to get on with the business of 
everyday life.  
 
Thus, research of the type in focus here must take account of people’s everyday 
understanding. Hence, the decision to take a constructivist-interpretive approach 
and to make use of a conceptual framework that relates to the everyday 
experiences of the research subjects, an approach and framework that remained 
relevant even when it became apparent that an extensive ethnographic study of 
Ulawa Island would not be possible and would, therefore, need to be replaced by a 
largely descriptive account of development in Solomon Islands accompanied by a 
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more modest case study of Ulawa Island, an instrumental case study designed to 
provide an illustration of rural development (see Chapter 6).  In the event, this 
thesis therefore employs the research strategy of an instrumental case study 
(Punch, 1998; Stake, 1995) which is in keeping with the research field experience 
as well as in concert with the qualitative approach and the constructivist-
interpretive paradigm. 
2.8  Some practical issues and implications  
As indicated earlier, a primary aim of this study is to integrate discussion of 
development concepts in a particular area of the Solomon Islands (Ulawa Island) 
with discussion of the process of state reform in the Solomon Islands generally. In 
relation to both of these areas of investigation, a number of fieldwork trips to the 
Solomon Islands were incorporated into the original planning.  However, political 
and social unrest during my initial fieldwork trip made the collection of data 
extremely difficult. It was therefore decided not to attempt further fieldwork trips 
but to redesign the thesis, combining the data I had been able to collect with the 
discussion of documentation that was already available such as, for example, 
development planning documents. In this way, aspects of the political and social 
structure of the Solomon Islands and their impact on development planning could 
be re-examined in the context of a combination of empirical data (from interviews 
with Solomon Islanders and the stories told by interviewees) and historical data 
and through the lens of a range of contextually appropriate metaphors such as, for 
example, the betel nut metaphor which captures the essentially tri-partite structure 
of Solomon Islands society (kastom, church and state), a tri-partite structure 
which, it is argued, is fundamental to development planning in particular and state 
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reform more generally. In this context, the overall aims of the research project can 
be restated as follows: 
 
(1) To investigate the rationale behind national development thinking and 
planning in Solomon Islands since political independence in 1978, 
attending in particular to the extent to which issues of legitimacy are 
informed by an approach underpinned by Western notions of social reality 
inherited from the British. 
 
(2) To demonstrate, through a case study of Ulawa Island, some of the ways 
in which current national development policy and planning fail to take 
adequate account of the views about development of the indigenous 
peoples, rural Solomon Islanders in particular, and effectively impose on 
them a national, government-led approach to change and development 
which is neither necessary nor necessarily beneficial.  
 
(3) To consider the implications of (1) and (2) above for rural dwelling 
Solomon Islanders and other indigenous peoples.  
 
In order to facilitate the investigation so far as participants are concerned, I set out 
a checklist of questions about which I had hoped to get some information. That 
checklist is included here: 
 
• What does the term ‘development’ mean on a personal level? 
• Do participants consider themselves to be ‘developed’? 
 
-43- 
• What do participants believe affects their thinking about development?  
• Do participants believe that development is a good thing or bad thing?  
• What state of development do participants believe their community is 
in at the moment? 
• Do participants believe that they and their communities could develop 
further and, if so, how? 
• What do participants believe about the role that government plays in 
development? 
• Do participants believe that government has been successful so far in 
its development efforts are concerned, why do they have the beliefs 
they do on this subject and what, in particular, do they relate these 
beliefs to?   
• What role do participants believe churches currently play in 
development, how successful do they believe that role to be and do 
they believe that churches could they play a more central role? 
• Why do participants have the beliefs they do about the role played in 
development by churches and what do these beliefs relate to in 
particular? 
 
Because of the difficulties associated with the fieldwork trip, the information 
collected on each of these issues is less substantial than I had hoped it would be. 
An overview of the participants involved and a summary of their areas of 
contribution are outlined below.  
 
 
-44- 
During my visit to the Solomon Islands, I lived with my younger brother, Meffrey 
Awao Poenjili, and his family in our family home in Honiara. I therefore had time 
and opportunity to discuss the issues central to my research in detail. Meffrey, 
who supplied a great deal of information and opinion that has informed this thesis, 
has worked in the Solomon Islands public service since he left high school in 
1985.  His relevant experience and his honesty and integrity meant that I could 
rely on the information he provided. He was able to share with me what he knew 
from his work experiences and what he had heard from others. He was very 
pleased to do so not only because he was interested in the topic in its own right 
but also because he believed that it was both a duty and a privilege to be able to 
contribute what he could to support and further research in whose successful 
outcome he, as a member of my family, had a particular interest. During his time 
in the Solomon Island government public service, Meffrey had worked in the 
Physical Planning Office in the Ministry of Lands and Survey, the Honiara City 
Council and Guadalcanal Province Head Office at Point Cruz in Honiara. At the 
time of my field work, he was Planning and Monitoring Officer in the Rural 
Development Division of the Ministry of Provincial Government. It was he who 
made me aware of a major concept of development in Ulawa, mwa’ora(nga), a 
concept which is central to the discussion in Chapter 6. This concept emerged out 
of a week long seminar/workshop (The Ulawa/Ugi Constituency Development 
Profiling & Action Workshop) held in April 2001 at Piru Piru Community High 
School near Su’uholo Village. That workshop was part of a UN aid funded project 
(run by the Ministry of Provincial Government) which involved development 
profiling of nine different Solomon Islands constituencies (including the 
Ulawa/Ugi constituency). The workshop was conducted by a team from the 
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Ministry of Provincial Government’s Rural Development Division. The team 
consisted of Dr Nestor Petelos (who was also Team Leader and on UN 
Secondment to Solomon Islands for the constituencies profiling project), Alan 
Agasi and Meffrey Awao. Meffrey Awao was asked to put together the 
Ulawa/Ugi constituency development profile. At the time of my field research 
(October/November 2002), the Ulawa/Ugi constituency development profile was 
still in draft form. This was one of the documents I consulted in relation to my 
research. When Meffrey communicated the concept mwa’ora(nga) to me, he said 
that it emerged as one meaning of development from the workshop in Ulawa. He 
did not specify further. In fact, mwa’ora(nga) is a  the term that is used to refer to 
healthy garden crops. At first, it seemed to me that the term conveyed the idea of a 
crop or plant `sprouting’. Later, however, after I returned to New Zealand and had 
more time to reflect on this Ulawa-based concept, I realised that it was both more 
multi-faceted and more significant (see Chapter 6). 
 
Another concept important to the thesis that emerged out of discussions with 
Meffrey was that of Ulawa Island as an individual persona, something that 
contributed to my attempt in Chapter 6 to explain development in terms of 
mwa’ora(nga).13   
   
The only formal interview that I had during my field trip was with Nathaniel 
Waena, MP for Ulawa/Ugi and Minister of National Unity, Re-conciliation and 
                                                 
13 Many other ideas some included in the thesis and some not, emerged out of discussions with 
Meffrey. Among those not included was the concept of ‘backward development’, a concept that, 
although it might initially appear counter-intuitive, actually makes perfect sense in the context of 
the spiritual and social thought of Ulawa.  
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Peace. I delivered a written request for an appointment along with an indication of 
the nature of my research and was invited to a meeting at his Office at Kalala 
House, Honiara from 9.00am to 10.00am on Friday 8 November 2002. I recorded 
that interview as well as taking notes during it. Because he already had an idea of 
the direction of my research, Nathaniel Waena was able (speaking in both English 
and Ulawa) to provide information without it being necessary for me to make 
more than a few requests for clarification. He communicated to me his thoughts 
on a range of issues, including aspects of the state and government, development, 
the Guadalcanal conflict, foreign laws and foreign relations (including foreign 
consultants). He also provided an analysis of what he felt needed to be done in 
order to ensure a secure future for the Solomon Islands. Following that meeting, I 
transcribed the tape, translating into English any sections in Ulawa that were 
immediately relevant to the research.  
 
One of the most important things that emerged from my meeting with Nathaniel 
Waena was his reference to the fact that, in establishing themselves on Ulawa, our 
ancestors set up not only a dwelling place but also a spiritual entity, something 
that resonated in the way in which people conducted themselves and lived their 
lives, including the process of socializing children. The spiritual dimension of life 
in Ulawa was also referred to, but more indirectly, by a European instructor at the 
Royal Solomon Islands Police Force Training School at Rove, Police 
Headquarters, West Honiara (personal communication Meffery Awao, 
Wednesday 20 Nov 2002).14 After visiting Ulawa, he described it in three words: 
                                                 
14 This information was shared with Meffrey by our cousin, Michael Poki, who is a member of the 
Royal Solomon Islands Police Force.  
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‘lucky’, ‘interesting’ and ‘powerful’. The first of these can be translated into 
Ulawa as mwarudja(nga) (meaning luck in a spiritual sense). The second can be 
translated as ha’a mwa’e mwa’e sae (meaning to delight and entice at the same 
time, that is, to appeal to both the aesthetic and the emotional sense). The 
translation of the third - nanama – evokes spiritual power and authority.   
 
Another important aspect of the information and opinion communicated to me by 
Nathaniel Waena was his view that development should be family-centred. In 
connection with this, he referred to the corrosive effects of both the 
state/government and the churches on peoples’ attitudes towards kastom (i.e. local 
customs and traditions). This had, he believed, led to confusion, making it all the 
more necessary to have good leadership. He emphasised the fact that leadership 
was the key to establishing a ‘home-grown’ federal system of government 
(something to which he had made reference in the past). References to a ‘home-
grown’ system have come to include, as Larmour (2005, p. 229) has pointed out, 
both institutions themselves and the processes by which they are adopted. One 
aspect of ‘home-grown’ solutions is, according to Waena, the full recognition of 
diversity. Thus, he criticised those who advise Solomon Islanders about the 
appropriate political structure for the nation in relation to their “failure to 
understand people’s diversity”. He noted that diversity “is acknowledged but not 
appreciated or properly understood by foreign visitors/advisors to Solomon 
Islands”. Indeed, as noted later, the proposal in this thesis that constituencies are 
made the foundation block or cornerstone of contemporary Solomon Islands 
society has, as part of its rationale, the proper recognition of that diversity which 
characterises Solomon Islands.  
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Another important meeting so far as this thesis is concerned was one with John 
Moffat Fugui who was, at that time, a political appointee (advisor to the Prime 
Minister) employed by the government of Sir Allan Kemakeza. That meeting was 
held in the cabinet meeting room in the Prime Minister’s office on Friday 22 
November 2002 and lasted from 3.50p.m. to 4.10p.m. and from 4.25p.m. to 
5.00pm. During the fifteen minute break, Mr Fugui photocopied some pages of a 
PhD thesis on Langa langa lagoon to which he had access. Having received my 
summary notes prior to the meeting, Mr Fugui was able to go ahead with his 
narrative without any prompting on my part. He covered a wide range of issues, 
including the Guadalcanal conflict, working in the PM’s office, the security wire 
fencing around the offices of the PM and Treasury, David Gegeo’s PhD thesis, a 
new doctoral thesis on Langa langa, national leadership, aid donors, Honiara in 
general (which he likened to an academic desert) and economic mismanagement.  
 
One of the things that John Fugui emphasized was the apparent lack of active able 
leadership in the Solomons. He noted not only that those who had appropriate 
leadership qualities were not prepared to become involved in the political arena, 
and that many of those who might appear to have such qualities had already been 
compromised through the nature of their involvement in the past. He also noted 
that the lack of capable leadership meant that it was not possible to formulate 
policies that would create an environment in which Solomon Islanders could 
thrive, especially those Solomon Islanders who were willing to venture into the 
private sector. He was of the opinion that the public sector had also suffered from 
lack of foresight in the area of policy formulation, the result being 
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mismanagement. In addition to this, parochialism, particularly in the area of 
recruitment into positions of authority and responsibility, had had a negative 
effect on public service. He observed, for example, that the requirement that 
different provinces be represented in the public service could be self-defeating. 
Overall, capable people were are either not being recruited or not being promoted, 
a situation that might be remedied by having a wider regional base of government 
infrastructure such as would be the case in a constituency-based government 
structure. In such a structure, selection on the basis of merit would be more likely 
and there would be more scope for the employment of innovative people who 
were prepared to try out new ideas in the context of a new political structure.                               
 
John Moffat Fugui commented on the fact that working in the Prime Minister’s 
office gave him a bird’s eye view of the nation. This draws attention to one of the 
advantages of having strong central government. He also noted that it was 
consistent with Melanesian values to disperse the functions and resources of 
government at a level that is readily accessible to the majority of the people. I 
argue later that a two-tier system of government in which constituencies play a 
central role would be appropriate in relation to a combination of central and 
authority and local management. 
 
A further point made by John Moffat Fugui is that David Gegeo’s PhD thesis 
(Gegeo, 1994) “brings out the best in our culture”. In locating a major part of the 
discussion of this thesis in a context with which I am very familiar (Ulawa 
Island), I have attempted to emulate that search for an essentially localised 
understanding that characterises the research of Gegeo.  
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Most of the other meetings that took place during my field trip involved informal 
and unstructured conversations and story telling. In many instances, I picked up 
bits and pieces of information which I recorded in my diary and field notes rather 
than involving people in interviews for which it would have been necessary to 
seek formal consent. One of the people with whom I was involved in informal 
conversations was my mother, Nesta Mamahe. My mother had no formal 
schooling. However, being born the daughter of a high chief in Mouta (both her 
parents are from chiefly families), she was well schooled in Ulawa traditions and 
culture/kastom. Both as mother and good gardener, she conceived development 
through the analogy of a tree which geminates and begins as a shoot (pasu), 
sprouts, grows and branches out (atosara), then matures (toli), New developments 
accrue from old processes (pwito haolu), and the whole cycle begins all over 
again. She conceives development as a cyclical process. Although it takes place in 
different ways at different stages, it remains the same (as a process) in some 
essential ways. Development, like life and death, and like the process of 
sustaining life itself, must always involve aspects of the old and the new. Central 
to effective development is continuity (see Chapter 6).  
2.9  Sources and methods of data collection        
The empirical data for the study are derived from both primary and secondary 
sources (Bickman, Rog & Hedrick, 1998, p. 18) and have been collected from 
three different sources: written sources, taped and informal interviews, and 
participant observation.   
 
Much of the information presented in this thesis has been derived from written 
sources and published literature, including library books, government 
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publications, journals, magazine and newspaper articles, news items and internet 
sites.15, 16  
 
Another source of information was a lengthy taped interview with a minister of 
the crown of the Solomon Islands government, collected on the field trip to 
Honiara,17 and four other discussions of various length and duration with four 
different senior government officers. Brief discussions were also held with five 
other government officials but another five possible interviews with another five 
government officers did not eventuate.  The other source of interviews (mainly 
informal) was from relatives from Ulawa Island and three other Solomon Islands 
wantoks, not from Ulawa Island. Indeed, there were altogether fifteen non-
government persons that I had the opportunity to discuss development issues with, 
either directly or indirectly, regarding my field research. Finally, participant 
observation proved to be a useful source of data.  
 
As a Solomon Islander who has lived, worked and studied in Solomon Islands and 
abroad (including Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand), I have had 
numerous opportunities to discuss (both formally and informally) with other 
Solomon Islander wantoks issues of development, society and state reform in 
                                                 
15 This is, in part, a result of the reorientation of the research resulting from the outcome of the 
field trip to Solomon Islands. 
16 The sources of the data are various and include national and international library collections 
(especially the libraries of the University of Waikato and the University of the South Pacific in 
Suva, Fiji and Honiara), Solomon Islands written literature (collected from USP Centre library, the 
Honiara Public library and the Ministry of Provincial Government). 
17 Some of those who initially agreed to be interviewed proved to be unavailable later. For 
example, although the Speaker of Solomon Islands parliament agreed to supply written responses 
which were to arrive by post after I returned to New Zealand, these did not arrive. 
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Solomon Islands.  I have found that the level of interest in politics more than 
outweighs problems associated with the generally low levels of literacy indicated 
in official government statistics.  The generally very high level of interest in 
politics that typifies Solomon Islanders relates, in part at least, to the widely held 
perception in Solomon Islands that politicians, especially national and provincial 
leaders, have enormous power and authority and can bring about major social, 
economic and political development.  Gaining access to what are perceived as 
being such powerful positions of influence is, therefore, a major preoccupation of 
many Solomon Islanders.  
 
The personal experiences, interactions and observations to which I have referred 
helped inform the conceptual and methodological frameworks designed and used 
in the thesis, particularly so because my associations with my fellow wantoks 
(including friends and relatives) extended to people from all parts of Solomon 
Islands, men and women, young and old, schooled and unschooled, secular and 
ecclesiastical, urban and rural.18  The significance of personal contacts is a 
reminder that the thesis is intended as much as a personal contribution to Solomon 
Islands as it is an academic exercise.  
2.10  Overview  
The three sources of data outlined above, along with the conceptual and 
methodological frameworks to which reference has been made, are, I believe, 
                                                 
18 This association with people from a wide spectrum of society is not uncommon among Solomon 
Islanders who attended secondary school in Solomon Islands, some of whom, like me, were 
fortunate enough to gain university degrees in the early years of Solomon Islands independence. 
Among the associations to which I have referred are university graduates who currently hold 
important positions of leadership in Solomon Islands. 
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sufficiently robust to satisfy the academic requirements of doctoral level research 
at the same time as providing a useful framework for analysis and interpretation 
of a kind that may be of direct relevance to Solomon Islanders. 
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Chapter 3 
International literature on development: A critical review of 
selected publications 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to provide a background to the research conducted here, and, in 
particular, in order to provide a context in which development in Solomon Islands 
can be better understood, I offer here a critical review of some pertinent aspects of 
development literature, attempting to indicate the differing perspectives that 
characterise different strands of development discourse.  However, in spite of the 
fact that there are differing perspectives, development discourse is fundamentally 
a Western phenomenon, one that, over time gained currency and legitimacy in 
former colonies of European imperial powers such as Solomon Islands.  It is of 
considerable significance that such former colonies are now generally referred to 
as ‘Third World’ or ‘developing countries’. For this reason, any critical review of 
development discourse is also, inevitably, a critical examination of aspects of the 
history, culture, rationality and social thought of Western society.  
3.2  Defining development  
Todaro (2000, p. 16), amongst others, has attempted to provide a comprehensive 
explanation and definition of modern social and economic development:  
 
Development must . . . be conceived of as a multidimensional process 
involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and 
national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the 
reduction of inequality, and the eradication of poverty. Development, in its 
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essence, must represent the whole gamut of change by which an entire 
social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals 
and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life 
widely perceived as unsatisfactory toward a situation or condition of life 
regarded as materially and spiritually better [italics retained]. 
 
The multidimensionality to which Todaro refers implies complexity.  However, 
notwithstanding the fact that Todaro refers to the multidimensional (and implicitly 
complex) nature of development, he also, at times, stresses the fact that it involves 
social engineering and is, for this reason, essentially linear in nature.  This 
unilinear conception of society and change, one that places development at a level 
of abstraction which implies a significant degree of universality, was, until 
comparatively recently, fundamental to Western social thought although, as 
discussed in more detail later, it involves a failure to recognise the contextually-
based nature of development.  Locating Solomon Islands development generally, 
and that of Ulawa Island in particular, in the context of what is referred to as 
‘island-space’ (see Chapter 1), effectively renders universal definitions of 
development, such as that proposed by Todaro, problematic.  
 
So far as Edelman and Haugerud (2005, p. 1) are concerned, `development’ is “an 
unstable term”. (p.1). They qualified this perspective further by observing that 
whereas, on the one hand, development is “both an urgent global challenge and a 
vibrant theoretical field”, it is also, on the other hand, unclear whether it is “an 
ideal, an imagined future towards which institutions and individuals strive [or] a 
destructive myth” (Edelman & Haugerud, 2005, p. 1).19  Thus, although 
                                                 
19 This is the postist stance in development theory popularly propagated by Arturo Escobar.  
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conventionally  ‘development’ may ”connote improvements in well-being, living 
standards, and opportunities, [it] may also refer to historical processes of 
commodification, industrialisation, modernisation, or globalisation” (p. 1).   
 
The instability and ambiguity surrounding development as a concept is a 
consequence of its conception as both “a legitimating strategy for states” and, at 
the same time, a way of asserting “citizen entitlement as well as state control” 
(Edelman & Haugerud, 2005, p. 1). Such ambiguity means that, in the final 
analysis, it is open to analysts to “focus on `development’ as discourse, as policy 
or project blueprint, as historical process, or as self-propelled evolutionary 
process, the concept [having] become highly contentious, and [having] attracted 
attention from an astonishing array of scholars” (p. 2).  
 
Rist (1997), in line with the perspective that underpins this research project, sees 
development in more contextual terms, perceiving the development problematic 
as being inscribed at the very core of Western imagery, and noting that 
conceptualisation of the growth process as continuing indefinitely is something 
that “radically distinguishes Western culture from all others” (Rist, 1997, p. 238).  
This cultural reading of development, a reading in which the development 
problematic is located specifically within Western imagery, is extremely 
significant although, as Hettne (2002, p. 7) observes, it may be that this perception 
is more directly relevant to the post World War II period than it is to later 
historical periods: 
 
The classical discourse, which had its roots in the late 1940s and was 
institutionalised in the 1950s and 1960s, assumed the possibility of an 
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autonomous, (inter)disciplinary field, containing a set of theoretical cores 
with development economics as a respected member of the family. The 
relevant theoretical schools, competing but yet in dialogue, were: 
modernization, structuralism, dependency and ‘another development’, all 
normatively concerned with the specific problem of national development 
in the so-called ‘Third World’.  
 
The reconstruction of war-torn Europe provided the model for state-
directed modernization of the ‘new nations’. Development implied the 
bridging of the gap by means of an imitative process, in which the less 
developed countries gradually assumed the qualities of the developed.  
 
Hettne clearly conceives of development in binary terms: the developed countries 
and the less developed countries.  He also sees it as involving an imitative 
process, with ‘less developed’ countries striving for inclusion in the prestigious 
‘developed’ category.  This differentiation between developed and less developed 
countries, a differentiation that implies superiority of the one (developed 
countries) over the other (less developed countries), underpins mainstream 
development discourse which is also seen as involving an ‘imitative process’ 
(Desai & Potter, 2002) whereby the less developed countries aspire to become 
like the developed ones. 
 
In this research project, the term ‘mainstream development’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘modern development’. In order to fully understand the 
nature of mainstream/modern development, it is necessary to locate and describe 
its spatial, contextual origins. Mainstream development literature generally, and 
classical development discourse in particular, is rooted within a Western 
epistemic and ontological framework (see for example, Tarnas (1991); Escobar 
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(1995); Cowan & Shenton (1996); Rist (1997)).  Furthermore, as Cowan and 
Shenton (1996, p. 2) observe, there is a fundamental distinction between 
‘development as intention’ and ‘development as process’.  Underlying these 
differing perspectives on development are differing beliefs and ideologies, among 
the most significant of which are those that not only locate development thinking 
in relation to the European Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries (Osborne, 
2001), but also locate present day post-modern sensibility in relation to the 
perspective that grew out of the European Enlightenment to the extent that 
postmodernism represents a challenge to the Enlightenment mode of thinking, a 
challenge to the hegemony of Western epistemic and ontological categories.    
 
My aim here is not to offer an alternative to development strategies in Solomon 
Islands.  Rather, it is to provide a description of development activities in one 
particular location, Solomon Islands, in relation to historical and global 
perspectives and, in doing so, to help provide a context in which these 
development activities, and responses to them, can be better explained and 
understood. 
3.3  Philosophical and ideological foundations  
3.3.1  Cultural and historical precedents  
The notion of ‘development’ is closely associated with the idea of ‘progress’, an 
idea itself associated with the European Enlightenment (Osborne, 2001).  Thus, 
although modern and mainstream development discourses have their empirical 
origins in the period following World War 2 (Hettne, 1995; 2002), their 
philosophical origins are rooted in the 17th and 18th centuries and are deeply 
embedded in Western culture and rationality.     
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Indeed, the Enlightenment ideals, which subsequently spawned other ideas and 
activities that later underpin development thinking and practices, themselves have 
antecedents in their opposition to medieval theism. As Tarnas (1991, pp. 320 – 
321) explains: 
 
Medieval theism and ancient cosmism had given way to modern 
humanism. . . . The West had “lost its faith” – and found a new one, in 
science and in man. But paradoxically, much of the Christian world view 
[predominant in the Middle Ages] found continued life, albeit in often 
unrecognized forms, in the West’s new secular outlook.  Just as the 
evolving Christian understanding did not fully divorce itself from its 
Hellenic predecessor but, on the contrary, employed and integrated many 
of the latter’s essential elements, so too did the modern secular world view 
– often less consciously – retain essential elements from Christianity.  The 
Christian ethical values and the Scholastic-developed faith in human 
reason and in the intelligibility of the empirical universe were conspicuous 
among these, but even as fundamentalist a Judaeo-Christian doctrine as the 
command in Genesis that man exercise domination over nature found 
modern affirmation, often explicit as in Bacon and Descartes, in the 
advances of science and technology.  So too did the Judaeo-Christian high 
regard for the individual soul, endowed with “sacred” inalienable rights 
and intrinsic dignity, continue in the secular humanist ideals of modern 
liberalism – as did other themes such as the moral self-responsibility of the 
individual, the tension between the ethical and the political, the imperative 
to care for the helpless and less fortunate, and the ultimate unity of 
mankind.  The West’s belief in itself as the most historically significant 
and favoured culture echoed the Judaeo-Christian theme of the Chosen 
People.  The global expansion of Western culture as the best and most 
appropriate for all mankind represented a secular continuation of the 
Roman Catholic Church’s self-concept as the one universal Church for all 
humanity. Modern civilization now replaced Christianity as the cultural 
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norm and ideal with which all other societies were to be compared, and to 
which they were to be converted.  Just as Christianity had, in the process 
of overcoming and succeeding the Roman Empire, become Rome itself in 
the centralized, hierarchical, and politically motivated Roman Catholic 
Church, incorporate and unconsciously continue many of the latter’s 
characteristic approaches to the world.  
 
Hoogvelt (1982, p. 105) notes that ‘development’ as both discourse and ideology 
appears to combine aspects of an evolving Western European habit of thought: 
 
[The] seeds of the passion for progress were planted . . . by the unique 
configuration of the Western European belief-system which combined a 
Judaic Voluntarist conception of man, a Christian eschatological view of 
history and an Aristotelian notion of imminent change. . . .  
 
[The] conjoining of these three disparate cultural legacies [also understood 
as medieval theism, ancient cosmism and modern humanism] fruited into a 
view of ‘inevitable yet man-made betterment through the ages’ and 
sponsored an enduring sense of historical destiny and human purpose that 
became one of the more stable elements of the European cultural tradition.  
 
This is a view shared by Rist (1997, p. 47) who argues that: 
 
[The] Western belief in ‘development’ has ancient roots, and by the late 
nineteenth century everything seemed in place, in terms of ideas, to 
embark upon the great adventure. 
  
This ‘great adventure’ is that of European colonisation in the 19th century.  The 
advent of the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ “merely turned the idea of ‘inevitable yet 
man-made betterment’ into a subject of systematic scientific enquiry” (Hoogvelt, 
1982, pp.105-106), that enquiry itself underlying the process of modernity. In 
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order, therefore, to understand that process, it is important to understand what is 
often referred to as ‘European Enlightenment’  
3.3.2  European Enlightenment  
Osborne (2001, pp. 120-121) provides the following overview of European 
Enlightenment:   
 
The Enlightenment refers to a period in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries during which the foundations of modern science and technology, 
together with rational and liberal ideologies of progress and development, 
were laid down. Beginning with a critique of the divine right of kings and 
of religion itself, Enlightenment thinkers developed a critique of society 
and a theory of a rational, ordered world. Many link the rise of 
Enlightenment reason with the work of Rene Descartes, who proposed 
rationality as the basic credo of all humanities and individualism as its 
central motif, however Enlightenment thought was fundamentally social in 
character rather than philosophical. It was a Europe-wide movement that 
drew on many sources and encompassed philosophy, political thought, 
literature and the beginnings of sociological thought.  
 
In the context of this research project, the fact that Enlightenment thought 
developed as a critique of existing society is a significant issue in two important 
respects.  First, mainstream development discourses are essentially normative in 
nature and are, significantly, underpinned by the avowed desire to change society 
for the better, although the process was initially conceived largely in terms of 
economic growth (see Rostow (1960)).20 Secondly, because development deals 
                                                 
20 The underlying historical processes, are, however, manifested in the technological revolution in 
Western Europe beginning in England that brought about industrialisation and increased 
production and consumption of goods and services largely apparent in many developed countries 
today. 
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with societal change, it is as much a historical experience and process as it is an 
intellectual issue and important aspect of a society’s social thought.  Edelman and 
Haugerud (2005) drew attention to these inextricable associations when they 
posed the question: “What types of faith in progress motivate development 
theories and practices?” (p. 2) and provided an answer (p. 2) that they refer to as 
‘historical teleologies’:  
 
The underlying historical teleologies [that motivate development theories 
and practices] include a presumed shift from kinship to contract, 
agriculture to industry, personalised to rational or bureaucratic rule, 
subsistence to capital accumulation and mass consumption, tradition to 
modernity, poverty to wealth.   
 
Even more important, however, is the critical observation that on closer 
inspection, prominent Western writers, such as Adam Smith, Max Weber, 
Immanuel Wallerstein, and others, appear to present human history in such a way 
that “the end or the process itself [of human history] is made to fit a pre-existing 
design” (Edelman & Haugerud, 2005, p.2).  Evidently, the emergence of the 
social sciences, especially sociology, took place in concert with vast and novel 
changes in European and Western societies generally, changes that resulted from 
the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries (Abercrombie, Hill & 
Turner, 1994, pp.213-5).  In a similar way, recent development activities in 
Solomon Islands have taken place in the context of the political and social 
upheaval (especially following World War II) that accompanied transition to self-
governing status. Just as Western European conceptions of development have 
been conceived in terms of a number of persistent metaphors, so too can Solomon 
Islands development be conceived of metaphorically.  In each case, these 
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metaphors, different though they are, help contribute to our understanding of the 
processes and perceptions involved.  In fact, it could be argued that just as the 
concept of development in Solomon Islands (and in Ulawa specifically) can be 
understood in terms of ‘island-space’, so the European or Western conception of 
development can be seen as having emerged from the conceptual and theoretical 
framework of a `continental-space’.  
 
In Europe, Enlightenment thinking represented a reaction against aspects of the 
past, the notions of freedom and equality that characterised Enlightenment 
thinking giving rise (Osborne 2001, p. 121) to the historical process of modernity: 
 
Enlightenment thinking has to be seen in the context of the mythical and 
reactionary religious thought that preceded it, and the feudal social 
structures to which it was opposed, not in the light of postmodern concerns 
with millennial relativism.  The French and American revolutions owed a 
great deal to the liberating and critical thought of the Enlightenment, in 
particular, the political ideas of equality and freedom before the law for all 
individuals, whatever their social origin.  In fact to believe in the innate 
possibility of reason and goodness in all men, and women, was itself a 
somewhat revolutionary idea at the time, especially as women were not 
universally seen as being equal to men.        
 
Unlike postmodernist thinkers such as Foucault, Habermas (1987) believes that 
‘the Enlightenment Project of Modernity’ is not over yet.  
 
As far as the West is concerned, both the French and American revolutions were 
important catalysts for important milestones in European modernity.  Since 
modernity is so significant in relation to modern development discourse, it is 
important to give some consideration here to modernity itself. 
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3.3.3  Modernity and progress 
Modernity and the notion of progress are often seen as being inextricably linked. 
Thus, in the words of Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1994, p. 336):  
 
Most nineteenth-century sociology was based on the assumption of 
progress which was equated with industrialization. Technological advance 
was assumed to result in improvements in material welfare, reflected in 
enhanced standards of health and longer life expectancy. Industrialization 
was also associated with a growth in the rights of citizenship . . . literacy 
and education. Progress was the social manifestation of reason, knowledge 
and technology. With the advent of mass warfare, fascism and totalitarian 
governments in the twentieth century, sociology has taken a decisively 
pessimistic turn as confidence in the progressive nature of industrial 
society has evaporated.   
 
Conventional theories of progress failed to provide adequate answers to 
three fundamental questions about social change. (1) Which social groups 
benefit from progress? (2) Who defines what is to count as progressive? 
(3) Who decides what personal or social costs are tolerable in relation to 
what degree of progress?  
 
Adding to this conceptual context, Jones (1993) sees modernity as “[implying] the 
constant pursuit of improvement in human lives and the pursuit of progress” so 
that unlike “traditional settings, where virtue lies in things remaining the same, in 
modern worlds change, development and improvement are the goals” (Jone, 1993, 
p.21).  Essentially, modernity in its apparent disavowal of the past and of tradition 
espouses change and is oriented to the present and future.  In other words, 
modernity is obsessed with novelty and the idea of the `new’.  In fact, the 
European Enlightenment ideal of human progress was also equated with the 
ideologies of freedom and emancipation, presupposing that traditional European 
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society and traditional societies in general offer less human freedom and 
emancipation than is desirable.  Therefore, in subscribing to the ideologies of 
freedom and emancipation, progress and modernity were conceived of as 
rendering greater human happiness to human societies, not only Western societies, 
but societies in general.  
 
In modernity, there was a dogmatic faith in human rationalism, empiricism and 
positivism represented through science and technology, to help recreate the `right’ 
if not necessarily the best society for human enjoyment. Jones (1993, p. 22) notes: 
 
The idea that humans can not only think about, and explain, their lives [i.e. 
produce social theories] but can employ them to change society for the 
better, is a specifically modern notion.  The idea that reason can provide 
an agenda and a set of prescriptions for living, rather than relying on 
divine intervention and instruction, only began to prevail after the 
Enlightenment.  
 
Higgot (1983, p. xii) discusses the influence of modernity on modern 
development thinking in terms of a change of worldview from “religious-
superstitious to science, technology and rationality”. Giddens (2003, pp. 1 - 2) 
emphasises the fact that this also involved an anti-dogmatic stance and a belief in 
the capacity of human beings to shape the future: 
 
[Our] epoch developed under the impact of science, technology and 
rational thought, having their origins in seventeenth – and eighteenth – 
century Europe.  Western industrial culture was shaped by the 
Enlightenment – by the writings of thinkers who opposed the influence of 
religion and dogma, and who wished to replace then with a more reasoned 
approach to practical life. . . .  
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[The] Enlightenment philosophers operated with a simple but apparently 
very powerful precept.  The more we are able rationally to understand the 
world, and ourselves, they thought, the more we can shape history for our 
purposes.  We have to free ourselves from habits and prejudices of the past 
in order to control the future.  
 
Implicit within the rationalism of the European Enlightenment is social 
engineering conceived of as a transformative-emancipatory process (Mertens, 
2003) which is underpinned by the writings of Karl Marx “whose ideas owed a 
great deal to Enlightenment thought” and who argued that “we have to understand 
history in order to make history” (Giddens, 2003, p. 2) (see for example Karl 
Marx ,1950; 1964; 1970).  
 
In the context of this discussion, it is significant to note that reason emerged as 
the legitimate and hegemonic instrument for social change, an important aspect of 
social theorising itself.  Thus Jones (1993, p. 22) notes that the construction of 
social theories “reflects a concern not only with how we live, but how we should 
live; social theories of modern society try not only to describe and explain our 
social world, but to diagnose its problems and propose solutions” (Jones, 1993, p. 
22). Research is regarded as being a critical aspect of social enquiry, the best way 
of finding solutions to social problems.  However, the issue is not so much the 
“goal and direction of desirable change” as “how to do it” (p. 22). This issue of 
social inquiry – how to find the best solutions to social problems – is as much a 
conceptual and philosophical issue as it is a methodological one. After all, given 
the socio-political, philosophical and disciplinary vantage-points of the researcher 
or inquirer, there may be as many proposed solutions as there are solution 
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proposers. This being the case, development theory and development discourse 
are inevitably pluralistic, including mainstream, alternative and post-development 
paradigms (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001).   
 
How, then, did a peculiarly Western and European outlook on development come 
to have global dominance? How did it come to overshadow other worldviews, 
other understandings of development?  
3.4  Contemporary European dominance: A brief overview  
To understand the hegemonic paradigm that characterises European and Western 
society, it is necessary to consider the historical context of European society. 
Arnold (2002) has argued that Europe’s emergence from a regional to a world 
power between 1400 and 1600 can be related to three main factors: trade, 
religious self-righteousness and rationality.  
 
Europe’s aggressive pursuit of overseas trade accompanied its own expanding 
economy.21 John Ralston Saul (1999), for example, endorses this proposition 
although his discussions of overseas trade emerge in a slightly different context:  
 
… look at the history of the British empire and you discover that the whole 
core idea of the British empire was you move in and start trading and then 
when you’re not getting what you want in trade you go in and beat the hell 
out of them.  It’s trade, which led to the construction of the British and the 
French and the German, and the Italian empires.  
 
                                                 
21 The significance of the economy to European society explains the important role it plays in 
social analysis. A case in point is Karl Marx’s ‘Mode of Production’ and related labour theories.  
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Clearly, overseas trade was one major factor in the emergence of Europe from a 
regional to a world power, the legacy of which remains with us today.  
 
Second, Europe’s experience of internal warfare and rivalry (due to its own 
internal disunity) coupled with an intermittent conflict with Islam “gave an 
additional confidence and aggressive swagger to European mariners and 
adventurers” (Arnold 2002, p. 60). In this respect, Raman (2002, pp. 4-5) concurs 
with Arnold as he explains that European contextual experience and process:   
 
The very formation of western Europe occurred, Marc Bloch points out, at 
a moment when it faced a triple threat: ‘[Europe] was attacked from three 
sides at once: in the south by the devotees of Islam, Arabs or their 
Arabized subjects; in the east by the Hungarians; and in the North by 
Scandinavians.’  The first of these incursions was especially significant.  
Until the twelfth century, the Moslem and Byzantine world ‘exercised a 
true economic hegemony over the West: the only gold coinage still 
circulating in … Europe came from Greek or Arab mints.’ European 
colonialism (and, to an extent, “Europe” itself) grew out of a perceived 
need to defend against various Islamic powers and to recover lands ceded 
in the preceding centuries. Hence, the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula 
by Portugal and Castile fused into a move outward, first into North Africa 
and later into sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, to snatch further territory from 
Arab colonizers.  The emergence of Europe and the establishment of its 
internal national boundaries were ‘simultaneous with a transgression of 
these boundaries’.  
 
Thus, there were ‘[few] if any, states outside Europe [which] possessed such a 
powerful combination of economic motivation and religious self-righteousness” 
(Arnold 2002, p. 60).  
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A third factor was the “developing spirit of enquiry and . . . rational approach to 
problem solving” (p.60).  For Esteva (1992, p. 17), the first of these factors is the 
most significant.  He regards “[economisation] and colonisation [as being] 
synonymous”: 
 
[During] the 19th century, but in fact starting much earlier in Europe, the 
social construction of development was married to a political design: 
excising from society and culture an autonomous sphere, the economic 
sphere, and installing it at the centre of politics and ethics. That brutal and 
violent transformation, first completed in Europe, was always associated 
with colonial domination in the rest of the world. 
 
In contrast to the views of Arnold (2002) and Esteva (1992) concerning the 
emergence of a Western (European) hegemonic paradigm are those of Blaut 
(1993) who argues that, although the significance of a convergence of economic 
and political interests cannot be overstated, the fundamental issue is not that of 
specific European traits, characteristics and circumstances, but the ideology of 
diffusionism, an ideology which underpinned colonialism.   
 
The rise of Europe was accompanied by political and economic domination of 
foreign territories, the process of colonisation itself becoming part of the general 
hegemonic process (see, for example, Abu-Lughod (1991); Diamond (1997)). 
Thus, as Esteva (1992, p. 10) observes: 
 
In the third decade of the [20th] century, the association between 
development and colonialism, established a century ago, acquired a 
different meaning. When the British government transformed its Law of 
Development of the Colonies into the Law of Development and Welfare of 
the Colonies in 1939, this reflected the profound economic and political 
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mutation produced in less than a decade. To give the philosophy of the 
colonial protectorate a positive meaning, the British argued for the need to 
guarantee the natives minimum levels of nutrition, health and education. A 
‘dual mandate’ started to be sketched; the conqueror should be capable of 
economically developing the conquered region and at the same time 
accepting the responsibility of caring for the well-being of the natives. 
After the identification of the level of civilization with the level of 
production, the dual mandate collapsed into one: development.  
 
It could be argued (as many educated Solomon Islanders appear to believe) that 
the British did not live up to their responsibilities in relation to Solomon Islands.  
Certainly, they appear not to have helped prepare Solomon Islanders adequately 
for political independence (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
In spite of the fact that development processes are complex and multidimensional, 
the ‘Occidental worldview’ (Sachs, 1992, p. 5) continues to exert enormous 
influence on global agendas and processes, not least on agendas and processes 
relating to social and economic development.  Even so, there are differing 
perspectives that must be acknowledged (Nederveen Pieterse, 2001, p. 77):  
 
[Broadly] speaking, then, the development terrain seems to be marked out 
into three overall positions: mainstream development (which, I will argue 
later, is by no means a coherent position), alternative development (which 
itself involves a range of perspectives), and post-development.  
3.5  Modern development: contextual and historical origins    
So far, I have noted that it has been argued that philosophically and ideologically, 
as well as socially and historically, modernity is derived from the European 
Enlightenment.  Modern (contemporary) development discourse, being a product 
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of modernity, can therefore also be seen as being rooted in the Enlightenment. 
Desai and Potter (2002, p. 59) provide the following overview of contemporary 
development discourse: 
 
Right-wing stances on development can be regarded as having their 
origins in the Enlightenment and the era of modernity which followed.  
The eighteenth-century Enlightenment saw an increasing emphasis placed 
on science, rationality and detailed empiricism.  It also witnessed the 
establishment of the `West’ and `Europe’ as the ideal.  It was during this 
period that the classical economists, Adam Smith and David Ricardo, 
writing in the 1700s, developed ideas surrounding the concept of 
comparative advantage, which stressed the economic efficacy of global 
free trade and, in many senses, gave rise to the earliest capitalist strategies 
of economic development.  These were followed by a plethora of dualistic 
and linear conceptualizations of development process, including 
modernization theory, unbalanced and unequal growth, and top-down and 
hierarchical formulations.  Together, such approaches are generally 
referred to as `neo-classical’.  Whatever, one’s critical view of 
modernization, the approach usefully pinpointed the salience of transport 
as a necessary (although not sufficient) factor in the development 
equation.  Such approaches are, of course, still alive and kicking, in the 
form of the `new right’ orthodoxy, involving the `magic of the market’ and 
the neo-liberal policies of structural adjustment, and very recently, poverty 
reduction strategies.  All of these approaches can be traced back directly to 
the works of Smith and Ricardo.  
 
The emergence of the European Enlightenment and, with it, the process of 
modernity is based also on a particular attitude towards the status quo, in effect, a 
secular challenge to the Christian religion and the dogma of the middle ages. 
Inevitably, therefore, there are dissenting voices, alternative perspectives as Desai 
and Potter (2002, p. 59) observe:  
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The antithesis to classical and neo-liberal views was provided by radical-
dependency approaches in the 1960s. It is a reflection of the Eurocentricity 
of development theory that Andre Gunder Frank has become the name 
most associated with dependency.  This is despite the fact that the 
approach essentially stemmed from the writings of structuralists in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. In respect of process, dependency theory was 
couched in terms of inverted cascading global chains of surplus extraction, 
and it was again all too easy to reduce this to simple dichotomous terms, 
involving polar opposites such as `core-periphery’, `rich-poor’ and 
`developed-underdeveloped’.  It was left to world systems theory to stress 
that contemporary development has involved the emergence of a 
substantial semi-periphery, consisting of the newly industrializing 
countries (NICs) of East Asia and Latin America.  
 
In contrast to the classical view, and in addition to radical-dependency, there is 
the post-modern paradigm (e.g. Lyotard, 1984) which aims to debunk prevailing 
meta-narratives.  Located within this post-modern paradigm is the development 
discourse of Escobar (1995) whose devastating critique of earlier development 
discourses continues to be extremely influential.  Even so, such critiques do not, I 
believe, represent the total emasculation of the development agenda.  Rather, as 
Desai and Potter (2002, pp. 59 – 60) note, they bring to it a greater self-
consciousness, a more developed awareness of what development can be about: 
 
The era of postmodernity may not be regarded as fitting the realities of the 
developing or poor countries in all respects, but the existence of these 
notions cannot be ignored in the analysis of the conditions faced by such 
nations.  Early standpoints taking a less generic, less monumental and less 
linear view of the development process included what are referred to under 
the heading `bottom-up’ and `agropolitan’ approaches, which have come 
to include ideas of `another’ development.  More recently, the `postist’ 
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stance afforded by postcolonialism has been added to the critique.  This 
argues that the production of Western knowledge has been inseparable 
from the exercise of Western power.  Ethical and moral considerations 
surface once more, this time in terms of the responsibilities which we 
carry for so-called `distant others’.  Most of us have been trained to favour 
people close to home, our so-called `nearest and dearest’, as opposed to 
those strangers who may be deemed more deserving, but who live far 
away.  Many of the practical problems that are to be faced in the field of 
humanitarian assistance stem from this basic but enduring conundrum of 
development.  Finally, it is notable that evolving conceptualizations of the 
roles of the state, civil society and social capital underpin continuing 
debates concerning development theory.  
 
Mainstream development discourse is essentially a modern phenomenon. Rooted 
conceptually and theoretically in the European Enlightenment, and representing a 
counter movement in relation to ancient cosmism and medieval theism, 
mainstream development discourse, pervasive though it is, now faces a number of 
challenges.  These challenges take the form of critical commentaries – labelled 
generically as ‘postist-stances’ (Desai & Potter, 2002) – drawing attention to the 
catastrophic consequences for non-Western peoples of much modern development 
activity.  
3.6  Some contemporary development issues       
Having established the conceptual and intellectual origins of modern development 
thought, it is important to consider development in its contemporary context, the 
primary aim being to locate an appropriate point of entry into the discussion of 
development as it relates to Solomon Islands. In this regard, it is not only the 
concept of development itself that requires consideration, but also the critical 
agents and stakeholders of development.  Thus, consideration is given below to 
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three contemporary stakeholders of mainstream development in the Solomon 
Islands context.  
3.6.1  State and development  
Nederveen Pieterse notes that globalization and regionalization are “overtaking 
the standard unit of development” which traditionally was the nation-state or 
society. Thus, the “conventional agent of development, the state, is being 
overtaken by the role of international institutions and market forces” (Nederveen 
Pieterse, 2001, p.1).  It could be argued that the discourse of globalisation and, 
with it, the dominant role played in development activities worldwide by such 
influential global institutions as the World Bank22 has contributed to the 
weakening role of the nation-state and, perhaps paradoxically, also to a 
heightened sense of parochialism and nationalism worldwide.  In Solomon 
Islands, this could be said to be exemplified by the recent ethnic conflict between 
militants of Guadalcanal and Malaita, and also, perhaps, by the incessant call for 
greater political autonomy by some of the country’s provincial governments, such 
as those of Rennell-Bellona, Makira/Ulawa and Temotu provinces.  On the other 
hand, the Canadian philosopher, John Ralston Saul (1999)23, who sees the Asian 
crisis of 1997 and 1998 as signalling the beginning of the end for the world 
economy, argues that it is not yet clear what will fill the vacuum left by faltering 
confidence in a globalisation agenda which has led to the normalisation of the 
dumping of underpriced goods into markets, thus destroying local structures.  
Whereas the globalist believes that the power of the nation state is waning, it may 
be that the nation state still has a significant role to play.  
                                                 
22 This includes the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the WTO and United Nations. 
23 See also Fallow (2005).   
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In Solomon Islands, whatever the future of the nation-state may be, the fact 
remains that development activity and the state have been inextricably linked over 
the past three decades although the influence of other agencies such as non-
government organisations have also been apparent. This state of affairs is in 
keeping with how Desai and Potter (2002, p.471) explain the functional 
relationship between the nation-state and development to date: 
 
Development activity was for long virtually the monopoly of the state. 
However, the lack of alternatives did not mean the state was always a 
positive force for development.  Moreover, in the late twentieth century, 
the state’s claim to this monopoly weakened, while other agencies of 
development such as the World Bank, the IMF and non-government 
organisations (NGOs), gained a higher profile.  Development has to be 
seen in the economic context of global capitalism, but also in the political 
context.  The most crucial relationship is between the state and the 
economy: states participate directly in processes of productive capital 
formation (establishing a set of economic policies favourable to capitalist 
accumulation), provide infrastructure and affect private-sector resource 
allocation through monetary and fiscal policies. The state provides an 
enabling environment/structure for development by other agencies. The 
state is the network of government, quasi-government and non-
government institutions that co-ordinates, regulates and monitors 
economic and social activities. The role of non-state actors seems destined 
to grow as the power of the nation-state declines and global economic 
activity intensifies.       
 
In the case of Solomon Islands, the nation-state, as a legitimate social and political 
entity, promoted the national development agenda, and discharged the 
implementation of this authority through national policy and planning.  Even so, it 
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would be naïve to assume that the nation-state was the sole legitimate institution 
in Solomon Islands society.  The institutions of state may have planned for 
development, but the process of implementation necessarily involved contending 
with both internal and external dynamics.  Even so, it remains the case that the 
state continues to play a major role in social and economic development in 
Solomon Islands, something that must be accommodated in any description and 
analysis of development activities in Solomon Islands over the period in question.  
Nevertheless, it also needs to be acknowledged that the nation-state itself, like 
development, is a peculiarly European model of society.  In fact, recognising that 
Solomon Islands as a nation state is a British colonial creation is an important 
factor in understanding the enduring and unresolved nature of state reform in 
Solomon Islands.  Furthermore, as in the case of so many former European 
colonies, the role played by international institutions such as the World Bank and 
United Nations continues to have enormous influence on development activity 
and practice.  Even so, although the nation-state can still be described as the main 
protagonist of mainstream development discourse and practice, it is very far from 
certain that this will continue to be the case even in the short term. Indeed, there 
are persistent calls for the state to relinquish some of its development 
responsibilities and for these to be undertaken by business entrepreneurs and the 
private sector (see for example, Holden & Holden (2005)).           
3.6.2  Civil society and development   
Civil society in general can be described as involving the realm of non-state actors 
or entities, whether these are religious or secular in nature. Such actors sometimes 
also include social movements.  As Desai and Potter (2002, p. 471) observe, the 
role of non-state actors “seems destined to grow as the power of the nation-state 
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declines and global economic activity intensifies”. Indeed, in their critique of 
mainstream development, Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998) place 
considerable emphasis on the role and place of social movements and NGOs in 
general, seeing them as, in many cases, the ‘good Samaritans’ of the poor and 
‘have-nots’ of society, those who have inevitably been left behind and are beyond 
the patronage of the nation-state and mainstream development activity.  Escobar 
(2005, p. 349) is even more forthright:  
 
Perhaps social movements, as symbols of resistance to the dominant 
politics of knowledge and organisation of the world, provide some paths in 
the direction of this calling, that is, for the re-imagining of the ‘Third 
World’ and a post-development era.   
 
In Solomon Islands, NGOs play an increasingly important role in development in 
society at large.  However, apart from the Solomon Islands Development Trust 
(SIDT) - which is possibly the most visible of the local NGOs - many of the 
others originate from outside the country.  This is linked to a range of practical 
and conceptual problems in relation to the possibility that development can, in the 
future, play a meaningful role in the lives of the majority of ordinary rural-
dwelling Solomon Islanders.  
 
So far as Solomon Islands is concerned, one of the issues that needs to be 
addressed is that of the positioning and role of civil society.  Many of the civil 
society groups in Solomon Islands, whether church-based or otherwise, still 
operate from within the institutional framework of the nation-state, and within the 
state’s prescribed political and legal jurisdictions, even though the acronym NGO 
presupposes a complete absence of the state.  NGOs and civil society groups, 
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apart from the church, generally still do not enjoy the same level of legitimacy 
that is accorded to the state and to culture/kastom.  Thus, given that they currently 
operate very much within the context of state, it is difficult to determine how 
effective they might be in promoting and providing development assistance to 
Solomon Islanders were the state’s role to be reduced, especially in a context 
where rural villagers generally expect, in line with kastom, that NGOs will serve 
the interests of individuals, their immediate families and close relatives.  NGOs 
and civil society generally, tend to gain their legitimacy, often as forces that 
question the state, in capitalist economic frameworks.  As Edelman and Haugerud 
(2005, p. 2) note, their critique of mainstream development is often from the 
standpoint of “alternatives in rather than to development”.  However, the fact that 
the subsistence economy of Solomon Islands has not been fully replaced by a 
capitalist economy means that the position of NGOs is not as clear cut as it would 
otherwise be.  The question of whether NGOs and civil society groups can, or 
will, assume greater significance in Solomon Islands, and whether they can, or 
will, be able to address development issues currently unresolved within Solomon 
Islands therefore remains an open one.   
3.6.3 Social capital and development   
In an internet article, Smith (2001, ¶ 1) notes that social capital has emerged as an 
important notion in contemporary society:  
 
The notion of social capital is a useful way of entering into debates about 
civil society – and it is central to the arguments of Robert Putnam and 
others who want to ‘reclaim public life’. It is also now being used by the 
World Bank with regard to economic and societal development and by 
management experts as a way of thinking about organisational 
development.  
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Putnam’s (2000) influential book, Bowling Alone, notes that social capital is 
primarily concerned with revitalising urban communities in the United States of 
America, with the attempt to counter societal breakdown and decay and bring 
about a greater measure of social cohesion.  The World Bank takes the view that 
social capital is indispensable to social and economic development (World Bank, 
PovertyNet, 2006, ¶ 1):  
 
Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape 
the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. Increasing 
evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper 
economically and for development to be sustainable. Social capital is not 
just the sum of the institutions which underpin society – it is the glue that 
holds them together.    
 
From a development standpoint, the World Bank advocates a broad view of social 
capital, one that includes the social and political environments that shape societal 
structures and enable norms to develop.  Thus, the concept of social capital 
extends beyond communities and community groups to include “the most 
formalised institutional relationships and structures, such as government, the 
political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties” 
(World Bank, PovertyNet, 2006, ¶ 5).  Although the concept of social capital is 
clearly relevant to Solomon Islands development, the precise nature of its role is 
less evident than it is in the case of the United States.  
 
The World Bank’s broad application of social capital not only ensures that the 
virtues and vices of social capital are taken into consideration, but also that the 
notion of social capital is located squarely within a nation-state-wide societal 
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framework. In this way, whilst the importance of forging relationships within and 
across communities is acknowledged, there is also a critical recognition that the 
capacity of various social groups to act in their own best interests depends 
crucially on the support, or otherwise, they receive from both the state and other 
private and public sector institutions.  Such a formulation highlights also the 
critical relationship between the state, its constituent parts, and other sectors of 
society.  Thus, social capital is seen as applying equally to the state as a whole and 
to social groupings in that the viability and durability of the state depends on 
social stability and widespread popular support (World Bank, PovertyNet, 2006, ¶ 
5).  When social cohesion breaks down at the group or community level, the 
stability and viability of the nation-state is also, in the longer term, under threat. 
The recent experience of Solomon Islands is a case in point.  
 
From the point of view of the World Bank, economic and social development 
thrives when the state, through its institutions and representatives, works in 
tandem with the corporate sector and civil society groups, thus creating a 
favourable context for the creation of forums through which common goals can be 
identified and pursued (World Bank, PovertyNet, 2006, ¶ 5).  From this 
perspective, the situation in Solomon Islands, one in which the state has been, 
over the past three decades, the dominant player in development activity is no 
longer the best option.  
 
Smith (2001) (see discussion above) identified three dimensions of social capital. 
The first is the civil society or community application of social capital developed 
by Putnam (2000) and others.  The second is the nation-state-wide application of 
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social capital developed by the World Bank (PovertyNet, 2006) for social and 
economic development.  The third is the efficiency and sustainability of an 
organisation from a management point of view. This third dimension, although 
not discussed at any great length here, is nevertheless implicit in subsequent 
discussions (see, in particular, Chapter 6 where the issue of state reform is 
discussed in the context of development in Solomon Islands).  From an 
organisational point of view, social capital which “consists of the stock of active 
connections among people: the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and 
behaviours that bind the members of human networks and commitments [makes] 
cooperative action possible” (Cohen & Prusak, 2001, p. 4).  
 
Given the fact that there are a number of important contemporary stakeholders in 
development, it is important to identify those stakeholders which are most 
relevant to gaining an understanding of Solomon Islands context and are therefore 
critical to the formulation of appropriate development process for the future.    
3.7  Implications for social and economic development in Solomon Islands  
Edelman and Haugerud (2005, p. 2) note that much debate about development in 
the 20th and 21st centuries “explores whether all or most societies follow the same 
trajectory toward greater accumulation and well-being or, alternatively, whether 
wealth in some places or among certain social groups is causally related to 
poverty in other places or among other groups”.  They also note that the “notion 
of a single development trajectory implies that history, rather than reflecting the 
outcome of struggles between contending social groups – including at times very 
localised struggles – is simply a deus ex machina, in which culture and political 
processes play no role”(p. 2).  
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In view of the unresolved debate noted by Edelman and Haugerud (2005), the 
importance of contemporary stakeholders in determining what approaches to 
development will best serve Solomon Islands in the future is a complex matter, 
one that necessarily entails a comparative analysis of Solomon Islands context. In 
approaching this matter, I employ the metaphor of the ‘island-space’ 
conceptualisation explained in Chapter 1.           
3.7.1  ‘Island-space’ and the underlying dynamics of development in 
Solomon Islands 
The concept of ‘island-space’ is intended, first and foremost, to stand in contrast 
to a ‘continental-space’ conceptualisation, the latter representing the European or 
Western geographical, historical and social context.  The fact that modern and 
mainstream development discourse originated in a ‘continental-space’ already 
implies a disjuncture between the Solomon Islands context and that of Europe. 
From this follows the proposition that the concept of development in an ‘island’ 
context is not necessarily the same as that in a ‘continental’ context.  Inevitably, 
the concept of development that emerged from a ‘continental-space’ (the West or 
Europe) must have a history and nuances that are different from the concept of 
development that is located within the context of an ‘island-space’.  In 
understanding and explaining development in Solomon Islands, it is logical, 
therefore, to begin with the notion that it is an ‘island’ society, one that leads to a 
focus on the significance of its geographical, historical and social context.  
However, although Solomon Islands can usefully be conceptualised as an ‘island’ 
society, it is also important to acknowledge that it is a pluralistic one (see Chapter 
1).  Thus, notions of development in one part of the country will not necessarily 
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be the same as those in another part of the country. It is therefore important to 
acknowledge that development will not only have general ‘island’ connotations, 
but also more specific contextual ones, something that remains the case 
notwithstanding the fact that Pacific Islanders and their close collaborators, such 
as Huffer and Qalo (2004), have observed a number of common traits in 
indigenous philosophies and social thought which can, I believe, be attributed to 
the island nature of the societies they discuss. The concept of development in the 
case of Ulawa Island is discussed further in Chapter 6.  
  
The fact that the nation-state has been the major stakeholder in  social and 
economic development in Solomon Islands to date, and the fact that there are 
other important stakeholders, such as, for example, the World Bank, NGOs and 
other civil society groups, means that the issue of their role in the future needs to 
be addressed.  This is not, however, the primary concern of this research project, a 
project which focuses on ‘island-based’ conceptualisations of development and, in 
particular, those of rural Solomon Islanders in the hope that such 
conceptualisations will be taken more fully into account in future considerations 
of Solomon Islands development as a whole.  The active involvement and 
participation of rural Solomon Islanders in development activity is critical. 
However, unless their conceptualisations of development are understood, there is 
little hope that their active participation can be secured.  This simple premise 
underlines the discussion of mwa’ora(nga), an Ulawa Island concept of 
development, and its implications for the wider issue of state reform in Solomon 
Islands (see Chapter 6).  
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3.8  Overview   
Official definitions and descriptions of development in Solomon Islands are based 
on production and deficit models.  My aim here is not primarily to challenge such 
conceptualisations.  Rather, it is to supplement them, to deepen our understanding 
of development in Solomon Islands by articulating an indigenous and organic 
concept of development, one that takes account of the diversity of human 
experience, and one that is not easily reflected in government reports and official 
development statistics. Chapter 4 provides the local context in an outline of 
contemporary Solomon Islands society; Chapters 5 and 6 explore the notion of an 
indigenous, organic concept of development peculiar to Ulawa Island with 
reference to development activities over the past quarter of a century. In Chapter 
6, these discussions are extended to include a proposal concerning state reform in 
Solomon Islands.  
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Chapter 4 
Solomon Islands:  A nation of ‘wantoks’  
 
4.1 Introduction 
In a seminar paper entitled The husk, the nut, the lime & lif; Reflecting on 
Solomon Islands through `betel nut’, I noted (Rohorua, 2002a) that contemporary 
Solomon Islands society could be described through the broad framework of the 
following metaphors: ‘island’ and ‘betel nut’.  However, critical also to the 
perspective adopted in this chapter is the notion of ‘wantok’, literally meaning in 
Pidgin English ‘one talk’ (someone with whom you share the same language).  In 
the context of the diversity of Solomon Islands, ‘wantok’ has come to be used as a 
marker of social identity.  It is, however, used in two different ways. Within 
Solomon Islands, it is commonly used by people of the same cultural and 
linguistic background to refer to one another.  In this context, it is an identity 
marker referring to people from the same geographical area, region, island or even 
province.  However, outside of Solomon Islands, Solomon Islanders use the word 
‘wantok’ to greet one another or to refer to fellow Solomon Islanders generally or, 
indeed, to refer more widely to people from the Pidgin speaking Melanesian 
countries (including Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea).  The word ‘wantok’ 
therefore serves an important purpose as a marker of collective identity. In this 
chapter and thesis, I conceive of wantok identity metaphorically in terms of a 
betel nut.  The outer wrapping (the betel nut husk) is the state or Constitution, the 
inner core (the betel nut inner core) is kastom, the customs and practices of the 
people.  Solomon Islanders often chew a mixture of betel nut, lime (made from 
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burnt coral), and areca leaf (commonly known as lif), the last two providing 
additional flavour.  Here, the lime and the lif symbolise the role of the church.  In 
seeking to understand Solomon Islanders, and, hence, Solomon Islander 
conceptions of, and responses to development, it is important to take account of 
the inner core (kastom), the husk (state/Constitution) and the lime and lif (the 
church), all of which are important aspects of wantok identity.  
 
What is symbolised in these metaphors is something that is absent from the 
Solomon Islands ‘story’ that was passed on to generations of Solomon Islands 
school pupils in the past.  As it was, attending primary school in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, one was taught in social studies that the Spanish explorer Alvaro 
de Mendaña was the first person to discover Solomon Islands.  He it was who 
named these Islands after the biblical King Solomon.  The main thoroughfare of 
the central business district (CBD) of Solomon Islands capital, Honiara, is called 
Mendana Avenue.  The premier hotel of the CBD is called Mendana Hotel. 
Honiara’s CBD itself is often referred to also as Point Cruz after one of 
Mendaña’s Spanish galleons.  Certainly, then, there are many reminders of 
Mendaña in the Solomons. 
 
However, from a critical point of view, Mendaña was by no means the first person 
to discover these islands. Soon after political independence, we began to teach our 
young people that Mendaña was certainly a first, the first foreign ‘tourist’.  The 
first people to discover these islands were, however, the indigenous peoples 
themselves.  That this self-evident truth needed to be emphasised demonstrates the 
important role that naming can play in historical and political awareness.  Naming 
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is, in fact, a critical aspect of that process of misrepresentation of history that has 
so often typified the process of colonisation.   
 
To many people, ‘Solomon Islands’ is little more than a name attached to a group 
of islands on a map, a name associated with a green, blue and gold flag with five 
stars, with a National Anthem with sentimental lyrics (God Bless Our Solomon 
Islands, From Shore to Shore),24 with a legal Constitution and a Coat of Arms 
featuring native creatures and symbols and bearing the slogan To Lead Is To 
Serve, and with its own Passport (a small green book stamped throughout with 
reminders that it is the property of Solomon Islands Government).  That these 
islands are perceived as a totality, as a bounded entity, relates to the fact that they 
are identified by a single name and the fact that this name is now associated with a 
political entity, a nation state.  Whether these islands can be said to represent a 
social entity is a rather different matter, one that is critical to our understanding of 
both the people who inhabit these islands and the political processes that have 
played a part in shaping their sense of identity.  In seeking to clarify some aspects 
of contemporary Solomon Islands society below, I shall refer, on occasion, to the 
three metaphors: the island, the betel nut and the wantok. 
4.2  Island geography and location   
‘Solomon Islands’, as the name suggests, is an island country.  From a 
geographical point of view, this implies both location and spatial orientation. In 
terms of location, the Solomon Islands lie in the wider South Pacific Islands or 
Oceania region, and sub-regionally in Melanesia.  It is a tropical country, sharing 
                                                 
24The national anthem of Solomon Islands was, in fact, composed by a Solomon Islands National, 
Panapasa Balekana, who had originally come from Fiji.  
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a number of important characteristics with the other South Pacific Island states or 
countries.  From the point of view of development discourse, Oceania is made up 
of small, scattered, isolated communities with open economies which are 
vulnerable to the vagaries of global political and economic factors.  However, as 
seen from the perspective of the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 1, it 
is equally possible to think of Oceania as a large, open area, a ‘Sea of Islands’, a 
perspective that counters the largely negative views so often associated with 
mainstream development discourse (Hau’ofa, 1993a & b; 2000). It remains the 
case, however, that Oceania is made up not of continents, but of islands.  This 
island status can be conceptualised in two ways: (a) in terms of a series of 
politico-social entities (each metaphorically an island) that are cut off from 
mainstream development and mainstream development discourse, and (b) in terms 
of Oceania itself, its series of islands constituting a single entity (metaphorically 
an island).  Thus, the smallness, remoteness, and vulnerability of each of the 
politico-social ‘islands’ can be seen as being potentially offset by the fact that 
each of these ‘islands’ is part of a bigger ‘island’, potentially a formidable force 
but currently, like the smaller politico-social ‘islands’ from which it is constituted, 
lacking the necessary unity and the power to have any significant impact on the 
inequalities, the injustices and the disparagement that currently typify 
development and development discourse on the world stage.  In this regard, with 
specific reference to Solomon Islands, Judith Bennett (1987, p. xix) maintains:  
 
Once the islands officially became a British possession, there was also a 
kind of inevitability about how the administration would finance itself, 
given the apparent abundance of land and labour. These developments 
were largely beyond the control of the fragmented peoples of the 
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Solomons, but soon involved them largely in the world economy. On such 
a wide stage they could play only the most insignificant role.  
 
It could be said that the situation described by Bennett above remains as true 
today as it was when she made those remarks in 1987.   
 
As a political entity, Solomon Islands is located between 5 and 13 degrees south 
longitude, and 155.5 and 170.5 degrees east latitude (Solomon Islands Curriculum 
Development Centre (SI CDC), 1990, p. 2).  In the context of the South Pacific 
islands, it is one of the major island groups of Melanesia, larger than both 
Vanuatu and New Caledonia in terms of population and land mass, and, before 
independence, apart from Fiji, the largest of Britain’s tropical dependencies in 
Oceania.  The Solomon Islands group is a scattered island archipelago extending 
over 60,000 sq. km of sea and is oriented from the northwest to the southeast.  It 
consists of six large, mountainous continental islands - 1,400 km from one 
extremity to the other and with a total land mass of 29, 785 sq km with hundreds 
of little islands and islets. The six major islands of the Solomons are Choiseul 
(also known as Lauru), New Georgia, Santa Isabel, Guadalcanal, Malaita and San 
Cristobal (also known as Makira).  These six islands also constitute six of the nine 
provinces that make up the provincial government system in Solomon Islands.  
The major islands are largely volcanic in origin, although Ontong Java (or Lord 
Howe) in the north and Sikaiana (Stewart Island in the northeast) are both coral 
atolls, while Rennell Island (in the south), which is home to Lake Tenggano, is a 
raised coral atoll.  Of the six major islands, Guadalcanal is the largest, with a total 
land area of approximately 5,650 sq km.  It is also the site of the country’s 
national capital, Honiara (see Map 1). 
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Map 1: Map of Solomon Islands 
 
 
Solomon Islands is the second largest country in the South Pacific region in terms 
of total land mass (after Papua New Guinea) and is third overall in terms of 
population, with approximately 500,000 people (after both PNG, with 
approximately 5 million, and Fiji, with approximately 800,000 people).  On the 
whole, the islands of the Solomons are well watered by rivers and streams and 
many of the islands are overlaid by marine sediments and fringed coral reefs 
surrounded by lagoons.  Two of the famous lagoons in the Solomons are also 
featured in anthropological studies, Marovo Lagoon by Edvard Hviding (1996) 
and Langalanga Lagoon by Pei-yi Guo (2001). Langalanga lagoon, or rather the 
people of Langalanga, near Auki in Malaita, are famous in the Solomons for their 
shell-money and ship building industries.  Marovo Lagoon, on the other hand, is 
world famous as it is also being considered as a possible World Heritage site by 
UNESCO.  
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4.3  Societal overview   
The current political and socio-cultural structure of Solomon Islands is related to 
its historical evolution.  Although Solomon Islands as an entity came into 
existence only under colonial rule, its roots are based on earlier migration and 
settlement patterns.  In Melanesia generally, the indigenous foundation of 
contemporary society is widely known as kastom.  The early migration and 
settlement of the indigenous people of the islands was followed in the 16th and 
17th centuries by sporadic European contact.  This contact took place initially 
through seafaring explorations, followed by trading expeditions and later intense 
missionary activity.  In the case of Solomon Islands, that historical wave of 
European adventure and travel into the south seas led to the declaration of the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate (B.S.I.P.) which involved direct political and 
administrative control by Britain. Solomon Islands became, in terms of modern 
political discourse, a protectorate of the British Isles, formerly a British colony or 
outpost (for more detail, see for example, Bennett (1987); Laracy (1989)).    
4.4  Early settlers   
Linguistic and archaeological understanding of the pre-historic period of the 
islands now known as Solomon Islands is limited although it is generally believed 
that the central Solomons were occupied by hunters and gatherers about 10,000 
years before the present (B.P.) and that these hunter gatherers were overrun by 
Neolithic peoples (who spoke a variety of languages belonging to the widely 
spread Oceania branch of the Austronesian language family) about 4,000 B.P. 
(Boutilier, 1981, p. 265).  These newcomers, who must have had a high level of 
marine technology which enabled them to cross the open seas between the islands, 
appear to have been agriculturalists who planted taro and domesticated chickens, 
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dogs, and pigs.  Archaeological fieldwork (Douglas & Douglas, 1994, p. 602) 
suggests that the islands’ cultures enjoyed a remarkable degree of continuity over 
time (Rukia, 1989, pp. 3-13).  In many important respects, contemporary Solomon 
Islands society reflects earlier patterns of indigenous society.  For example, it is 
widely accepted that about 80% of contemporary Solomon Islanders continue to 
live in rural locations on the numerous islands of the Solomons.  Wherever the 
ancestors of the present indigenous population of Solomon Islands originated, and 
whatever their reasons for migrating to these islands, these settlers and their 
descendants adapted over time to their new environment and developed their own 
kastoms before the arrival of European explorers. 
4.5  European exploration   
In terms of written historical records, the first Europeans to visit Solomon Islands 
were Spaniards who, under the command of Alvaro de Mendaña, set out from 
Peru in South America and landed on the east coast of Santa Isabel (Estrella Bay) 
in February 1568 (Boutilier, 1981, p. 265).  Mendaña then sailed through the 
central Solomons, skirmished with the islanders in a desperate attempt to secure 
food, and eventually retired to Peru believing, however, that the islands were rich 
in gold.  In fact, what was often mistaken for gold at the time was one of three 
minerals – pyrite, chalcopyrite or weathered biotite mica: “ The discovery of the 
fool’s gold, exaggerated by sailor’s talk, led to the islands being officially 
described as the Isles of Solomon in 1574” (p. 265).  In a second expedition to the 
‘Isles of Solomon’ in 1595, Mendaña established a settlement at Graciosa Bay, on 
Santa Cruz, traditionally called Nendo.  When he died, the remnants of the 
expedition departed for the Philippines although a small party of Spaniards did 
reach and settle in Makira.  Later, however, other European explorers, including, 
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in 1643, the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman visited Solomon Islands. In the late 
eighteenth century, a number of European explorers also visited Solomon Islands.  
These included Philip Carteret (1767), Louis Bougainville (1768), Jean Surville, 
Comte de Laperouse (1788), Shortland (1788), and Sir Alexander John Ball 
(1792).  It was, however, not until 1838 that a French navigator, Dumont 
d’Urville, confirmed that these were in fact the same islands that had been 
referred to by Mendaña as Islands of Solomon (Boutilier, 1981, p. 265).  
 
These early European explorers had no immediate significant impact upon the 
lives of the islanders, although they did prepare the way for other European 
travellers and adventurers, some of whom recorded their impressions of life in 
these and other islands (see, for example, Charles Woodford (1890); R.H. 
Codrington (1891); Charles Fox (1924); Walter Ivens (1927); Cyril S. Belshaw 
(1945; 1954); Harold Scheffler (1965); Ian Hogbin (1969); and Judith Bennett 
(1987)). Boutilier (1981, p. 265) provides a brief description based on such 
sources:   
 
The Melanesian societies which the European explorers encountered were 
highly fragmented linguistically and geographically.  Broadly speaking, 
the islanders were interior-dwelling, up-country, swidden agriculturalists 
(later known as ‘bush people’) or coastal-dwelling fisher folk (known as 
‘saltwater people’). In kinship terms, they might be matrilineal or 
patrilineal depending on the island or part of the island where they lived.  
Most of the Solomon Islanders lived in small villages or hamlets seldom 
exceeding two hundred people.  Their wood carving, canoe making, and 
other crafts were highly developed and artistic.  They indulged in fairly 
constant interclan warfare of a largely ritualistic, honour-readjusting 
variety on a small scale, though fairly large head-hunting raids did take 
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place in and from the New Georgia archipelago until early in the twentieth 
century.  The islanders inhabited a world of ghosts, spirits, sorcery, and 
magic and many of their activities involved the propitiation of spirits or 
the enactment of appropriate rituals.  
 
All of these characteristics, whether or not they would be universally recognised 
by more recent travellers, have had some influence on contemporary Solomon 
Islands society.  Indeed, recent ethnic conflict in Solomon Islands between 
Guadalcanal and Malaitan ethnic militant groups reinforces some of these 
observations.         
 
It is generally believed that Mendaña, motivated by ambition and self-interest, 
sought “the legendary Isles of Solomon, believed to lie west of South America 
and said to be visited by the Incas” and that he believed that he had discovered 
them (Douglas & Douglas, 1994, p. 602).  From the earliest period of European 
exploration, therefore, these islands were associated with King Solomon of the 
Old Testament whose wealth and wisdom were thought to have originated in 
some mysterious place, the Isles of Solomon.  This association had an immediate 
and lasting effect.  European travellers continued to explore the islands, seeking 
that mythological island paradise, that distant place that would eventually reveal 
its treasures providing them with untold wealth and influence.  When it failed to 
do so, Solomon Islands became the victim of a new and dangerous mythology. It 
came to be seen as the opposite of that mysterious place of wealth and wisdom 
sought so assiduously by European adventurers.  It came to be associated with 
abject poverty and ignorance, and it is this mythology, as fanciful as the earlier 
one, that fed so readily into mainstream development discourse.  In opposition to 
the wealth, the influence and the success of the European continent, the islands of 
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Oceania, including Solomon Islands, came to be seen in almost wholly negative 
terms, the islanders themselves being cast not as victims of European 
expansionism, but as lazy incompetents who consistently failed to take advantage 
of the opportunities that that expansionism was held to accord to them.  It is this 
mythology that underlies my use of ‘island’ as a metaphor not for isolation, but 
for isolationism, for the wilful failure to exert themselves in the ways required for 
participating in that global economic success that was the dream of mainstream 
development thinking. 
4.6  Whalers and traders 
Contact between Europeans and Solomon Islanders was fleeting prior to 1870. 
However, following the early European explorers, traders (mainly to beche-de-
mer fishers and sandalwood cutters) and whalers (who brought goods such as 
fishhooks, calico, and axes) began to visit these islands (Boutilier, 1981, p. 265).  
The lives of the Neolithic agriculturalists of the islands were dramatically 
transformed both by introduced diseases and by the iron implements brought by 
these visitors to the islands (Siikala, 1982).  They were now able to clear the 
jungles, prepare gardens and wage war more efficiently than before. Furthermore, 
as Bennett (1987, p. xix) observes:  
 
Almost from initial contact [with Europeans] a dependency was created 
because Solomon Islanders wanted and soon needed Western goods. In the 
trading period this dependency did not imply any real loss of autonomy. 
However, when the continuing search for Western goods meant that some 
Islanders became a significant component of the Pacific labour pool, their 
incorporation into some colonial framework was virtually inevitable.  
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The initial encounters between Europeans and islanders were fraught with cultural 
misunderstanding which frequently led to murder and reprisals. However, during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, thousands of Solomon Islanders 
(principally from Malaita) were recruited to work as labourers on the sugarcane 
estates in Queensland (see also, Corris (1973); Wawn (1973)) and the coconut 
plantations in Fiji, a process that gradually led to acculturation (Boutilier, 1981, 
pp. 265-266).  In fact, the South Sea Evangelical Church (SSEC), one of the 
predominant Christian denominations in Solomon Islands today, was initially 
established in the sugar estates in Queensland, Australia.  In this area, the work of 
Moore (1990; 1993) provides an indispensable backdrop.   
4.7  Missionaries  
European interest in Solomon Islands was minimal until the mid-19th century 
when missionaries began to take an interest in the islands.25  The first real 
missionary attempt at Christianising the islanders involved a number of priests 
and lay brothers of the French Marist26 order who, under the direction of Bishop 
Jean-Baptiste Epalle, landed on the south coast of San Cristobal in December 
1845. From Makira, they went on to Thousand Ships Bay in Santa Isabel.  
Although Bishop Epalle was killed within only a few days of arrival in Santa 
Isabel, the remaining Marist Fathers returned to Makira.  There, following the 
                                                 
25 Much of the later missionary activity in the Solomons was via Australia (there was a British 
settlement in Sydney from 1788).  However, Leslie Fugui (1989, p. 84) notes that the “first 
clergymen to visit Solomon Islands were two Catholic priests of the Franciscan order who came 
with the Spanish explorer Mendana”.  They celebrated mass at Santa Isabel on 9th February 1568.  
A second Spanish expedition (1595) also carried priests, although the missionaries had little 
impact on Solomon Islanders at that time. 
26 These missionaries were Frenchmen, unlike the earlier Spanish clergy who had merely 
accompanied Spanish explorers, and were members of the Society of Mary. 
 
-97- 
murder of three other members of the order and the death from malaria of another, 
the effort was abandoned (Douglas & Douglas, 1994, p. 604).27  Missionary 
activity then remained dormant until later in the nineteenth century.  The later 
missionary visits included Anglicans (1852), Roman Catholics (1898), Methodists 
(1902), the South Sea Evangelical Mission (now the South Sea Evangelical 
Church) (1904), and Seventh-Day Adventists (1914).  These missionaries 
encouraged the movement of people from the bush to the coast, modified 
traditional cultures and customs, and further divided Solomon Islands society by 
adding a religious dimension, and also, importantly, provided all formal education 
and most of the health services prior to World War II (Boutilier, 1981, pp. 265-6).       
 
The impact of missionary activity is evident in the fact that 95 % of Solomon 
Islanders are now professing Christians.  This phenomenon is critical within the 
context of this thesis.  The significant thing is that, despite their differences, the 
missionaries were generally imbued with the firm belief that their role was to 
change peoples’ lives for the better.  This paternalistic outlook informed both their 
institutions and their practices.  Indeed, one could argue that missionary activity 
may be partly responsible for the ‘dependency mentality’ that has so often been 
commented on in relation to Pacific Islanders.  In this regard, the colonial 
government may have merely perpetuated an attitude that originated with 
missionary activity in the Pacific (Nabalarua, 1998).  
                                                 
27 Dr Charles Fox (1924), who studied Makira from an anthropological perspective, claimed that 
cannibalism was practised on the island but there is nothing to show that any of the three murdered 
missionaries may have ended up in someone’s (earth) oven. 
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4.8 Colonial history and political independence   
4.8.1  Colonization: British Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP)     
The declaration of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP) was a colonial 
move by Britain to thwart the French who were already in the New Hebrides (now 
Vanuatu) next door.  This was merely part of the global process of empire 
building begun by the British in parts of Africa and Asia.  From this perspective, 
the formation of a Solomon Islands society was the result of direct intervention by 
a foreign country in another society.  The administrative intervention and 
initiative by Britain was greatly assisted by the work of missionaries, but the basic 
fact remains that Solomon Islands was `born’ out of foreign interests, intervention 
and design.         
 
One other critical activity that was to bring another important dimension to 
Solomon Islanders lives was labour recruitment or `blackbirding’.  In the 1870s, 
when missionary activity was just beginning to make inroads into Solomon 
Islands society, labour recruiters also arrived in the islands seeking labour for the 
plantations in Fiji, Queensland, and occasionally New Caledonia and Samoa.  
Records estimate that some 19,000 Islanders altogether were taken to Queensland 
and more than 10,000 to Fiji (Douglas & Douglas, 1994, p. 605).  Abuses 
committed by labour recruiters, also known as `blackbirders’, frequently led to the 
murder of innocent people, particularly in the early days.  Two prominent 
Europeans lost their lives because of this practice.  One was Bishop John 
Coleridge Patteson, second Bishop of Melanesia, clubbed to death at Nukapu Reef 
Islands in 1871; the other was Commodore Goodenough of HMS Pearl who died 
from a poison arrow wound sustained in Carlisle Bay, Santa Cruz, in 1875.  It was 
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partly the deaths of these prominent individuals (as well as the ‘evils’ of the 
labour trade more generally – see Clive Moore (1990) and (1993)) that prompted 
Britain to declare a protectorate over the southern Solomon Islands (Guadalcanal, 
Savo, Malaita, San Cristobal and New Georgia) in 1893.  Later additions were 
made over the years and by 1900 the rest of Solomon Islands had become what 
was then called a British Solomon Islands Protectorate (B.S.I.P).     
 
When a British protectorate was established, there were approximately four dozen 
European traders resident in the islands.  Twelve years later, in 1905, there was a 
move to open up the country commercially.  The British Government invited 
private businesses to invest in the new territory and the managers and officials of 
Levers Pacific Plantation Ltd. visited the protectorate.  They liked what they saw 
and immediately acquired land on a large scale.  Coconut plantations began 
almost immediately and by 1940 the company had more than 8000 hectares under 
cultivation.  Two other companies acquired interest in the Solomons in the early 
20th Century: Burns Philp & Co. Ltd of Sydney, and the Malayta Company.  The 
latter sold out to W.R. Carpenter & Co. Ltd in the 1930s. On the whole, however, 
economic development of Solomon Islands progressed sluggishly before World 
War II. Overseas companies were initially engaged only in plantation 
development, largely involving coconuts for copra exports.  This concentration on 
plantation agriculture led to an uneven distribution of development activity and 
employment opportunity (which were concentrated in certain areas, and on some 
islands, especially those with good natural harbours where ships could easily 
collect the copra).  The corollary of plantation development was head tax which 
was imposed on locals by the colonial government.  This forced people, especially 
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young men, to move from their villages to other islands to find work to pay for the 
head tax. In this way, cheap labour for the plantation was ensured.  The 
beginnings of uneven and distorted development in Solomon Islands were, 
therefore, already in evidence.  As Bennett (1987) has noted, what we see here is 
the beginning of the erosion of the autonomy and independence of indigenous 
Solomon Islanders.          
 
One can only speculate on what might have happened in Solomon Islands, or the 
world generally for that matter, had the Second World War not happened.  As it 
was, most of the planters and traders in the Solomons group were evacuated to 
Australia after the Japanese entered the war in 1942.  Solomon Islands played a 
crucial role in World War II, the major turning point of the Pacific campaign 
being a fiercely fought battle between the allied forces and the Japanese Imperial 
navy off Savo Island, near Guadalcanal, in August 1942. Indeed, from May 1942, 
when the Battle of the Coral Sea was fought, until December 1943, the Solomons 
were almost constantly a scene of battle.  Eventually, in February 1943, the 
Japanese army withdrew from Guadalcanal.  By December 1943, the allied forces 
were in command of the northern Solomons.   
 
When civil administration resumed, the British authorities found that Tulagi, the 
former capital, an islet off Ngella/Florida Islands, had been destroyed completely 
during the war.  It was therefore decided to relocate the capital to Honiara on the 
north coast of Guadalcanal where it is today.  This was the site of an important 
campaign against the Japanese during the war and an important US military base.  
Moreover, the site was only 16km west of Henderson Field (now the Solomon 
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Islands international airport), a major wartime air field, built by the Japanese but 
named by the Americans after one of their own fighter pilots who had died in the 
Guadalcanal campaign.  Point Cruz, the major port area in Honiara today, is also 
said to be the place where Mendaña and his ships anchored during their first visit 
to the Solomons, and Holy Cross, where the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Honiara 
now sits at the top of a small hill, is where Mendaña and his men are said to have 
placed a cross in honour of the Spanish monarch and of their own achievement. 
4.8.2  Maasina Ruru  
After the war, especially between 1946 and 1950, a good deal of official attention 
was devoted to a native movement known as Maasina ruru (Marching Rule) (see 
also for more detail, Keesing (1978; 1982; 1992) and Laracy (1983)).  Begun in 
Malaita, this movement spread to some of the nearby islands, including Ulawa 
Island. Maasina ruru was an entirely indigenous protest movement against 
colonial rule although it was imbued with a religious cargo-cult (Worsley, 1968) 
orientation.  Detecting its anti-British or colonial ideals, the administration had 
many of the leaders gaoled in late 1948, crushing a sullen defiance of government 
authority and weakening considerably the movement itself.  This protest 
movement was at the forefront of British administration thinking when the 
decision to grant independence to Solomon Islands was taken.  There were other 
indigenous protest movements, including one that centred on the followers of 
Silas Eto (Holy Mana) who broke away from the Methodist Church to form the 
Christian Fellowship Church in 1959-60.  This breakaway movement was, it has 
been suggested, as much a symbolic rejection of colonial rule as was the Maasina 
ruru movement.  On Guadalcanal, another notable protest movement was the 
Moro movement which centred on Makaruka, located on the southern part or 
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weather coast of Guadalcanal (Davenport & Coker, 1967).  Moro’s followers 
were dissatisfied with colonial rule during the 1960s and wanted to return to the 
old ways of custom and self-sufficiency.  Another Guadalcanal-based protest 
movement was the Custom Company referred to as also as ‘The Society for the 
Development of native Races-western Guadalcanal’ and led by Matthew 
Belamatanga (Bennett, 1987).   
 
What these protest movements demonstrated was a dislike for, and rejection of, 
British colonial rule.  The war had taught the locals some important lessons.  The 
American soldiers, in the experience of the Solomon Islanders, did not 
discriminate in the way that the British colonial administrators did.  Solomon 
Islanders who helped out in the war effort as coast-watchers or carriers observed 
that black soldiers fought alongside their fellow white Americans against the 
Japanese. Even long after the end of the war, Americans were viewed favourably 
amongst Solomon Islanders.  The British colonial administrators, on the other 
hand, were perceived very poorly by the islanders, one significant aspect of this 
being the willingness with which they accepted evacuation to Australia during the 
war.  During times of peace, the British administrators often adopted an 
aggressive stance towards Solomon Islanders; at the outset of war, however, they 
fled (see for example, Gina (2003), especially Chapter 8, pp. 159-184).  
 
In response to local protest, and having been weakened considerably by World 
War II, Britain began to make changes in the system of government, changes that 
were evident from the end of the war through to the early 1970s.  After that, 
Britain moved rapidly towards granting political independence.  Thus, for 
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example, when civil administration resumed after the war, an advisory council, 
originally established in 1921, was re-established.  In 1960, however, that 
advisory council was replaced by a legislative council and an executive council. In 
1970, under a new constitution, a new single government council replaced both 
the legislative council and the executive council.  The new single government 
council sat for the first time in July 1971. In April 1974, a new constitution was 
adopted.  In mid-1975, the name Solomon Islands was officially adopted in place 
of British Solomon Islands Protectorate.  On 2 January 1976, Solomon Islands 
became an internally self-governing state.  Political independence followed on 7th 
July 1978. Initially, the transition from colonial rule to political independence was 
relatively peaceful, although the abrupt departure of the British, together with 
inadequate preparation for independence, helped to create the circumstances that 
led to the upheavals of 1998 and the ethnic conflict of 1998–2003.  These events 
are critical to an understanding of social and economic development in Solomon 
Islands after independence (see Chapter 5).  Sam Alasia (1997, pp. 3-4) sums up 
some of these apparent contradictions as follows:  
 
From 1893 to 1945, the colonial administration did nothing to encourage 
Solomon Islanders to participate in the affairs of the country. Generally, 
Solomon Islanders were relegated to being passive subjects of colonial 
rule.  Their opinions were not sought and their wishes ignored.  They were 
subject to a government not responsive to their wishes.  In addition, the 
colonial government laid the basis for a centralised government and it did 
so at the cost of ignoring, and in some instances challenging, traditional 
leadership systems by appointing headmen from amongst those 
sympathetic to their . . .  cause, rather than those held in high regard by the 
communities involved. . . . This gave rise to the emergence of a new group 
of leaders who were often not recognised in the traditional context and, in 
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cases, did not have the support of the entire community. . . . [Thus the] 
manner in which the colonial administration carried out its affairs led to 
the displacement of Solomon Islanders from the political process – they 
were not participants, but rather, passive subjects answering to the needs 
and demands of the colonial institution.  
 
Alasia (1997, p. 4) insisted that such deliberate disregard for, and mistreatment of, 
Solomon Islanders by the British colonial administration “caused many Solomon 
Islanders to resent the government and rebel against its authority”.            
4.8.3  Kastom  
In this thesis, I use the word kastom rather differently from the more specific 
sense in which it is used by Akin (see for example, (2005)). I use it simply in the 
sense of ‘culture’ and/or ‘tradition’ rather than as a signal of cultural opposition to 
central authority and control (Akin, 2005, p.76), a sense in which it would also 
have been possible to use the term.  It is this more general sense of kastom I have 
in mind in proposing an essentially tripartite explication of contemporary 
Solomon Islands society in terms of kastom, church and state/government. In 
Ulawa, this general understanding of kastom would be translated as tolaha (way) 
or tolaha-ka (way-our), as opposed to say, tolaha-ni-haka (way-of-ship, i.e. 
European way).   
 
It is important, however, to bear in mind another approach to the 
conceptualisation of kastom. Many anthropologists, in discussing kastom, draw 
attention to the fact that it can represent a more or less conscious ideology of 
opposition. This understanding of kastom is not restricted to the Solomon Islands. 
It is used with reference to Melanesia more generally (see for example, Burt, 
1982; Jolly 1982; Keesing, 1982 a & b; 1992; Larcom, 1982; Lindstrom, 1982; 
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Tonkinson, 1982, a & b). Although “there is significant variation in how Solomon 
Islanders  . . . conceive of kastom”, and consequently how government officials 
feel they can evoke it in different contexts, “it is Malaitans who have most 
developed and deployed kastom as a potent political ideology, and who have 
mounted the most effective challenges to government power” (Akin, 2005, p.80).  
Indeed, “Malaitans have for 60 years been much the dominant force in the 
political history of kastom in the Solomons, and they have been key players in 
events surrounding the recent chaos that has crippled the government” (p. 75).  
 
Akin notes that “[governments] of the Solomon Islands have lagged behind other 
Melanesian states such as Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea in the cultivation of 
kastom as an ideological tool” (Akin, 2005, p.76). Although he notes that there are 
“many reasons why kastom has remained an ineffective political resource for most 
Solomon elites”28, Akin does not explore these reasons in any detail, observing 
that “examination of complexities specific to kastom and different elites must wait 
another venue” (Akin, 2005, p.76). He does, however, note that successive 
Solomon Islands governments have recognised that promoting kastom too 
strongly might “strengthen the position of local kastom authorities and provide 
them with additional ideological weapons”, adding that “[this] has made them 
wary of an idea that they cannot control” (p. 80).        
 
In the Solomon Islands, as in other areas of the Pacific, kastom has important 
social, historical and political dimensions. It involves “social and community 
                                                 
28 David Akin (2005, p.76) notes that “analysis of this subject must distinguish between the `state’ 
and `elites’ – although they obviously share important characteristics and people, they are not 
synonymous, particularly vis-à-vis kastom”.  
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ideals and perceived threats to them”, especially threats to community autonomy 
(Akin, 2005, p.76). Thus, in Malaita in particular, there has been long and active 
resistance to threats to autonomy which have involved “[rallying] around the flag 
of kastom” (p. 76). So for many Solomon Islanders, Malaitans in particular, 
kastom is often associated with an ideology of resistance. It emerged in the form 
of resistance to the British colonial government after the World War 2.  Later, 
during and after independence, it continued to be a powerful political symbol 
(Keesing, 1982, p. 297) which was, for example, associated with the Kwaio 
Fadanga of Malaita (pp. 363-366).   
 
As indicated in the preceding discussion, kastom has a range of possible 
interpretations. It can be interpreted in a general cultural sense as involving those 
contemporary beliefs and practices that have arisen out of, and are related to, 
traditional pre-contact beliefs and practices or it can be interpreted in an 
essentially political sense as involving culturally-centred opposition to authority 
(including opposition to colonial and post-colonial governments).  It is in the first 
of these senses that the term is used in this thesis. 
 
So a more nuanced reading of kastom other than the way I have used it in the 
thesis entails a form of ideology that seeks to consciously protect, preserve even, 
the autonomy of indigenous societies from outside forces and influences. In this 
manner kastom is a politically charged concept. Which thus begs the question; in 
the absence of the colonial government, how does one reconcile kastom with the 
contemporary system of government in the Solomon Islands? This is an issue I 
take up later (in Chapter 6). 
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4.8.4  Solomon Islands independence    
4.8.4.1 Post-World War II  
Solomon Islands as a sovereign and political entity is essentially a post-World 
War II phenomenon.  It is important, in attempting to understand exactly how and 
why Solomon Islands gained political independence, to locate Solomon Islands in 
the global context of World War II.  Following the war, Britain was involved in 
major reconstruction at home.  In that context, Solomon Islands, a distant outpost 
like other Pacific colonies, was one whose infrastructure (limited as it was) had 
been subjected to extensive damage during the war.  Furthermore, the war had had 
a huge impact on the attitudes and perceptions of indigenous Solomon Islanders in 
relation to the British colonial administrators.  Formal protest combined with anti-
colonial movements of various kinds had become commonplace.  All of this 
indicated to the British that they could no longer take their colonial rule over the 
islanders for granted. 
4.8.4.2  Decolonisation in the 1960s and 70s  
Decolonisation of what came to be known as Third World countries became a 
world-wide process in the 1960s and 1970s.  In the case of Solomon Islands, 
neither issues relating to society generally, nor issues relating specifically to 
development had been clearly articulated at the point of independence.  Anti-
colonial rhetoric characterised the development agenda.  This anti-colonial 
rhetoric, often accompanied by other ideologies such as ‘nation-building’ and 
‘social and economic development’, seems to have had a significant impact on 
national development policy and planning, the underlying assumption being that if 
government took care of the polity and the economy, the rest of society, 
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particularly in the social and cultural domains, would be able to take care of itself 
(see Chapter 5).  
4.9  Solomon Islands modernity 
By world standards, Solomon Islands is a relatively young nation which has not 
yet had time to put in place the institutions and practices that are required to 
establish and sustain stability.  It is, furthermore, a nation which is the outcome of 
global and historical processes of European imperialism and colonialism.  It is 
only when these two things are clearly understood that the nature of contemporary 
Solomon Islands society can be appreciated. 
 
For any society, the past is both a point of reference and of departure; it is the 
source of a sense of origin and of identity and belonging; it is fundamental to 
positioning.  In other words, the past defines the present and the present in turn 
defines the future.  Memory and remembering play an important part in that sense 
of movement, action and continuity that characterises human societies.  In 
Oceania, traditional cultures encode recollections of the past in song, dance, art 
and craft, naming and story-telling, all of which contribute to their histories as do, 
for example, historical documents, such as, in the case of Solomon Islands, the 
Constitution.  
 
The Solomon Islands Constitution represents a political definition of Solomon 
Islands rather than a social or cultural one.  To understand Solomon Islands, it is 
necessary to understand its diversity, the variety of its peoples, its lands and its 
customs.  This variety is not evident when the ‘nation’ is constitutionally (read 
politically) defined in terms of institutional structures, powers and procedures. 
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Nor is Kastom, the traditional practices that inform the lives of the people, evident 
in the apparently uniform legal system.  Underlying the appearance of uniformity 
that accompanies nationhood is the diversity that is evidenced in the different 
languages, ethnicities and cultural practices of the peoples.  
 
The point here is that Solomon Islands society, as defined constitutionally, is a 
recent development, the imposition of an externally defined unity.  The 
indigenous people of the islands that now constitute a single political entity had 
no choice but to accede to the principles which underpin the Constitution and 
Constitutional Law.  Thus, although political independence was generally 
peaceful in the initial stages, it was not without controversy.  In Gizo, a protest led 
by Peter Salaka of the Short Islands and other prominent individuals from the 
western Solomons during independence day, called for the Western part of the 
Solomons nearest to Bougainville and PNG to secede from the rest of the country 
(see Gina (2003), especially Chapter 9, pp. 187-99).  In fact, as Kabutaulaka 
(1999) has observed, the people of Guadalcanal also resisted, calling for a federal 
system of government at the time of independence.  
 
Written Constitutions, including that of Solomon Islands, are products of their 
own times and places and are underpinned by the values and principles of those to 
whose tradition they belong.  They do not necessarily sit comfortably with the 
values and attitudes of traditional societies where ‘kastom’ is a significant factor 
in the daily lives of the people.  Issues relating to development and reform in the 
Solomons cannot be fully understood unless this is taken into account. 
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Tarcisus Kabutaulaka, an academic from Guadalcanal, has argued that the 
underlying causes of the ethnic conflict in the Solomons relate, in large measure, 
to three major factors: land, disrespect and social issues/unemployment 
(Kabutaulaka, 1999).  These are the types of issue that inevitably occupy every 
rural community in Solomon Islands today.  What this suggests is that ethnic 
conflict in Solomon Islands is really a ‘kastom row’ played out in a modern 
setting and amplified by the media.  However, Andrew Nori (2002), a lawyer 
from Malaita, argues that changing the system of government from a provincial to 
a federal one will not necessarily address the development issues which are said to 
have contributed to the ethnic conflict.  He argues that much of what can be done, 
what needs to be done to ensure that development activities impact positively on 
rural communities, is already embodied within existing laws, in particular the 
Provincial Government Act 1981 (amended, repealed and reinstated up to 1997).  
Even so, the national government under the leadership of Sir Allan Kemakeza was 
keen to press on with plans to change to a federal system, believing that this is 
what the majority of Solomon Islanders want (John Tuhaika, n.d.).  It is in this 
context that the issue of state reform is discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
Overall, whilst the Government and other interested parties have tried to work 
within the framework of the Constitution, the militants (both Isatabu Freedom 
Movement and Malaita Eagle Force) have appeared to be operating within the 
framework of the differing `kastoms’ of Guadalcanal and Malaita.  In this sense, 
recent ethnic conflict can be seen as part of a ‘crisis of legitimacy’, one that is 
underpinned by the belief of the people of Guadalcanal and Malaita that their own 
particular kastom-based ideologies should be reflected in the Constitution.  In that 
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the legitimacy of existing state and national institutional structures is under 
scrutiny, so also is the present form of governance, including the national 
development policy and planning practices.  
 
Currently, RAMSI appears to be effective in restoring law and order and in 
assisting in ensuring economic recovery in Solomon Islands.  However, if 
RAMSI’s work is to be consolidated in the longer term, the issue of the 
underlying conflict between Constitutional law and kastom needs to be adequately 
addressed (see also John Naitoro (2000)).29  
 
Kastom is based on values and principles that play an important part in the lives of 
ordinary people in the Solomons.30  Thus, for example, although the rationale 
underlying each relates to some concept of justice, Constitutional Law, with its 
emphasis on corrective institutions and custodial practices, adopts a clinical 
approach based on rehabilitation, whereas kastom, with its emphasis on 
compensation processes, embodies the concept of restitution, involving mending 
or restoring social and cultural/kin relationships.  For Solomon Islanders, the issue 
of whether one form of justice - rehabilitation or socially-based restitution – is 
more legitimate than the other is a critical one, particularly as there are those 
whose personal interests are best served by exploiting the apparent lacunae 
                                                 
29 This point is reinforced by the outbreak of violence that accompanied the April 2006 election of 
the Prime Minister. 
30 I remember, in particular, being told about a woman from an Island in the Solomons who 
continually referred to her three young daughters as potential ‘stoa’ (literally, store or shop).  That 
is, she was anticipating the future when her daughters would fetch a handsome `bride-price’ .This 
sort of anecdotal evidence indicates the significance of kastom. 
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between the two. If not attended to, this issue may have serious implications for 
the future of Solomon Islands society, post-RAMSI.    
 
The fact that the ideals of the Constitution may be foreign to traditional ways of 
thinking and behaving does not mean that Solomon Islanders will not adapt 
themselves to the values and principles that underlie the legal constitution.  
However, they are much less likely to do so if the kastoms that are familiar to 
rural dwellers in particular are not taken into account.  Thus, for example, 
although many of the alleged offenders have been apprehended by the police and 
have served time in prison (Constitutional Law), Guadalcanal Islanders maintain 
that the murder of some of their kinsfolk by Malaitans in the recent past has not 
been compensated (Kastom).  This is a classic example of the apparent 
contradiction between Constitutional Law and kastom in Solomon Islands (Nori, 
2001), one that needs to be addressed urgently by Solomon Islands legal 
practitioners and custodians.  
 
The betel nut metaphor introduced earlier has underpinned the overview of 
Solomon Islands society provided thus far.  The betel nut husk (state/ 
Constitution) and inner core (kastom) have been introduced.  What remains to 
introduce is the lime and lif (the role of the Church).   
 
Bishop Terry Brown (2003, ¶ 3) has observed that: 
 
The three institutions of Solomon Islands life are the traditional culture 
(‘custom’), the church and the civil state, listing them in the order in which 
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they reached the Solomons.  Over the past century, the first two have been 
strong, the third weak.  This is still the case.    
 
In the context of what could be seen as a crisis of legitimacy, the role of the 
Church needs to be considered.  In this context, it is important to note that 
approximately 90% of Solomon Islanders profess to be Christian.  The Church, 
therefore, can and does play a significant role in peoples’ perceptions of, and 
attitudes towards, Constitutional law and ‘kastom’/traditional practices. It is the 
third critical component of the social and political brew. 
4.10  Contemporary Solomon Islands:  A society of ‘wantoks’   
As indicated in 4.1, the word ‘wantok’ can be used in a variety of different ways.  
Although it can be used to signal a type of collective identity or national 
consciousness, it can also be used with reference to those clan-based family 
groupings which characterise traditional islands society.  
 
These different uses of the word ‘wantok’ sum up differing perspectives on 
contemporary Solomon Islands society.  Although most contemporary Solomon 
Islanders come from island and clan-based family groupings, many do not.  For 
example, there are the i-Kiribati who came to Solomon Islands before 
independence from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (now Kiribati and Tuvalu 
respectively); there are the descendants of Hong Kong Chinese who have made 
Solomon Islands their home; there are, residing mainly in urban areas (especially 
Honiara), peoples from other areas of the Pacific.  This diversity is evident in the 
previous national parliament of (December 2001 – March 2006): the Minister of 
Finance had a New Zealand background; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a local 
businessman, was the son of a wealthy Hong Kong Chinese merchant trader; the 
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sitting member of parliament for West Honiara, also a wealthy local businessman, 
came initially from Japan.  
 
The various uses of the word ‘wantok’ provide a metaphoric framework in which 
issues of national identity and consciousness can be addressed.  The metaphor of 
the betel nut provides a context for the discussion of complex issues of the 
interaction between State, kastom and Church.  The island metaphor provides a 
context for the discussion of the relevance, or otherwise, of mainstream 
development discourse.  Taken together, these three metaphors inform the 
discussion of development and state reform in Solomon Islands. Running through 
this discussion is the concept and practice of reciprocity, a concept and practice 
that has significant implications for Solomon Islands generally (Bennett, 1987), 
and for issues associated with development in particular. 
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Chapter 5 
National development policy and planning  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In a general sense, national development policy and planning is a complex and 
multi-dimensional phenomenon (Todaro, 2000) which is conceived of in terms of 
progress, as a means-to-an-end - part of that wider understanding of societal 
change that involves technical and bureaucratic processes of social engineering 
(Bendix, 1962; Weber, 1976).  This conception is underpinned by European/ 
Western social thought as inherited from the Enlightenment, a critical aspect of 
which is its theoretical conception as the manifestation of Reason (see Chapter 3). 
National development policy and planning therefore encapsulate the historical 
experience of the Occident (as opposed to that of the Orient).  It is an expression 
of that confidence in human rationality that led Karl Marx (1950; 1970) to object 
that philosophers have merely interpreted social reality, the real challenge and 
imperative being to change it, the implication being that it can be changed for the 
better.  In this sense, national development policy and planning in Solomon 
Islands can be seen as a bureaucratic process with important political dimensions.  
5.2  Development planning in the South Pacific 
The South Pacific Islands region has a very particular economic and geographical 
nature.  It is made up of small and scattered tropical islands which are 
characterised by highly open mixed economies, largely involving the production 
of primary commodities.  The private sector, conceived of as the engine of 
economic growth, is generally treated as being ‘sacred’, the result being that 
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governments generally plan only for the public sector, any intervention in the 
private sector being largely restricted to the indication of priority areas and the 
offering of investment incentives in line with national development policy 
objectives.  There is, in addition, a pragmatic awareness that the particular 
characteristics of the region are such that development plans can be seen as broad 
guidelines to assist in a movement towards development and modernisation rather 
than as “rigid blueprints for modernization” (Chand, 1984, p. 764).  
 
Chand (1984, p. 765) has argued that there are three different, but not entirely 
dissimilar, approaches to national development planning in the South Pacific 
Islands, all of which are underpinned by the rationale of economic growth.  Most 
countries begin with a “capital development budget” approach; some adopt an 
“integrated public investment programme” approach; others adopt a 
“comprehensive planning” approach, generally involving complex mathematical 
models and the establishment of “a set of clear objectives and relatively precise 
targets” for from three to five years, and allocating resources in line with specific 
targets which are generally determined by the government of the day.  According 
to Chand, most countries in the South Pacific, apart from Solomon Islands, had 
adopted a comprehensive planning approach by the early 1980s.  The fact that 
Solomon Islands was an exception to this suggests that political factors may have 
been more significant than pragmatic ones (see the following discussion).  
 
According to Chand (1984, p. 768), national development planning involves “a 
combination of top-down and bottom-up procedures” and five sequential stages:  
identification of national objectives; definition of the overall development 
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strategy;  creation of development plans and their translation into a series of 
programmes; implementation of the plans; and monitoring and evaluation.  In 
Solomon Islands, the political imperatives, together with the fact that the public 
service sector operates at the behest of whatever politicians are in power, ensures 
that national development policy and planning is a highly centralised, bureaucratic 
activity.  
 
The political and bureaucratic nature of national development policy and planning 
in Solomon Islands is clarified in the following discussion which begins with a 
consideration of development thinking and practice under British rule and goes on 
to consider the impact of political independence.  
5.3  Development planning: British Solomon Islands Protectorate 
As in the case of Fiji, Solomon Islands, as a former British colony or protectorate, 
was subject to “the introduction by the United Kingdom of the Commonwealth 
Development and Welfare Grant Scheme under which British colonies were 
required to submit development plans in order to qualify for financial aid” 
(Government of Fiji, Fiji’s Sixth Development Plan, 1971-75, Suva, 1970).  Thus, 
the initial move towards development planning was a colonial government 
initiative.  
 
Before the country gained political independence, the British produced at least six 
development plans in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate.  Of these, I have 
been able to locate only the last two - DP5 and DP6.  These are dated 1968 – 70 
(DPS 5) and 1971 – 73 (DPS 6), suggesting a three yearly planning cycle (with 
the initial plan almost certainly having been introduced in the 1950s).  The Fifth 
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Development Plan 1968-1970 provides a glimpse of the motivation for the 
preceding two (DPS 5, p. 1):  
 
2. The objective of the Fifth Development Plan remains as for the Third 
and Fourth Development Plans:-  
“To develop the national and human resources of the Protectorate 
with the object of strengthening the economy to enable the 
standards of living in all sectors of the community to be raised.”          
 
Thus, development planning was conceived of as a government responsibility that 
involved ensuring that the country’s human and natural resources were developed 
in such a way as to help build up the economy in order to raise the standard of 
living of the islanders.  What this brief statement reveals is that the colonial 
government had definite views about (a) the need for development and (b) the 
purpose of that development – to raise the standard of living.  Inevitably, this 
conception of development was based on British experience and had a clear 
political dimension.  
 
This Fifth Development Plan is a clear example of a ‘capital development budget’ 
approach (see section 5.2 above).  In retrospect, such an approach to development 
planning can be seen as a consequence of the need to rebuild the economy of the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate following World War II which ended just a 
few years earlier, in 1945.  Indeed, a document produced in June 1965 - The 
Development of the Economy of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate - clearly 
indicates the development planning philosophy of the times.  It incorporates a 
number of conclusions, including two “particularly necessary” things for the 
“future economic development of the Solomon Islands”: “greater knowledge of 
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the territory’s potentialities” and a “comprehensive view of its economic 
structure” (p. 35). 
 
Before reaching those conclusions, the authors of this Report note that the 
“economic structure of the British Solomon Islands is determined . . . by its 
geographical layout” which was seen as having critical economic implications for 
development planning (p. 1):  
 
From an economic point of view . . . the group consists of a large number 
of separate units of production, most of which are separated by long over 
water distances; and moreover, while so far as their external trade is 
concerned the relative importance of the islands varies considerably (and 
not necessarily in accordance with the size of their populations) no one of 
them has a dominating position compared with the others.  
 
It was evident to the authors of this Report that this plantation-based economy 
was predisposed to uneven development: only those islands deemed suitable for 
coconut plantations would have their own unit of production.  Contextual realities 
of this kind were to have a considerable impact on development thinking at the 
time of political independence.  
 
The June 1965 Report records the main exports from the British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate for the period 1958-1964.  Although copra was the major export, 
there were other export commodities (such as trochus shells, timber and cocoa) 
whose volume was considered insufficient to justify quantification (p. 3):  
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Table 5.1: Main Exports – 1958-1964 (%)31
Commodity 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Copra 95.7 90.1 87.2 88.8 91.5 91.5 88.3 
 
The figures for trochus shell, timber and cocoa, while undoubtedly important, 
were not available with enough consistency to make longitudinal comparisons. 
 
What the above figures clearly demonstrate is that the economy of the British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate was essentially a plantation economy based on a 
single export commodity, copra.  It is therefore not surprising that the colony had 
to rely heavily on foreign aid in order to finance its development plans.  Nor is it 
surprising that multinational companies took the opportunity of investing in 
Solomon Islands plantations.  
 
The colonial government hoped to address the issue of lack of economic diversity, 
Therefore, one of the ‘particularly necessary’ things the report highlighted was the 
need for “greater knowledge of the territory’s potentialities” in relation to soil 
characteristics and the possibility of growing crops that would be suitable for 
export.  The second ‘particularly necessary’ thing was gaining a “comprehensive 
view of [the] economic structure [of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate]”, 
with particular emphasis on the problems associated with the scattered nature of 
the islands and the difficulties of communicating and transporting goods both 
within and beyond the islands (p. 35).  These difficulties were compounded by 
disparities among the different islands in terms of population density and in terms 
                                                 
31 Source: The development of the economy of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate – June 
1965 
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of “their degree of participation in an exchange [capitalist/market] economy” 
(p.35).  
 
Solomon Islands became a British protectorate in 1893. The fact that it clearly had 
little idea of the development potentialities of that protectorate in 1965 (seventy 
years later) indicates an astonishing degree of complacency and neglect.  In fact, 
following the Second World War, especially during the late 1940s and 1950s, 
active local protest movements against the colonial administration emerged in the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate (see Chapter 4) and British attempts at 
development planning and administrative and political reform should be seen in 
this context.  To some extent at least, the British development efforts represented 
little more than an attempt to appease Solomon Islanders. In such a context, the 
argument that Britain did not prepare Solomon Islands adequately for political 
independence seems unavoidable.  In fact, British interest in its Pacific Islands 
territories appears to have been focused largely on Fiji. The Western Pacific High 
Commission was located in Suva, the capital of Fiji and this office had 
administrative oversight not only over the Solomon Island Protectorate, but also 
over other territories such as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, now two separate 
independent nations, Kiribati and Tuvalu respectively.   
 
The type of development planning employed by the British can be described as 
involving a ‘capital development project’ approach.  The total funds available to 
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finance the Plan amount to about eight million dollars (AUS)32.  The DP5 
development budget (p. 1) provides an illustration of this (see Table 5.2 below):  
Table 5.2: Sources of Funds to Finance Fifth Development Plan33  
Source       $AUS 
Allocation of Colonial Development and Welfare Funds notified 
by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs     
4, 910, 300
Other Funds controlled by the Minister of Overseas 
Department to finance research 
         597, 900
Protectorate Special Funds (Japanese Assets and Trading  
Corporation Realisation 
          189, 000
Contribution from Protectorate Budget 352, 100
Australian South Pacific Technical Assistance Programme       77, 100 
Bank Loans 1, 610, 000
United Nations Development Programme             25, 000
World Health Organization/United Nations Children Fund 147, 500
United Kingdom Technical Assistance               4, 000
Oxford famine Relief   17, 000
Total Funds Available               7, 929, 900
Add for planning purposes only 10% of Commonwealth  
Development and Welfare allocation 
          491, 000
Total used for planning purposes           $8, 420, 900
         
More than half of the budget was derived from Colonial Development and 
Welfare Funds ($4,910,300), the remainder coming largely from bank loans 
which contributed over one and half million dollars ($1,610,000).  Contributions 
from the Protectorate’s own budget are less than a quarter of a million dollars 
($352,100).  This illustrates the high level of dependency of the Protectorate on 
external funding and foreign aid.  It also clearly demonstrates that economic 
development in the Protectorate had been insufficient to generate the amount 
required.  This state of affairs had not improved significantly by the time DP6 was 
released (1 June 1971).  In this context, it is important to bear in mind that prior to 
                                                 
32 After World War 2, the Australian dollar was the currency in use in Solomon Islands until that 
was replaced by the Solomon Islands dollar at independence in July 1978.  The Australian dollar 
was gradually phased out after that.    
33 Source: DP5 
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World War II, much of the development activity in the islands (apart from that 
conducted by multinationals and individual planters and traders) was conducted 
by missionaries and the Christian churches.  These activities also centred on 
plantations, but also and perhaps more significantly, involved efforts to strengthen 
communication and transport and included the establishment of training 
institutions, schools, clinics and hospitals.  In fact, only one secondary school was 
ever built in the Solomons by the British government. 
 
A careful reading of DP5 and DP6 clearly illustrates the fact that the British 
colonial government, when it did eventually decide to become more active in the 
protectorate, controlled the whole national development process.  Thus, for 
example, DP5 refers to three important changes in relation to previous 
development plans. One of these was that Colonial Development and Welfare 
funds could now be applied only to capital projects (rather than to both recurrent 
and capital projects).  This meant that recurrent projects were to be funded from 
sources other than the Colonial and Welfare funds.  This decision was reflected in 
the following principles (Fifth Development Plan 1968-1970, p. 2):  
 
8. The following principles have been observed in selecting projects for 
inclusion in the Plan:-  
(1) certain projects which were undertaken during the Fourth Plan 
period and which have not yet been completed have naturally 
had to take first priority in the Fifth Plan;  
(2) in deciding what new projects should be included consideration 
has been given to the requirements of agreed policy as 
expressed in White Papers agreed by the Legislative Council 
and as modified by the capacity of the Departments of 
Government to implement such projects and by the aid ceilings 
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imposed for development expenditure in 1968, and likely to be 
imposed for 1969.  
 
The underlying rationale appears to have been the avoidance of waste.  Prudence 
and sound management appear to have been the order of the day.  From Britain’s 
point of view, this was perfectly reasonable at a time when Britain itself was also 
rebuilding after the ravages of World War II.  However, in imposing such 
restrictions, the government was exercising its sole sovereign authority in such a 
way as to limit the development of the protectorate, something that highlights 
those issues of accountability that were raised in Chapter 1. 
 
The second change to which reference is made in DP5 is the decision to group 
projects into six categories (rather than into four categories as was previously the 
case) (Fifth Development Plan 1968-1970, p.3):  
 
Table 5.3: Fifth Development Plan: Classification of Major Projects34 
Project classification $AUS %
Administration and Organization 356, 000           4.31
Physical survey and Census 170, 000 2.06
Communications 2, 116, 000         25.62
Natural Resources 2, 328, 300 28.19
Social 3, 209, 800 38.96
Miscellaneous 79, 500       0.96
Total Committed 8, 259, 600        100
Uncommitted 161, 300  
Colonial Development and Welfare 
allocation as described  in para. 8 (4) 
          8, 420, 900  
 
Although no direct comparisons can be made between DP5 and previous 
development plans, it is clear from the breakdown of actual costs and percentages 
                                                 
34 Source:DP5  
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for the various projects that more was to be spent on “economic and 
communications schemes” than had previously been the case, with less being 
spent on “education and medical projects” (p. 2).  A target figure of $161,300 
remained uncommitted in order to allow for (a) a degree of flexibility should 
preliminary estimates prove to be too low; (b) the inevitable carry over from year 
to year (without upsetting too seriously the balance of new projects planned for 
the succeeding year); (c) the inclusion of some small new projects (p. 2).  Such a 
small exigency fund suggests a high level of confidence in the planning process, 
something that seems difficult to justify in the light of actual achievements. 
 
The third change referred to in DP 5 was the intention to cap the actual rate of 
expenditure to an annual ceiling approved by the British Government (as opposed 
to controlling the expenditure on schemes over the period of the plan as a whole) 
(p. 2):   
 
(3) in the years 1964 to 1966 underspending on Colonial Development and 
Welfare account has been as much as 40% of expenditure.  It has 
accordingly been judged prudent to plan for expenditure on this account 
10% in excess of known allocations for the years 1968/1969 and 
19169/1970.  Actual expenditure will be controlled strictly in accordance 
with the annual estimated provision as approved by the Legislative 
Council.           
 
The three changes to which reference has been made (the limitation of Colonial 
Development and Welfare funds to capital projects; the percentage reduction in 
spending on education and medical projects; annual project funding capping) were 
no doubt, from the British government’s perspective, simply pragmatic measures 
designed to avoid wastage and to ensure the success of the plans.  However, they 
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did not represent any growth in understanding of the real needs and interests of 
the people of the islands.  This is particularly true in the case of the percentage 
reduction in spending on education and medical projects.  Furthermore, DP5 (p. 
3) introduced some significant caveats, including a surprisingly direct statement 
that the plan was not based on any professional economic appraisal, and a 
decision not to include either private sector projects or projects requiring more 
than a two year implementation period:  
 
11. The Plan does no more than set out projects in the public sector which 
it is intended should be implemented in the two year period 1968 – 1970. 
It does not embrace projects in the private sector and is based on no 
professional economic appraisal, nor are national income statistics 
available from which a projection can be made of the effects of the 
developments planned.  Nevertheless, it is considered that the individual 
schemes reflect a proper sense of priorities and a balanced approach to the 
development of the protectorate as a whole.  
 
In other words, the British government was not prepared to conduct the type of 
research that is necessary for effective development planning.  Its so-called 
‘proper sense of priorities’ and ‘balanced approach’ were based on nothing more 
than assumption. It had nothing to say about the real needs of the islanders, 
nothing to say about why the projects identified were considered important or 
what benefits were expected as a result of their implementation.  At best, this 
approach could be described as blind optimism on the part of the British 
administration; at worst, as culpable neglect of its responsibilities.  There appears 
to have been no sense of accountability for the effects of this type of inadequate 
planning activity.  
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Needless to say, the same sense of ‘blind optimism’ evident in DP5 is also evident 
in DP6.  It is stated in the Introduction to DP6 that the plan “sets the pace for 
major transformation of the economy of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate” 
(Sixth Development Plan 1971-1973, p. 4).  It is envisaged, in particular, that 
during the 1970s there would be “increased participation in and responsibility for 
policy formulation by the Protectorate’s own citizens, investment in major new 
projects in agriculture, forestry and mining and the achievement of an educational 
system designed to produce the manpower needed to sustain and expand the 
economy as well as attain a high degree of localization of posts presently held by 
expatriates” (p. 4).  Even so, although the continuing substantial dependence of 
the economy on the public sector is noted, it is not addressed. Furthermore, the 
document itself again refers (as in the case of DP5) to the lack of statistical 
information.  Even basic information about the country’s economy is absent. 
Indeed, there is a complete absence of any genuine policy and planning 
framework (p.7).  Nevertheless, the planners reported that the plan reflected 
“honestly” and accurately, the “circumstances of the Protectorate” (p. 4).  In view 
of all of this, the stated confidence in the future can be seen to have been nothing 
more than empty rhetoric. After all, constitutional changes, involving planning for 
self-government, were already well underway.  The British government would not 
itself have to deal directly with the consequences of its failure to take 
development planning in the Solomons seriously.  It could point to its optimistic 
forecasts prior to independence and blame the Solomon Islanders themselves if 
these forecasts were not achieved.  After all, they would have the advantage of 
being able to draw on the services of the Statistical Office (set up in 1970) and the 
permanent Planning Unit (set up in 1971) (p. 7). 
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The British, without any apparent sense of embarrassment or paradox, announced 
in their planning document (DP6, p. 5) that planning was, in fact, not possible in 
most sectors: 
 
6. It has not been possible to make specific investment projections for the 
private sector, and local government is still at a rudimentary stage and is in 
no position to engage in planning. 
 
Failing entirely to address one aspect of this problem (planning for private sector 
development), they went on to note (p. 5) that: 
 
It is intended during the plan period to upgrade local government so that 
local councils can play an effective role in the preparation and 
implementation of the Seventh Development Plan.                      
 
Underlying this type of statement is the clear message that the British could not 
themselves be expected to take any responsibility for past, present or future 
planning deficiencies.  So far as past and present planning deficiencies are 
concerned, it is important to stress that the British Solomon Islands Protectorate 
had, at the time of DP6, been under British control/ protection for over half a 
century.  So far as future planning deficiencies are concerned, it is important to 
note that the mere establishment of a Statistical Office and a permanent Planning 
Unit, together with the (unspecified) upgrading of local councils, could hardly be 
expected to be sufficient remedy for many decades of inadequate and incompetent 
planning efforts.  
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The frenetic development activity by the British in relation to the Solomons after 
World War II was more apparent than real.  The agitation of the islanders made 
development activity necessary; the economic situation faced by Britain itself (in 
recovering from World War II) created difficulties in relation to development 
activity beyond its own shores.  Thus, it is observed in DP6 that the “overall 
objective of the Sixth Development Plan is to lay the basis for substantially 
reduced external dependence in this [1970s] decade, a pre-requisite for effective 
self-government” (Sixth Development Plan 1971-1973, p.5).  The hasty departure 
of the British from Solomon Islands described by Mary O’Callaghan (see Chapter 
1) may have been due, in part, to an awareness of the likely consequences of their 
failure to deal adequately with development issues.  
 
The British approach to development planning in Solomon Islands was a 
centralised one.  The efforts of local people were conducted in the context of a 
policy framework established by the Colonial Office in London (see Bennett 
(1987), especially Chapter 14, pp. 311-343).  Their task was simply to design 
development plans that reflected the political and ideological thinking of the 
British government of the day.  Within the Protectorate itself, development 
planning was also a highly centralised exercise involving bureaucratic processes. 
All of this centralised planning took place in the absence of any real 
understanding of the economy and without recourse to statistical information.  So 
far as the British were concerned, the process was directed largely by political 
expediency.  Thus, development planning in the British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate can be described as a bureaucratic process that was largely politically 
motivated.    
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5.4  Development planning: Solomon Islands   
In any consideration of national development policy and planning in independent 
Solomon Islands, a number of critical issues emerge.  These include issues 
relating to national leadership, political rhetoric and legitimacy (including anti-
colonialism), state-hood and nation building, and practical considerations relating 
to uneven development and distribution of the nation’s wealth. National 
development policy and planning documents cover a wide range of categories.  
The focus here is on one of these, that is, the private sector. In particular, it is on 
policy initiatives designed to encourage indigenous Solomon Islanders to 
participate actively in business enterprises.  The overriding rationale for this focus 
on the private sector is, as Chand (1984) notes, that this sector is critical to 
economic growth and hence, to development.  Thus, close examination of this 
policy area is not only appropriate in the context of Solomon Islands, but also 
significant in terms of its direct relevance to the issue of accountability, to the 
question of where the blame for problems relating to economic and social 
development over the past two and a half decades lies.  
 
In terms of the categorisation of development planning approaches proposed by 
Chand (1984), national development policy and planning in independent Solomon 
Islands can be described as initially exemplifying, under the Premiership of 
Solomon Mamaloni who came to power in 1981, a ‘comprehensive approach’.  
He replaced the 1980 – 84 development plan with a Programme of Action (1981-
84), a programme that Chand (1984, p. 765) interpreted as “a direct result of the 
rejection of the old government’s development manifesto”.  That Programme of 
Action was cast in very general terms and had the following broad objectives 
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covering, administration and decision-making; economic productivity; equitable 
distribution of development; and redirection of policies and programmes in such a 
way as to ensure that they were appropriate to the needs of Solomon Islanders, 
especially the majority in the rural areas.  It included a list of projects, each of 
which was ranked in relation to one or more of the broad objectives.  
 
Before considering in detail the private sector as a development policy arena, it is 
important to discuss some of the issues that overshadowed national development 
concerns at independence. 
5.5  Contextual issues  
5.5.1  National leadership     
Some of the major issues relating to national development at the time of 
independence emerged out of, and centred on, the hasty departure of the British.  
Although Solomon Islands is a small country in comparative terms, it is also a 
socially diverse one (see Chapter 4) in which there was no dominant group (in 
social, political or economic terms) with the power and authority to assume the 
mantle of leadership after the departure of the British.  In Fiji, Sir Ratu Kamisese 
Mara was especially groomed by the British to take over political power; there 
was no equivalent of this type of preparation in the case of Solomon Islands.  
There was, therefore, a political vacuum.  Thus, although Solomon Mamaloni was 
the country’s first chief minister when self-government was granted in 1976, it 
was Sir Peter Kenilorea who became the nation’s first Prime Minister.  This lack 
of adequate preparation for national leadership was compounded by the fact that 
nationhood and, with it, the rights and freedoms conferred on its citizens by a 
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modern nation state were, in some respects, inconsistent with kastom, the very 
basis of Solomon Islands society.  These two factors, taken together, were to have 
huge political ramifications.  Solomon Mamaloni (1992, p. 8), for instance, was 
only too aware of these contradictions when he wrote the following:   
 
What is a nation? …it is a community of people of the same ethnic 
origin… Its own traditions, cultures and rules (unwritten) were given by 
God to govern its own affairs.  A nation uses its individuality to discern 
what part it is to play in order to safeguard the interests and well-being of 
its people.  
 
Indeed, he went on to add (Mamaloni, 1992, p. 8) that were a smaller nation to 
merge with a larger one, the likely consequence would be the loss of the smaller 
nation’s identity.  No doubt Mamaloni, in making these remarks, was mindful of 
the diversity that exists in Solomon Islands.  After all, he later insisted that even 
after ten years of political independence, the “so-called Happy Isles are far from 
being one nation and under [the] present constitutional structure will never 
become one” (Mamaloni, 1992, p. 11).     
 
In retrospect, the ethnic conflict of 1998 seems almost inevitable.  Also inevitable 
perhaps have been the problems associated with the fact that since independence 
national leaders have tended to be selected on the basis of personality rather than 
on the basis of ideological identity and political party membership. In fact, there 
are almost as many political parties in Solomon Islands as there are members of 
parliament.  Thus, for example, when Francis Billy Hilly was elected as the third 
prime Minister of Solomon Islands, he was an independent Member of 
Parliament. Similarly, when Bartholomew Ulufa’alu became Prime Minister, he 
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was one of only two sitting members of his political party.  Historically, at least 
one third of members of parliament lose their seats at each round of national 
parliamentary elections and each seat may be contested by as many as one or one-
and-half dozen candidates (see for example Alasia (1997); Fraenkel (2004), 
especially Chapter 11, pp. 131-138). Bearing in mind the fact that even the largest 
constituencies have, at most, ten thousand voters, it becomes clear that the ratio of 
candidates to voters is usually high. Furthermore, in the prevailing first-past-the-
post electoral system, candidates frequently win by a mere handful of votes.35  If 
democracy could be said to be about people exercising their citizenship rights, 
then Solomon Islands would undoubtedly be one of the most democratic countries 
in the world. In fact, in the first national general election, one of those elected was 
a highly respected local leader who was unable to read or write, something that 
severely handicapped him in his four years as a parliamentarian.  Apart from those 
standing for Honiara seats, aspiring national politicians generally contest 
parliamentary elections primarily as individuals and only secondarily as political 
party members.  Their best chance of winning is therefore to contest a seat in the 
local area where they originally come from where family connections and 
relationships can be fully exploited.  This leaves considerable scope for 
unacceptable practices.  Indeed, it is not uncommon after the elections to hear 
allegations of bribery, which are usually lodged by losing candidates.36  
 
                                                 
35 In the 2001 general election, one candidate won by just two votes: “SIAC’s Afu Billy narrowly 
missed becoming the sole woman MP in the new parliament by two votes, obtaining 699 votes in 
the East Malaita constituency to former civil servant Joseph [Joses] Wawari Sanga’s 701” (Jon 
Fraenkel, 2004, p. 134).   
36 This was illustrated in the riots that followed the April 2006 election of Snyder Rini as Prime 
Minister. 
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This state of affairs makes parliamentary democracy very unstable and 
unpredictable. In fact, the Kemakeza government was the first to complete its full 
four year term of office in Solomon Islands, the others having been dissolved in 
mid-term following a vote of no confidence.  This type of governance experience 
characterises all of the national parliaments of wantok Melanesia (that is, those of 
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu as well as Solomon Islands)37 and has huge 
implications for national development policy and planning.  
5.5.2  Political rhetoric and legitimacy: Anti-colonialism, statehood and 
nation building  
One could say that the explicit political rhetoric contained in Development Plans 
is a corollary of the lack of British attention to grooming national leadership at 
independence.  Indigenous national politicians have tended to base the legitimacy 
of their appeal on rhetoric rather than genuine authority.  This rhetoric, generally 
referring to the twin ideals of statehood and nation building, is generally anti-
colonial in nature.  Such an appeal is not necessarily disingenuous.  After all, 
legitimacy must be anchored somewhere.  To attempt to anchor it in relation to 
national development policy and planning is, in many respects, both logical and 
sensible: development policy and planning was also the British government’s 
major tool of political legitimacy. Improving the social and economic wellbeing 
of the islanders through national development policy and planning (largely 
unsuccessful though it proved to be) was the primary rationale for the lengthy 
period of British colonial influence in Solomon Islands.  Thus, both during and 
                                                 
37 There is a large body of literature on this issue in the State, Society and Governance in 
Melanesia project based at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies of The Australian 
National University, Canberra, Australia.    
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after the period of British colonisation, development policy and planning were 
overtly political and bureaucratic in nature precisely because they were, and are, 
central to the appeal to legitimacy.  One consequence of this is the much 
centralised nature of national development policy and planning.  Thus, Sanga 
(2001, p. 34) observes that, since independence, national development policy and 
planning has continued to be centralised even where the focus appears to be on 
rural development and even where the language used appears to support 
decentralisation.  This remains the case in spite of the fact that national 
development policy and planning is characterised in the main by incoherence in 
relation to the support of national policies, general ambiguity and lack of clarity, 
incompetent policy management, and a failure to ensure that those likely to be 
affected, especially those in rural areas, are kept informed.  As a result, this highly 
centralised policy development framework has resulted only in “little pockets of 
development located sparsely in the regions” which are “either planned or 
influenced by the topography of the islands” (p. 69).       
 
One consequence of a highly politicised independence process is likely to be that 
it places greater emphasis on foreign policy than on domestic issues (Sanga, 
2001).  Thus, Sanga (2001, p. 69) observes that:  
 
Successive governments’ priority since independence has not been the 
domestic issues. Rather, they have seen foreign policy and establishing 
diplomatic relations as priorities and have paid little attention to 
developing the regions.    
 
While it is difficult to fault a newly emerging nation for paying considerable 
attention to its foreign policy, the fact remains that a failure to attend to the need 
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to develop the economic base of Solomon Islands to a point where it can meet its 
own domestic commitments has created a situation in which “very rapid 
population growth, inequalities, high formal unemployment and very little 
improvement on public facilities have given rise to competing pressures on 
government resources” (Sanga, 2001, p. 69).      
 
Clearly, then, development policy and planning remain highly centralised in 
Solomon Islands. So, too, does the governance infrastructure in spite of the clearly 
held aspirations for greater regional autonomy (Paia, 2003).  A major 
consequence of a highly centralised and unitary form of government is the fact 
that provincial government entities have become mere extensions of national 
government rather than real partners in development.  This has led to duplication 
of responsibilities, waste of resources, and a general lack of initiative and 
innovation at the provincial government level (see Chapter 6).  
 
The political orientation of national development policy and planning in Solomon 
Islands is evident in its centralised nature.  A more decentralised approach would 
be more likely to take account of the cultural dimension of development.    
5.5.3  Practical considerations   
The British colonial government appears to have paid little or no attention to 
cultural issues in its development activities.  The incoming Solomon Islands 
leaders therefore had no prior experience of development policy and planning that 
took culture into consideration.  This can be seen as one aspect of the failure of 
the British government to prepare the Solomon Islanders for independence.  
Equally, there is little evidence that successive governments since independence 
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have attended to the cultural imperatives that underpin contemporary development 
thinking and practice.  They, too, have focused on the political and administrative 
dimensions of development, failing to address important issues that are evident 
only at a deeper conceptual and theoretical level, issues that, nevertheless, have 
significant practical implications.  Some of the practical difficulties surrounding 
development following independence are considered below.           
5.5.3.1  Uneven development  
At independence, the economy of Solomon Islands was largely plantation-based 
and characterised by uneven development.  Thus, for example, almost all 
industrial activity was concentrated in the central Solomons (particularly in 
Guadalcanal and Western Province).  People from all over the country were 
attracted to this area in search of work and formal education, especially at 
secondary school and tertiary levels.  This uneven development was, and is, 
compounded by the fact that much of the land used for plantations is customary 
land rather than crown land.  The labourers on that land were not free to develop 
their own plots for food gardens as had been the custom in the subsistence, rural-
based economy that is rapidly being replaced.  With basic tools such as axes and 
knives, they can supplement their formal income with produce from the land.  
However, the inevitable encroachment on customary land creates tensions, 
tensions which, over time, can lead to ethnic tension.  This is what Kabutaulaka 
(1999) meant when he attributed aspects of ethnic tension in Solomon Islands to 
unemployment and “lack of respect for land”.  All of these things required urgent 
attention by the new independent government. Its attention, however, was directed 
elsewhere; its development efforts were primarily oriented towards the 
international arena.  
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5.5.3.2  Equal distribution  
The fact that population and resources are unevenly spread in Solomon Islands 
has led to problems of unequal distribution of wealth.  These problems needed to 
be addressed as quickly and as delicately as possible.  Despite the many failings 
of national leaders since independence, the fact is that they took the issue of 
distribution seriously.  They were well aware of the rumblings just prior to 
independence (Paia, 2003) and of the need to find a way of distributing the 
county’s wealth more evenly at the same time as providing those whose islands 
and lands were being used to generate the nation’s economic wealth with a 
realistic return for their contribution to nation building.  
 
From a political standpoint, it was considerations such as these that led to support 
for the emergence of the provincial form of government which currently exists in 
Solomon Islands.  At the same time, a provincial government system had an 
inbuilt tendency to reinforce the type of the divide and rule tactic used by the 
British when they divided the British Solomon Islands Protectorate into four 
districts: Eastern, Central, Malaita and Western.  Even so, a provincial system 
recognises the country’s diversity, and, in particular, the significance of the fact 
that it is the rural-based population who actually own the country’s natural 
resources.  Having a provincial system of government could, in principle, provide 
an appropriate vehicle for ensuring that resource owners have an opportunity to 
participate in the production, distribution and consumption of these natural 
resources.  In other words, the provincial government system could give greater 
social and economic power to the rural- based majority of the country’s 
population.  At present, however, as Paia (2003) observes, the provincial 
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government system is little more than an extension of central government 
bureaucracy.  Up till now, there “has been no institutional framework to involve 
landowners in the design and implementation of development projects and 
investments on their land” (Aqorau, 2004, p. 116). In fact, no attempt has been 
made “to ensure their [i.e. landowners] rights to resources are translated into 
tangible benefits to contribute to their social and economic wellbeing” (p.116).  
 
The approach to national development policy and planning following 
independence was inherited from the British.  The provincial government system 
was copied from that of neighbouring Papua New Guinea which gained political 
independence only a few years earlier (in 1975).  Thus far, neither has proved 
effective in addressing the nation’s problems. 
 
It has already been noted that from a critical and theoretical point of view the 
process of national development policy and planning in Solomon Islands has been 
characterised by the application of legal-rational principles.  Cultural 
considerations have been subordinated.  The effect of this, so far as the 
involvement of indigenous Solomon Islanders in the private sector is concerned, is 
discussed in section 5.6 following.   
5.6  Policy planning and implementation: The private sector   
The development policy frameworks left behind by the British were the only 
instruments of familiarity to the new administrators to help shape a new nation.  
Viewed in this light, it is highly optimistic at best, if not downright naïve, to 
expect the process to be free of hiccups and obstacles.  This did not dampen the 
enthusiasm of the nation’s new leaders.     
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5.6.1  Optimism and high expectations     
When Solomon Islands gained political independence in 1978 one of the 
expectations of all Solomon Islanders was that a prosperous Solomon Islands 
society would be created.  As a result of British colonisation, Solomon Islands had 
become grafted onto the global market system and capitalist economy.  Political 
independence was an unprecedented opportunity because, for the first time in the 
modern history of Solomon Islands, Solomon Islanders themselves were given 
responsibility for deciding their own future, especially regarding social and 
economic development.  In this newly formed nation, responsibility for helping to 
bring about development was left essentially in the hands of national leaders and 
the central government.  This overwhelming responsibility was to occupy the 
minds of the leaders of the young nation throughout its first two-decades of 
political independence.   
5.6.2  From optimism to concern   
Solomon Islands gained political independence from Britain on 7th July 1978.  
Leading up to that auspicious moment, the architects of the pre-independence 
Solomon Islands National Development Plan 1975-1979 (S.I. NDP, 1975 Vol.1, 
Ch.6, p. 48) noted that:  
  
Most of the developed private sector is owned and controlled by non-
Solomon Islanders; … A sustained breakthrough into the developed sector 
by local enterprise depends on supplies of commercial know-how and 
financial capital which so far have been hard to obtain in combination.  
 
As noted earlier (see Chapter 4), Solomon Islands had been a British Protectorate 
since 1893.  An acting Resident Commissioner was appointed in 1896 and the 
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colonial administration was established. Its development before and after World 
War II, primarily through plantation agriculture by large foreign companies, 
contributed to the exclusion of indigenous Solomon Islanders from the developed 
sector (Bennett, 1987).  Non-Solomon Islanders controlled the economy at 
independence.  Although they included a few European traders who had remained 
after the war, the majority were Chinese general merchants from Hong Kong, 
many of whom were descendants of Chinese migrants who came to Solomon 
Islands after the war and initially worked as cooks, carpenters and mechanics.  
These people had helped to rebuild the devastated economy.  By the time of 
political independence from Britain in 1978, the descendants of these Chinese 
migrants, together with Chinese migrants who arrived later, had already 
established themselves in the wholesale and retail sectors.  They played, and 
continue to play, a significant role in the market economy of independent 
Solomon Islands.  As the country stood at the threshold of political independence, 
it is this situation that motivated the architects of the Solomon Islands National 
Development Plan 1975 – 1979 to call for a substantial breakthrough of 
indigenous Solomon Islanders into the developed sector. Only then would 
independence be economically as well as politically meaningful to indigenous 
people.  There was, however, the further issue that the majority of Solomon 
Islanders lived – and continue to live – in rural areas. As noted in the Solomon 
Islands National Development Plan 1975 – 1979 (S.I. NDP, 1975, Vol.1, Ch.3, p. 
19):   
   
No commercial activity has been deliberately located away from Honiara 
so far, except for those which could not be located in Honiara anyway. . . . 
There is a widespread assumption that all manufacturing and processing 
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activities will take place in Honiara; continuance of this trend would run 
against the government’s overall objectives.  
 
Thus, in 1975, at a time when Solomon Islands had, in preparation for full 
independence, a Governing Council headed by a Chief Minister, the government 
of the day recognised that only by encouraging indigenous Solomon Islanders to 
engage in private sector activities would it be possible to disperse economic 
development to the rural areas and thus enhance the socio-economic development 
of the majority of Solomon Islanders.  Indeed, there was a clear understanding 
that the pre-independence NDP 1975-79 was a transitional plan only, a plan that 
was designed to help the country to make the transition from a British dependent 
colony to an independent sovereign nation.  Hence, it was clear that the national 
government recognised the need for (S.I. NDP, 1975 Vol.2, Part 1, Section 2, p. 
2):  
 
a deliberate slanting of economic development into operations which can 
be owned, wholly or partly, by Solomon Islanders as individuals or 
groups; special credit arrangements to assist local companies and co-
operatives to develop and expand; [improvement of] commercial law so 
that local firms can comply with it; and the closure of some forms of 
activity to non-Solomon Islanders.  
 
On the whole, government was optimistic about the future and committed to 
ensuring that the indigenous population took advantage of opportunities to reap 
maximum benefit from the nation’s resources.  As indigenous leaders stood at the 
threshold of assuming leadership from the British colonial administrators, all of 
this seemed possible.  In an overly optimistic tone, government, through the 
development planners, stated that one of its major objectives was “to build a 
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national economic structure which extends local ownership and control to all key 
areas of the economy” (S.I. NDP, 1975 Vol.2, Part 2, Section 2, p. 7).  It seems 
unlikely that those who made this statement were fully aware of the enormous 
undertaking such a commitment involved. In hindsight, the Solomon Islands 
National Development Plan 197 – 1979 was accurate in diagnosing the problems 
that needed to be addressed but, so far as actual planning for change was 
concerned, overly optimistic about the possibilities.  Overall, the document 
expresses, through the rhetoric of political independence, the excitement and 
enthusiasm of a youthful nation.  Even so, there were attempts to determine what 
measures were necessary for bringing about the desired changes.  One of these 
was to be ‘affirmative action’ in the form of direct assistance by way of incentive 
schemes for Solomon Islanders (S.I. NDP, 1975 Vol.2, Part 2, Section 2, p. 7).  It 
is, for example, noted in the National Development Plan - Section 14: Business 
and Credit - that one of the government’s aims was to expand business activity by 
(indigenous) Solomon Islanders, whether as a group or as individuals.  Some of 
the principal methods of achieving this intended expansion were (S.I. NDP, 1975, 
Vol.2, Part 2, Section 14, p. 28): 
  
• Licensing of businesses in selected sectors so as to remove imbalances and 
ensure openings for local enterprise.  
• Reservation for local enterprise of service industry openings in any major 
new commercial development e.g. mining.  
• Commercial activity by local councils where services or production are 
needed but local individual or group enterprise is not forthcoming.  
• Introduction of tax incentives for localization of jobs and ownership, 
decentralization, pricing policies and use of locally produced inputs.  
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This was an impressive undertaking. In retrospect, however, it is evident that one 
major problem was that government stability – as is also the case in the 
neighbouring Melanesian countries of Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea – could 
not be assured.  Furthermore, the National Development Plan left government and 
development planners open to the charge of advocating discriminatory practices.  
Even so, for any country in the embryonic stages of nation building, policies of 
the kind to which reference has been made may be necessary and, hence, 
justifiable. The economic prescriptions in the NDP would, it was hoped, lay the 
foundations of, and, presumably, create the ideal catalyst for social and economic 
development in the `birth’ and `growth’ of a new nation.  The intention was that 
by 1978 (the year of political independence), a substantial part of the private 
sector would be owned and operated by indigenous Solomon Islanders (S.I. NDP, 
1975, Vol.2, Part 2, Section 14, p. 28). Whether government and the development 
planners really believed that their prescriptions could be implemented within this 
timeframe is open to question.  In the event, as we now know, the timeframe 
proved to be unrealistic and the strategies themselves now appear to be ill adapted 
to the political and social circumstances of the time.  
5.6.3  Disappointment   
In June 1977, when a review of the National Development Plan (1975-79) was 
carried out, it was noted that (June Review, 1977, p. 2): 
 
Most of the developed commercial sector is owned and controlled by non-
Solomon Islanders. The [non-commercial] sector is owned by nationals, 
but is subject to considerable influence by the developed sector.  
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Even so, it was decided then that no major alterations would be made to the 
National Development Plan (NDP).  In the Foreword to the NDP review, the then 
Chief Minister, Peter Kenilorea - now Sir Peter Kenilorea - who took over after 
the first Chief Minister, Solomon Mamaloni38, wrote: “The Plan covers a five 
year period and it is not the intention of this Government to replace it with a 
totally new one before that period expires.  To do so would not only be costly but 
also most unrealistic” (June Review 1977, Foreword).  As signalled in the review, 
in the Area of Business and Credit at least, efforts to assist indigenous people to 
venture into business would continue over the next three years (June Review, 
1977, p. 21):  
 
The Business Advisory division will continue to encourage indigenous 
business ventures where the experience and expertise promises a 
reasonable chance of success.  However, much of its efforts will be in 
continuing to help raising the level of management and accounting skills 
of existing businesses, particularly the larger ones that make the most 
significant contribution to the indigenous business sector.  
 
The tone is less optimistic than that of the NDP itself. Nevertheless, some 
optimism remained. If deficiencies in the areas of management and accounting 
skills were identified and addressed, all might still be well.  Although the report 
notes the absence of indigenous business enterprise, it does not identify the 
underlying causes.  Instead, the Chief Minister noted that there had been 
“[insufficient] time to assess and realize the effects of programmes implemented 
at the beginning of the period” (Foreword, June Review, 1977).  
                                                 
38 Note that he did not regain the post of Chief Minister in the “final general election of the 
colonial era … in July 1976” (Alasia, 1997, p. 7). 
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5.6.4  Renewed optimism   
By 1980, when the next National Development Plan was produced, the first 
Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Peter Kenilorea, was in office.  In fact, the NDP 
1980-84 was also the country’s first National Development Plan.  With the NDP 
1975-79 conceived as a transition plan, the NDP 1980-84 sought to meet the 
perceived needs, hopes and aspirations of the majority of Solomon islanders who 
live in the rural areas.  With a renewed sense of optimism, the Prime Minister had 
this to say in the Foreword of the new National Development Plan (NDP, 1980-
84, 1980 Vol.1, Foreword):  
 
Since we became a fully independent nation on 7 July 1978 this is the first 
opportunity we have had to shape the overall direction of our own 
development. This is our greatest challenge and all of us, from politicians 
in the national legislature and civil servants in the government to the rural 
gardener and fisherman, must try to make the fullest use of this 
opportunity. From a national planning point of view, this is the very first 
time that we, in our own right, have made the decisions about the activities 
we intend to do for our overall benefit both as a people and as a nation. 
This plan, therefore, is our First National Development Plan.  
 
In similar vein, he went on to stress that (NDP, 1980-84, 1980 Vol.1, Foreword):  
 
The previous plan – NDP 1975-79 - was drawn up during a transitional 
period and it has certain programmes and projects which will continue into 
this new plan period. But, apart from this, if we are to connect our new 
plan to the previous one by adopting substantially the same philosophy 
and aims, we will have done so little in our need for effective and positive 
decolonization: which is to free ourselves from those aspects of our 
colonial past that hinder our progress and development as an independent 
and forward-going people.  
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Those aspects of the “colonial past that hinder . . . progress and development” 
were not made explicit.  However, it was evident from the context that reference 
was being made to the economic dominance of non-indigenous people and that 
the intention was to encourage indigenous Solomon Islanders to play a more 
active role in both the private and public sectors.  
 
The Prime Minister’s remarks signalled that political independence was to be the 
beginning of a process of political, social and economic development for Solomon 
Islanders.  However, although the previous NDP (1975-79) had specific 
provisions relating to the engagement of indigenous Solomon Islanders in the 
private sector, the 1980-84 NDP did not.  This was, at least in part, because there 
was “little detailed statistical information available on the nature and scale of 
Solomon Islander industrial and commercial activity” (NDP, 1980-84, 1980 
Vol.1, Ch. 5, p. 102).  Also, the emphasis was now on rural development, as 
indicated in the Foreword by the Prime Minister (NDP, 1980-84, 1980 Vol.1, 
Foreword): 
 
In this plan we intend to do much more for our people. We intend to bring 
development to areas of the greatest need and where development will be 
acceptable to the people. . . . The basic [objective] (sic) of this plan is to 
promote effective rural development which will provide the opportunity 
for as many of our people as is possible to share in the benefits of our 
country’s development.  
 
What this meant in practice was that Government would play a much greater role 
in the political, social and economic development of the new Solomon Islands 
nation.  
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The National Development strategy was to be given coded expression in the 
country’s National Development Plan 1985-89 which stipulated, under the 
heading of Social and Economic Progress, that “Government will continue to 
actively participate in strategic areas of the economy’ (NDP, 1985-89, 1985, Part 
1, Ch. 3, p. 18).  
 
The National Development Plan 1985-89 placed greater emphasis than did the 
earlier ones on indigenous business entrepreneurship (NDP, 1985-89, 1985, Part 
1, Ch. 3, p. 18):  
 
The development of indigenous entrepreneurship will be encouraged and 
fostered whilst genuine foreign investment with significant local 
participation and employment in production activities will be encouraged 
and supported.  
 
In summarizing the existing situation (in 1985), the planners noted (NDP, 1985-
89, 1985, Part 2, Ch. 19, p. 140) that:  
 
19.4  The Government initiated its support of business development in 
the mid 1970s with emphasis on trade stores which were the predominant 
type of business. In recent years the scope of the assistance has expanded 
to include petrol depots, transport business and other types of ventures . . .  
[including] agricultural, fisheries and forestry.  
 
Immediately after that summary, however, a number of constraints were identified 
(NDP, 1985-89, 1985, Part 2, Ch. 19, p. 140):  
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19.5  A major constraint on both co-operative and general business 
development is the poor road system and inter-island shipping services, 
which restrict inward and outward the distribution of goods.  
 
19.6  Inexperience in running business, including, limited management 
and financial skill, is also a key restraint.  
 
19.7  The limited size of local markets and the cost and difficulties in 
exporting tend to increase the difficulties of developing new business.  
 
These acknowledged constraints related directly to the Government’s policy on 
commerce in general and indigenous business entrepreneurship in particular and 
were therefore extremely significant.  There was, however, no reference to 
constraints of another type – constraints relating to the traditional social 
structures, norms and values that inevitably influence indigenous entrepreneurs 
and their business activities.  After all, capitalist activity in general, and business 
entrepreneurship in particular, are relatively new to Solomon Islands, and 
Solomon Islanders’ reaction to them are inevitably influenced by their cultural 
expectations.  Thus, the following strategies for promoting indigenous business 
enterprises and cooperatives, comprehensive though they appear to be, would be 
unlikely to prove adequate unless there were a significant culture shift (NDP, 
1985-89, 1985, Part 2, Ch. 19, p. 141):  
 
91.8  The primary strategy will be to promote indigenous business 
enterprises and co-operatives by providing potential investors with the 
requisite financial resources, knowledge and skills, and by actively 
seeking Solomon Island participation in foreign investment ventures.  
 
19.9  A complementary strategy of the Government will be to provide an 
effective advisory and accounting extension service for those Solomon 
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Islanders owned businesses and co-operative societies which cannot afford 
the services of private chartered accountants.  . . .  
 
19.10  The Government will also organize and provide training courses 
and seminars, and disseminate information on business and management 
practice through all forms of media, including specialized publications 
such as booklets. Greater use will also be made of the radio as a mean of 
keeping people informed of commercial affairs.  
 
As with all things that relate to society and people generally, a National 
Development Plan has to be understood within a certain socio-historical and 
cultural context.  In other words, a National Development Plan is not value-
neutral.  It is inevitably underpinned by a particular philosophical position.  In 
Solomon Islands, the underlying rationale is that economic prosperity depends on 
economic growth and economic growth depends on entrepreneurial activity within 
a capitalist economic structure.  In the wider context, the argument remains that 
national development policy and planning at the national government level in 
Solomon Islands is basically a political phenomenon and bureaucratic process.   
5.7  Shift in policy  
In the immediate change-over of Government from Francis Billy Hilly to 
Solomon Mamaloni in late 1994, a Solomon Star editorial (23 November) had this 
to say in connection with the policy of getting indigenous Solomon Islanders to 
actively engage and participate in the private or business sector (Solomon Star, 
Wednesday 23 November, 1994, p. 4):  
 
Running a business is a serious business. Now the Mamaloni government 
intends to expand the area in which indigenous Solomon Islanders can 
participate in business. Under its policies, strategies and programme of 
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action, it is the government’s policy to “encourage more indigenous 
people to participate in various investments”. It will reserve certain 
business to be taken only by indigenous Solomon Islanders.  And it is the 
time for Solomon Islanders to work at it.  But before we can dive into the 
unknown seas, there are certain questions we must ask ourselves.  How 
many Solomon Islanders are prepared to try, take the risk and do 
something better for themselves and their families?  How many Solomon 
Islanders will say that there is no capital to start the business? . . . 
Opportunities are always around, but many Solomon Islanders do not want 
to take the challenge . . . .  
 
The implication is that indigenous people are neither sufficiently enterprising, nor 
sufficiently willing to commit themselves to hard work, to take up the 
government’s challenge.  This is simply a reiteration of the commonly held 
misconception that indigenous people are lazy (Alatas, 1977) and averse to risk-
taking. In this regard Paul Gardner (1989, p. 119) has observed that in Melanesia 
generally, “entrepreneurs arose in surprisingly large numbers, [but] capable 
Melanesian managers have been notably lacking”.  A more plausible explanation 
(than one relating to laziness or aversion to risk-taking) for the under-
representation of indigenous Solomon Islanders in business is that they lack, for 
perfectly understandable cultural and historical reasons, a clear understanding of 
what business actually involves.  For indigenous Solomon Islanders, going into 
business is like diving into an unknown sea.  Herein lays the dilemma facing 
indigenous Solomon Islanders in relation to social and economic development in 
general and private business enterprise in particular.  Even so, some indigenous 
Solomon Islanders have successfully engaged in business enterprise.  One 
example, noted by Fairbairn (1988, p. 5), is Warren Paia, from the Western 
Province “who controls real estate, stationery, and computer businesses”.  People 
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such as Warren Paia are, however, the exception.  As Fairbairn (1988) says of the 
handful of leading indigenous business entrepreneurs in the Pacific Islands region, 
they are “stars in a dull firmament” (p. 5).  For many others, the temptations and 
the risks are simply too great.  As a Solomon Star editorial observes (Solomon 
Star, Wednesday 23 November, 1994, p. 4):  
 
Some who claim to have the skills and the know-how were successful in 
securing large sums of money from banks but because of their reckless 
spendings, they ended up in bankruptcy. Many did not want to seek sound 
advice. They wanted to start big.  
 
The consequences of this sort of business failure resonate throughout Solomon 
Islands.  Where indigenous Solomon Islanders fail in business, the blame is placed 
squarely upon their own shoulders.  Where they do not rise to the challenge of 
establishing new business enterprises, they are accused of not being sufficiently 
entrepreneurial.  Little wonder, then, that Mamaloni’s government, which was in 
power at the time, noted in the Solomon Islands Trade Directory (1995) that 
“[specific] areas of economic activity are no longer reserved exclusively for 
Solomon Islanders, although foreign investors will generally have to justify their 
investment . . .” (Porras & Saunders, 1995, p. 65).  
 
This apparent change of policy did not augur well for the future chances of 
indigenous Solomon Islanders who are brave enough to attempt to plunge into the 
unknown sea of business entrepreneurship.  Although foreign investors were, 
apparently, expected to ‘justify their investment’, there was no indication of what 
type of justification would be considered acceptable.  This was of particular 
concern in view of the fact that it was widely known – though rarely 
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acknowledged – that some politicians and their cronies were involved, with the 
support of unscrupulous foreign investors, in a range of illicit business activities.  
In 1996, the much publicised forestry issue and public officers’ scandal were 
simply the tip of the iceberg.  Recently, senior public officers have been convicted 
of fraud and embezzlement of public monies.  In retrospect, it appears that the 
continued dominance of the private sector by foreign investors was even more 
problematic than it appeared at the time when the first Solomon Islands National 
Development plan was penned.  What we have not seen to date is any real 
evidence of the ‘positive decolonisation’ process envisaged by the pioneering 
political leaders of the modern Solomon Islands nation. 
5.8  Overview  
In hindsight, it is clear that the magnitude of the task that successive Solomon 
Islands leaders had to tackle in attempting to encourage the economic 
development of indigenous Solomon Islanders was not fully appreciated at the 
time of independence.  The early optimism was initially replaced by caution, and 
that caution has, in turn, been replaced by cynicism as it has become increasingly 
evident that development planning can be high-jacked by those in power in order 
to serve their own interests and those of their collaborators (indigenous and non-
indigenous).  The economic and development process in Solomon Islands in the 
1980s and 1990s was eventually punctuated by the outbreak of ethnic conflict in 
December 1998.  To what extent that conflict was actually attributable to the 
perceived failure of the development process itself is something that is worthy of 
serious consideration.  
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I have argued that national development policy and planning in Solomon Islands, 
both before and after independence, has been largely conceptualised in terms of a 
political, bureaucratic processes.  Chapter 6 examines the way in which 
development is conceptualised by rural Solomon Islanders themselves.  
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Chapter 6 
The concept of development in Ulawa Island 
6.1 Introduction  
The broad theoretical framework underpinning this thesis is postmodernism. 
Whereas mainstream (or modern) development discourse is, broadly speaking, a 
phenomenon of the European Enlightenment and Western modernity (see Chapter 
3), post-modernism has involved a cultural turn in development theory that has 
provided the intellectual opportunity to ground alternative conceptions of 
development in cultural spaces and locations which are non-Western.  In this 
respect, post-modernism in general is as much an anti-thesis to the hegemony of 
Western social thought as it is a critique of modernity. Such a radical 
interpretation of postmodernism also provides, through post-development 
discourse, an opportunity to offer a logical alternative to mainstream development 
thought.  It is this that has motivated Nandy (1987) to call for non-Western 
intellectuals to use their own cultures as the point of departure for the articulation 
of alternative discourses of social reality.  This chapter represents an attempt to 
respond to that call, an attempt that involves focusing on the concept of 
development in one society, that of Ulawa Island, from the perspective of local 
culture and local narrative.39  Underpinning this perspective is a critique of 
mainstream development discourse, itself a value-laden meta-narrative (Lyotard, 
1984).  At the end of this chapter, the issue of state reform will be addressed in the 
context of discussions in Chapters 4 and 5.   
                                                 
39 The Research Ethics Committee of the School of Māori and Pacific Development (University of 
Waikato) approved my approach to data gathering. 
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6.2  Why Ulawa Island?  
The choice of Ulawa Island as offering the best case of discussing a cultural 
dimension to development is based on a number of pragmatic considerations.  
 
Firstly, the researcher is from the Island, knows the people and speaks the 
language.  I disagree with the claim by academics such as Taylor and Bogdan 
(1998) that this level of involvement constitutes a disadvantage.  For them, the 
ethics and mechanics of social science research, especially regarding novice 
researchers, are such that it would be advisable for the researcher not to conduct 
research in an area familiar to him or her as this may compromise the rigour of the 
exercise.  Although this was given more as a precaution than a rule, the point is 
noted.  At the same time, being from a particular place enables one to provide an 
`insider view’ (Gegeo, 1998) in that one has access to certain insights and 
information that an `outsider’ would not normally `see’ or have access to.  In spite 
of the fact that there are apparently contradictory views on this, I believe the 
advantages of being an ‘insider’ outweigh any disadvantages in this particular 
instance: many of the field notes were derived from less formal and less structured 
contexts than those which are traditionally associated with empirically-based 
based research (see Chapter 2).40  
 
This leads on to the second consideration: Ulawa Islanders share a common 
language, culture and traditional knowledge system.  This cultural homogeneity 
allows for consistency in investigating and explaining the concept of development 
                                                 
40 Much of the material about Ulawa Island explained in this chapter, unless otherwise referenced, 
is based on oral knowledge passed on to me over the past years from my parents, or other relatives, 
particularly my uncle (Luke Rohorua).  Although I have not referenced them directly in the 
following text, I have referred in footnotes to my younger brother, Meffrey Awao (with whom I 
stayed during my field trip in Honiara) where he supplied oral information.      
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on the island, a concept that can be fully understood only in the context of kastom 
or Ulawa Island culture.  In this respect, the concept of development in Ulawa 
Island emerges from a specific local cultural and social context and is therefore 
different from the concepts that underlie national development policy and 
planning (see Chapter 5) which is conducted against the backdrop of Solomon 
Islands as a political entity (see Chapter 4).  Thus, whereas national development 
policy and planning can be seen as a political process and bureaucratic activity, 
the concept of development in Ulawa can be seen as a more specifically cultural 
phenomenon.        
 
The third reason why Ulawa Island was chosen for this research is that it is clearly 
different from many of the other islands of the Solomons in a number of ways and 
can, therefore, be treated as an entity in its own right.  Ulawa is possibly the most 
‘developed’ island in the whole of the country.  Only Ulawa has all of the 
following: a water supply in most villages, a dirt road (recently completed - 
August 2000) around the island, a copra buying point and wharf (at Su’umoli), 
clinics (at Kelimai, Hadja and Su’ulopo), an airstrip (also recently completed in 
April 2000 at Arona), a Community High School (also a recent development 
(1996) at Piru Piru near Su’utoliato village), a radio wireless (at Aroaha), a postal 
service (at Kelimei), and most recently, access to the internet (installed March 
2002 at Piru Piru Community High School).  Furthermore, I was surprised when I 
last visited the island in August 2000 to find that many villagers around the island 
had built homes from permanent materials.  For example, until fairly recently, the 
only building in the village of Su’uholo with permanent structure and roofing iron 
was the Anglican Church.  In 2000, however, there were at least half a dozen 
homes in the village which were made of permanent materials, including iron 
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roofing.  Furthermore, other families and individuals were in the process of 
having new permanent homes constructed.  However, in spite of these 
infrastructure developments, Ulawa Island would still not be considered a 
`developed' place in the Western economic sense because, amongst other things, it 
still does not have widespread access to electricity and telephones.  Those families 
and individuals who do have access to electricity own their own generators.  Most 
importantly, however, much of the rural village lifestyle remains as it has been for 
decades.  This is a village lifestyle which is centred predominantly on gardening 
and fishing.  So, while infrastructure development on the Island may be different 
from that of other rural parts of Solomon Islands, the rural village lifestyle 
remains similar to that of the rest of the country in that it could be described as a 
‘semi-subsistence lifestyle’. 
 
A final consideration in selecting Ulawa Island for this study is that it had, during 
British colonial rule, a separate island Council (Solomon Islands National 
Development Plan 1975-1979, Vol. 3) at a time when the rest of the protectorate 
was divided into island councils based around the major island groupings of the 
Solomons. Of all the islands, only Ulawa had an independent island council of its 
own.  Ulawa could have joined either the Malaita Island Council (which is 
geographically closer) or the Makira Island Council (which also included islands 
relatively close to Ulawa, they are, Ugi and the Three Sisters).  Its decision to 
have its own island council is indicative of its sense of its own distinctiveness.  
6.3  Physical geography and locality  
Ulawa Island lies roughly 250 km to the east of the capital Honiara (see Map 2 
below).   
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Map 2: Map of Ulawa Island 
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In the recent past, travel to the island was essentially by boat.  Nowadays, 
however, there are two ways of reaching the island.  One can travel by plane on 
Solomon Airlines (which takes about an hour on one of the Solomon Airlines 
Twin Otter Islander aircrafts), or one can travel by boat (a direct trip on one the 
local inter-island vessels taking around sixteen hours; a less direct one (via ports 
in South Malaita or Makira) taking up to twenty four hours).  For some, the longer 
trips, because they involve visits to different parts of the country, are welcome; 
for others, especially those who suffer from sea-sickness, they are to be avoided 
except where strictly necessary.   
 
It was indicated earlier that Ulawa Island society is based on kastom (island 
culture).  In order to fully appreciate the concept of development that emerges 
from within this island culture, it is necessary to also understand the role played 
by the island’s geography.  In his anthropological account of Sa’a in South/Small 
Malaita and Ulawa Island, Walter Ivens (1927) describes the physical geography 
of Ulawa in the following way (pp.42-3):      
 
Ulawa lies twenty miles east of Sa’a. Its length is about twelve miles, and 
its greatest width about seven. A high ridge runs along the centre from 
north to south, the highest point is named Poro ‘u’ua, and is 2,000 feet 
high.  The descent on the east (sic) [west] side is steep and abrupt.  At the 
north end a peninsula runs out a mile or so with two small hills midway.  
This peninsula is called Ngorangora, i.e. cape or promontory. On its east 
side is a marsh ‘The water of the black mussel’. . . . The only harbour on 
Ulawa, [Su’u] Moli, is at the base of the peninsula on the west side.  The 
island lies north and south.  The north cape is known as ‘The head of the 
pool’ or ‘The Pool’, and the south as Arona.  The Three Sisters Islands, 
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Olu Malau, lie fifteen miles south-east of Arona, and Uki is twenty-seven 
miles south-west.    
 
On the east side there is a tiny harbour, called [Su’u] Lopo, which small 
craft can enter in the north-west season, and there are two little bays with 
sandy beaches where a boat can enter in the south-east season.  The east 
coast has a shore reef with sand behind it.  There is no shore reef on the 
west coast, and the land rocks, which are sharp coral, rise abruptly from 
deep water to a height of over twenty feet in places, and the bush comes 
right down to the edge of the cliff.  Where the streams run into the sea on 
the west coast, there are openings into which a boat may enter.  The mouth 
of the streams is often closed by a bar of flint pebbles.  The wider 
openings are called su’u, harbour.  All round the coast there are openings 
in the shore reef or rocks which are called maalitawa, and are used for 
canoe landings. . . .         
 
The name of the island has been spelt in various ways by different writers, 
Uraba, Ulaua, Ulava, but the correct spelling is Ulawa.  This is shown by 
the name Ulaqa given to it by the Lau people of Mala, who regularly 
replace w by q (kw).  The Spaniards in 1568 were its first [European] 
discoverers, and they labelled it La Treguada, stating that its native name 
was Uraba.  The village they landed was Āhi’a …. Surville in 1768 was 
off the island and named it Contrariete owing to the baffling winds.  
    
Ivens (1927, p.2) also provides the following insight into Ulawa Island:  
 
The western coast of Ulawa rises abruptly from the sea, a cliff of rock 
broken here and there by the fresh water streams that come down from the 
hills above.  The eastern, or weather, side is much shallower and has 
beaches and bays.  Tradition says that Ulawa was fished out of the sea by a 
man from Mala who was fishing on the reef.  This may indicate fairly 
recent volcanic action. Dr Fox gives him a name, Mauwa, … but he does 
not seem to be known as such in Ulawa, where he is spoken of as Poro 
wa’i henua, He who pulled up the land. 
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Migrations to Ulawa may have occurred as early as 1500, although it has been 
argued that most migrations to Ulawa may have occurred in the early and mid-18th 
centuries (Walter Ivens, 1927).  These migrants to Ulawa came from a number of 
places and directions, including South Malaita to the west, Makira (Hanuato’o) to 
the south, and Santa Cruz by tepuka41 from the east.  In addition, an outrigger 
canoe from Sikaiana to the north-east landed at a place called Talaukela near 
Su’uholo village.42  However, although the name remains (Awao, n.d.), none of 
the outrigger voyagers survived, probably having been killed by earlier migrants.  
In fact, even today some people from Sikaiana (a Polynesian outlier) who may be 
related to those who travelled on the ill-fated outrigger canoe still recount the 
story. Some support for this story comes from the fact that the name ‘Talaukela’ is 
derived not from the Ulawa language, but from the language of Sikaiana: it refers 
to a place where pandanus plants grow in abundance.43  A few years ago, there 
were pandanus plants in Talaukela (located near Su’uholo village).  However, 
they were removed when Talaukela was occupied by people from the main village 
of Su’uholo.  
 
Despite the legend that Poro wa’i henua ‘discovered’ Ulawa Island, oral tradition 
has it that the first inhabitants of Ulawa were the Masi, a nomadic people who 
                                                 
41 A tepuka is the traditional ocean-going outrigger canoe used by people in Temotu Province in 
Solomon Islands’ eastern outer islands.   
42 Perhaps a testimony to the plausibility of this story is the fact that when, in 2003, an outboard 
motor carrying a number of people from Ulawa (who were travelling to Kira Kira on Makira 
Island) developed engine trouble between Ulawa and the Three Sisters Islands, it drifted for a 
couple of days before landing in Sikaiana. The Ulawa people were rescued by the people of 
Sikaiana and later returned home to Ulawa by ship.          
43 Meffrey Awao, personal communication. 
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lived mostly in the interior regions of the island.  Oral tradition also has it that 
Poro Pwahearona was the first Masi to know about human reproduction, later 
imparting that knowledge to his own people.  He is therefore referred to in 
legends as the Man of Creation.  The Masi were a nomadic people who did not 
have a formal political structure and organisation.  The existing Ulawa Island 
indigenous political organisation and structure is known as ālahanga (literally 
meaning chief or sovereignty), and was instituted by E’ewa Alaha (Awao, n.d.).  
 
Jan Sanga (1989, pp. 17-19) also relates a legend or traditional story told to her by 
Richard Teona (now Fr. Richard Teona) about the origins of Ulawa. According to 
this story, the original inhabitants of Ulawa came from Sa’a in Small Malaita (for 
an anthropology of Sa’a, see Walter Ivens, 1927).  According to the story, Ulawa 
Island was fished out of the sea by a certain Poromaua’ou’ou during a fishing 
expedition with other men from his village, including his brother, Poroe’ewalilioa. 
After keeping the secret of his brother’s discovery of Ulawa for many years, he 
decided to colonise his brother’s discovery” (p. 17).  Along with a party of sixty 
people gathered from various villages around South Malaita, Poroe’ewalilioa set 
out for Ulawa (which was then known by the people of Sa’a as `Hanuaniakalo’ or 
`abode of the spirits’).  Poroe’ewalilioa and his party landed in Ulawa at 
Su’umoli, at a place in the northeast called `Tahe-nga-ramo’ (now called 
Taheramo - `the landing place of warriors’).  From there, they travelled further in-
land and eventually settled in a place to the north of the island called Hanua 
Maea, holy land or place).  
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Ulawa Island was not, as the people of Sa’a thought, uninhabited. As noted 
earlier, it had already been inhabited by the Masi.  Thus, Poroe’ewalilioa and his 
landing party were, in reality, simply later migrants to the island from South 
Malaita. However, Poroe’ewalilioa is significant in Ulawa Island folklore, the 
birth of his son beginning “the hereditary chieftainship that has continued on the 
island ever since” (Sanga, 1989, p. 18).  Furthermore, after the death of his father, 
Poroe’ewa’alaha, hosted the first houla (kastom feast) in the island as well as 
building a toohi, custom house, in honour of his father. This initial gathering was 
the beginning in Ulawa of alahanga, the traditional chiefly system that continues 
to be practised today.  Indeed, during the houla, each clan in Ulawa is invited and 
presented with a piece of pork just as was the case in the first gathering in Hanua 
Maea organised by Poroe’ewa’alaha.  Today, the houla is still very significant to 
Ulawa islanders. Although Christianity has played a part in altering some of the 
rituals associated with the houla, and although they are now held less often than 
they were in the past, they remain an important part of the heart and soul of Ulawa 
Island society.  The most recent houla in Ulawa was held in Aroaha village about 
two years ago.     
 
The fact that these migrants from South Malaita landed and settled at the northern 
end of the island is also cultural and symbolically significant.  This is because, as 
Ivens (1927) has observed, the northern end of Ulawa Island is also known as 
Polungana wai (the head of the pool).  The opposite end of the island, the 
southern end (Arona), is referred to as aliana wai (the downstream-end of the 
pool). Today, as has always been the case since it was first inaugurated, houla 
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protocols require that formal proceedings start at the northern end of the island 
and finish at the southern end (in Arona).   
 
Ulawa is a patrilineal society, alaha (chiefs) and alahanga (chiefly authority) 
being determined through primogeniture.  Where the eldest child of a chiefly 
family is a daughter, alahanga passes to the oldest son.  If the existing chief does 
not have a biological son as heir, a male child is adopted either from within the 
extended family or from other families.  There have been instances in the past 
where refugees and visitors or guests to the island had been adopted by a barren 
alaha. Once the formal ceremonies are completed during the houla, the authority 
bestowed on the person appointed alaha (chief), whether he is the biological child 
of the previous alaha, or noran (an adopted child) is unquestioned.  The rituals 
and ceremonies, both public and private, which culminate in the public events of 
the houla, distinguish the traditional form of leadership in Ulawa Island from that 
of the rest of Solomon Islands.  The significance of this is indicated by the fact 
that when a House of Chiefs was recently proposed for the island, the honorary 
title of paramount chief was accorded to the existing clan who are the direct 
descendants of Poroe’ewa’alaha.  That title currently rests with Douglas Teaitala 
who inherited it from his father before him, John Teaitala (see Jan Sanga, 1989, 
pp. 18-9 for a direct genealogy of primogenitor from Poroe’ewalilio to Douglas 
Teaitala).   
6.4  Traditional conceptions of the Island  
Although Ivens (1927) provided a physical description of Ulawa Island, and an 
informative account of the Island’s culture, he did not discuss the common 
metaphors that Ulawa Islanders themselves employ to conceptualise the island.  
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These metaphors, which play an important role in later discussion of the Ulawa 
Island concept of development, are discussed below.    
 
Modern epistemology often employs common phenomena, such as buildings, 
pyramids, boats or fuselages, to conceptualise society in metaphoric terms 
(Blackburn, 1996, p. 123).  Ulawa Islanders also traditionally used metaphor to 
conceptualise their island society.  Three of these metaphors are discussed below: 
the completed house, the fish and the earth oven.  The first two of these metaphors 
are widely known throughout the island, the third is associated exclusively with 
Arona, at the southern end of the island.44  
6.4.1  Complete(d) house: nime ahu  
A metaphor that is commonly used to refer to Ulawa Island is a complete(d) 
house.  In this sense, Ulawa Island represents for its people, in the metaphor of the 
house, a dwelling place (whose front end is the northern end of the island and 
whose back end is the southern ends).  It is a home, a shelter from the elements of 
nature.  This metaphor of the island as a house applies to everyone who lives on 
the island. In one sense, because everyone who lives on the island considers it to 
be home, they are all in some respects part of one big family.  This understanding 
of the correspondence between home and family has huge implications in relation 
to how one perceives oneself in relation to all others. In this context, the metaphor 
of the island as a completed house conveys the sense that each person has a place 
within society.  As long as you reside on the island, you belong to one of the 
alahanga (family groups or clans) that make up Ulawa Island society.  A person is 
                                                 
44 Meffrey Awao, personal communication.  Meffrey was provided with this information by one of 
our uncles, John PalmSunday Haununupaine, who is a direct descendant of the clan in Arona.   
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never fully an individual in his or her own right.  First and foremost, a person is 
recognized as this or that person’s son or daughter. You are known on the island 
by your parents, and, more particularly, by the alahanga (family) you belong to 
(either by birth, adoption or association).  Even guests and visitors to the island 
are indirectly ‘adopted’ into the family with whose members they have the closest 
association.  Guests and visitors are welcomed as family members because Ulawa 
is conceptualised not just as an island or place but as a home made up of different 
alahanga.  
 
The metaphor of the island as a complete(d) house is a significant one. Ulawa as a 
completed house is made up of alahanga (families), each of which represents a 
geographical and political unit as well as a family one.  Each alahanga has access 
to specific land and sea territories and resources.  According to kastom, all of 
these political, land, sea and resource distributions based on the alahanga are 
underpinned by corresponding spiritual forces or foundations.  Outwardly, the 
alahanga in Ulawa Island society may appear simply to be an extended family of 
clan.  More importantly, however, it is also a political, social, economic and 
religious entity. In this sense, Ulawa island society differs from Solomon Islands 
as a whole which is a political entity made up of ‘wantoks’ (see Chapter 4).  
 
In the case of Ulawa Island society, because the ‘house’ is already full or 
complete, you can never add or introduce another alahanga at the same grassroots 
level in Ulawa.  Thus, although there have in recent years been splinter groups 
within some of the existing alahanga, their legitimacy will remain in question as 
long as the present social structure remains.  Even if these splinter groups were to 
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host a houla to publicly inaugurate their new alahanga, they would be seen as 
lacking the spiritual foundation to sustain that proclamation.  The entire island of 
Ulawa, its land territory, coastline and surrounding sea, are already divided up 
amongst all the existing alahanga in the island and this underlying cultural 
structure provides a basis for the perceived legitimacy of the alaha, and alahanga.  
That is why Ulawa Island is understood metaphorically as a complete(d) house.              
6.4.2  Fish: hoie  
Ulawa is also spoken of metaphorically as a fish by its inhabitants (the northern 
end being conceived of as the head, the southern end as the tail, the central or 
middle part as the belly).  Associated with the conception of Ulawa Island as a 
fish is the related narrative of the two sharks which oversee both the eastern and 
western sides of the Island. On the eastern side of Ulawa lives Poro Awao, and on 
the western side, Sautehi Matawa.  Although Poro Awao has always been the 
guardian of the eastern side of the island, legend has it that the western side had 
no shark guardian until one day when the mother of the baby boy, Sautehi 
Matawa, was bathing him in the stream at Su’utelihia (near Mwadjoa village) and 
he slipped out of her wet hands and was fully submerged under the water, 
immediately turning into a shark which made its way into the open sea and 
became the guardian shark of the western coastline of Ulawa Island.  Because 
both of these sharks are the island’s sea guardians, each keeps strictly within his 
own territorial boundary.  Thus, in metaphoric terms, the island of Ulawa is 
guarded by a ‘father’ and his ‘son’.  The western coastline of Ulawa faces inwards 
towards the central Solomons:  this is where the ‘son’ or infant shark, Sautehi 
Matawa resides.  The eastern coastline faces the vast expanse of ocean separating 
the inner Solomons from its eastern outer islands: this is where the ‘father’ or 
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adult shark, Poro Awao resides.  Although there are no female guardian sharks 
protecting Ulawa Island, tradition has it that the ‘mother’ of the island is the 
female ancestor of some interior tribes in Small Malaita.  
 
So what does the metaphor of the fish signify?  First, it represents the idea of life, 
the idea that the island is not dead but alive.  Indeed, the island itself is conceived 
of as a living entity.  Thus, for example, with reference to the building of the 
airfield in Arona (at the southern end of Ulawa), an uncle of mine, now deceased, 
observed that the tail of the fish had been clipped (construction of the airfield), 
and the fish (Ulawa Island) would now begin to swim a little faster.  He suggested 
that before the construction of the airfield, the fish (Ulawa) was merely drifting 
along, almost stationary, in the current; now that the tail had been clipped, it 
would wake up, flap its tail and fins, and swim along faster.  This metaphoric 
discourse of modern development in Ulawa Island is particularly interesting in 
that it represents the interpretation of someone who had never attended formal 
schooling.   
 
Secondly, the metaphor of the fish represents the idea that the island is a source of 
food for its inhabitants. In fact, fishing provides an important part of the diet of 
this island.  Fishing is such an important life skill that boys and men who were, 
and are, unable to develop fishing skills are often ridiculed.  They are said to be 
tolo (bush or interior), implying that their inability to fish is because they are 
inland bush dwellers.  Indeed, during the fishing season, Saturdays were, and still 
generally are, set aside as a day for men to go fishing, especially deep-water 
fishing.  In Ulawa language, Saturday is called wa’o wa’o, which literally means 
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‘fishing’.  Another important aspect of the fish metaphor in Ulawa Island culture 
relates, therefore, to the fact that, as mentioned earlier, every alahanga in the 
island has its connections to the sea.  Every alahanga, as a political and social 
institution, has on land a toohi (men’s house) and, by the sea, a taoha (canoe 
house). In addition to the taoha, each alahanga has a maalitawa (passage to the 
sea).  This is one of the reasons that it would be difficult to create an entirely new 
alahanga in Ulawa: these traditional houses are undergirded by spiritual 
foundations.  Thus, each alahanga in Ulawa island has a deity of the land and a 
deity of the sea.  This is one of the ideas contained in the metaphor of the 
complete(d) house.  As indicated earlier, Ulawa Island is a patrilineal society. This 
is reflected in the fish metaphor.   
 
Thirdly, the metaphor of the fish represents the idea of continuity as embodied in 
the expression used for the practice of primogeniture in alahanga.  Just as the fish 
species continues to live on through regeneration, so the alahanga, as a practice 
and as an institution, also lives on through continuity. In other words, in Ulawa 
the alahanga is si’e suu (never ending).  It continues oli mala i’e (to live on), just 
as the fish do, spawning at the right season and continuing to replenish the stock 
and maintain the species itself.  The idea of the alahanga renewing and 
replenishing itself, just as do fish, has caused some rifts in some clans in the 
island. In instances where, for whatever reason, the person who should take over a 
chieftainship is unable to do so, another member of the alahanga, usually an able 
bodied male, will request the role of caretaker.  Over time, a caretaker and his 
children might be tempted to try to usurp the position, assuming it as their natural 
and legitimate right.  It is, however, by no means a simple matter to deny the 
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rightful persons their proper inheritance since everyone in the extended family 
knows who has the right to become the next alaha in each alahanga: genealogies 
do not lie. In each alahanga, there is not only the alaha, but also his popotana 
(assistant).  The assistant is usually selected and agreed on by the elders in the 
alahanga on the basis of outstanding personal life skills and personality, 
competency in traditional knowledge, and general abilities.  
 
At first sight, it may appear that the female element is absent from the fish 
metaphor. This is not the case. The female is implied in every aspect of the 
metaphor, and is embodied, in particular, in the idea of continuity. Unless there is 
‘rebirth’, there can be no continuity in either the fish species or alahanga.  
6.4.3  Earth oven: ora    
The third metaphor referred to here, that of the ora (earth oven, derived from 
‘ora’, the word for light), appears to be part of the social thought of only one 
alahanga, in the Island.45  
 
Arona has a special place in Ulawa Island mythology and genealogy. It is located 
at the southern end of the island (the back-end of the house; the tail of the fish) 
and it has its own metaphoric conception of the island.  People of Arona perceive 
the island of Ulawa in the form of an earth oven. Ulawa is surrounded mostly by a 
rugged coastline of volcanic rock.  The metaphor of the island as an earth oven is, 
therefore, linked to the geography of the island.  Just as the island is surrounded 
by volcanic rock, so the earth oven is ringed round by volcanic rocks in the form 
                                                 
45 Meffrey Awao, personal communication.  
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of either a circle or a square.  The oven is the space and site for cooking food; 
before the introduction of pots and pans, the earth oven was also the place where 
the fire was stored.  In traditional Ulawa Island architecture (where houses were 
situated on the ground rather than, as is common today, on stilts), the ora was 
located at the back end of the house, the house being divided into two areas, the 
front end (used mainly by the husband and for entertaining guests and visitors), 
and the back end (used mainly by the wife, and including an area for cooking).   
 
These traditional, indigenous metaphors resemble, in some ways, the common 
European conception of Nature as a life force, a type of guardian of the social 
order.  However, whereas the European notion of Nature is based on the 
presumption of universal relevance and applicability, the Ulawa Island metaphors 
to which reference has been made are strictly local.  As such, they are indicative 
of the very local and specific nature of the way in which Ulawa islanders 
conceptualise their world and, by extension, conceptualise the notion of 
development.  
6.5  Contemporary society   
In Chapter 4, Solomon Islands society was described as a nation of wantoks, the 
general structure of Solomon Islands society being characterised by kastom, 
church, and the modern state or government.  Through the Constitution, the State 
defines Solomon Islands society as a political (rather than socio-cultural) entity.  
Thus, when considered in the context of the history of the evolution of the state, 
development can be seen as being largely a political phenomenon and 
bureaucratic process (see Chapter 5).  In contrast, Ulawa Island society could be 
said to be a social, political, cultural and religious entity. This holistic nature of 
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Ulawa Island society can be represented by the metaphor of a complete(d) house. 
Development discourse has, therefore, for Ulawa islanders, an important cultural 
dimension.  Even so, the wider forces that have determined and defined Solomon 
Islands society have also been at work in Ulawa.  
6.5.1  Kastom  
The basis of Ulawa Island society is kastom or tolaha(ka) (Ulawa Island culture) 
and the alahanga are at the root of Ulawa kastom.  These alahanga are located in 
certain regions throughout the island.  
 
Ulawa Island as a whole is divided into fourteen different geographical regions. 
Some of these regions, but not all, are characterized by a main settlement centre or 
village.  Many of these village settlements are the consequence of the arrival of 
Christianity where people were gathered together in one large village, usually 
along the coast, the church building becoming the focal point of the village. In 
some villages, a mission school was built as well.  In recent years, especially in 
the 1980s, people have begun to return to their ancestral homes and to revive their 
traditional villages and settlements.  The extent to which this reverse migration 
can be described as part of a renaissance of traditional culture is not clear.  Even 
so, it does provide some indication of the fact that kastom does indeed underpin 
Ulawa Island society even today.             
 
While there is a reverse migration in settlement patterns, those who choose to 
remain in the main villages do so also within a settlement structure based on the 
alahanga.  For example, in the village of Su’uholo on the eastern side of the 
island (where I come from), six different alahanga live and make up the village of 
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Su’uholo.  To a casual visitor, Su’uholo may appear to be one large village, but 
every house in the village is, in fact, located in its own alahanga’s geographical or 
physical space.  In the large villages, such as Su’uholo, each of the alahanga is 
referred to in the metaphor of a canoe, iola laku.  Thus, each alahanga is 
understood as a distinct canoe or entity which is part of the fleet of canoes that 
make up the village of Su’uholo.  In traditional discourse, Su’uholo village, as a 
fleet of canoes, is known as tala ni kaula (path of the frigate bird).  You do not 
normally use the name in ordinary, everyday conversation but it comes up on 
special occasions such as the traditional feast, houla.  As well, each alahanga has 
its own traditional name.  Because each alahanga has its geographical space 
within the village locality, people cannot choose to build their houses wherever 
they want.  Each individual must live within the boundary of the appropriate 
alahanga.  Just as the alahanga is thought of as a separate canoe, so the members 
of an alahanga are thought of as travellers in that canoe.  Just as there are sitting 
arrangements in a canoe, so too, in terms of rank and file, there are clearly 
understood places and positions for all the members of the alahanga.  The front 
two seats belong to the alaha (chief) and his popotana (assistant), while the rest of 
the male members rank according to age.  Moreover, each canoe within a ‘fleet’ is 
also ranked according to how it is located within the village.  In Su’uholo village, 
the alahanga closest to the sea is said to be in the front row, with the rest 
following in the order in which their alahanga is geographically located in the 
village.  The very last alahanga (which also happens to be the furthest inland) is 
said to be purine iola (at the back of the canoe or fleet).  Although this ‘sitting’ 
arrangement (front to back) is not, in other respects, indicative of a hierarchical 
relationship among the canoes, the members of the alahanga in the front of the 
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‘fleet’ are expected to play some leading role in the affairs of the village as a 
whole.  This expectation is not mandatory; it is a kind of gentleman’s agreement. 
If the ‘front’ alaha fails to exercise this leading role, any of the other alaha may 
carry out the leading role if they so wish.  This often happens in consultation with 
the other alaha because there is no real seniority, they are all equals.            
 
This equality of relationship among the different alahanga in the village, and by 
extension, the individual members of the village community, has important 
implications for village-wide activities.  Because there is no overall village chief 
as such, people have to be enticed, not coerced, to participate in any village and 
communal undertaking, including development activities.  Even so, every 
individual person in Ulawa belongs first and foremost to his or her alahanga, then 
to his or her village and, finally, to other institutions such as the church or state. 
 
By way of example, I personally belong to an alahanga in Su’uholo village which 
is located in the middle.  Therefore, in terms of the fleet or sitting arrangement by 
rows in the sense of the traditional canoe, my alahanga is in a middle row.  The 
name of my alahanga is Ahungakalo, which means ‘devil’s wrapping or 
habitation’.  Our ancestral deity is a shark and is called Awao Poenjili.  My father, 
who was named after his grandfather, was named after our ancestral deity.  My 
elder brother is also named after our deity.   
 
Legend has it that Awao Poenjili was the eldest amongst the walu Awao, eight 
Awao brothers who used to live in the interior of the island, above Su’uholo 
village, in Lopo-i-Suuhau.  After their home in the interior became uninhabitable, 
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they moved to the coast where Awao Poenjili and six of his brothers descended to 
the east coast of Ulawa.  Their present day descendants, amongst others, live in 
Su’uholo village.  One brother descended to the west coast of the island and his 
present day descendants live in Mwaradja village.  His descendants also use the 
name Awao.  As in the case of many other oral cultures, names represent 
memories, narratives, truths and realities.  
 
Essentially, the alahanga is the inner core, the social and cultural heart of Ulawa 
Island society.  It is the only inclusive indigenous institution to which everyone 
from Ulawa belongs and it is central to the Ulawa Island belief system, principles, 
values and practices.  Recently, however, the alahanga in Ulawa have begun to be 
placed under enormous strain. Unless something is done quickly to strengthen the 
alahanga through some kind of formal state recognition of traditional chiefs, 
alaha, the essence of Ulawa Island society is at risk of losing its foundations and 
legitimacy, something that could prove catastrophic for Ulawa society.  In the 
absence of a stable society, development activities are unlikely to have any 
significant effect.  
6.5.2  Church(es)      
The Church is a significant part of Solomon Islands society (see Chapter 4).  
Christianity was introduced to Ulawa by an Anglican missionary, Clement Marau. 
Clement Marau, originally from the Torres and Banks Islands of northern 
Vanuatu, was, like many other young men from the islands of Melanesia, taken by 
the Anglican Church missionaries to Norfolk Island where he was educated and 
trained as a missionary.  While at Norfolk Island, he befriended Walter Waaro 
who was from Mwadjoa village in Ulawa.  When their stay in Norfolk Island was 
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over, Walter Waaro persuaded his ni-Vanuatu friend to accompany him to Ulawa.  
In Ulawa, Christianity was first introduced to Mwadjoa village and Clement 
Marau set up the first mission school at Su’utaluhie near Mwadjoa.  Later on, the 
second village in Ulawa to be Christianised by the Anglican Church was Su’uholo 
village in the east.  Subsequently, the Anglican Church spread throughout Ulawa 
Island.  In 1849, however, the Roman Catholic Church also came to Ulawa, the 
majority of its adherents now living in villages along the northeast coast.  In the 
1980s and, in particular, the 1990s, new religious movements arrived in Ulawa, 
especially Pentecostal Christian Churches.  In many instances, these new religious 
movements came to Ulawa at the invitation of someone from the island who had 
converted to the new church either in Honiara or in another area of the Solomons.   
 
The largest Christian churches in Ulawa island are the Anglican (Church of 
Melanesia), Roman Catholic and Seventh Day Adventists, listed chronologically 
in the order in which they arrived on the island as well as in terms of adherents, 
from the largest to the smallest.  Besides these three major churches, there are 
other minor Christian churches whose numbers are less significant.  These include 
the Christian Outreach Centre (COC), Rhema, and South Sea Evangelical Church 
(SSEC).  The Bahai Faith also arrived quite recently, but has not yet been able to 
establish itself in the island. Ulawa Island today could be described as almost one 
hundred per cent Christian.  
 
So what are the major issues associated with the fact that almost all Ulawa 
islanders today are affiliated to a Christian church?  
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The two oldest and largest Christian churches, Church of Melanesia and Roman 
Catholic, are quite open-minded about kastom, generally respecting it and having 
a receptive attitude towards traditional practices.  On the other hand, the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church, along with the other Christian churches, has tended to 
view kastom in a more negative light, associating it with paganism, and seeing it 
as backward and antithetical to modernisation.  Indeed, they seem to be more 
concerned with personal hygiene, appearance and physical wellbeing than with 
spirituality.  Commonly practised activities such as smoking, drinking alcohol, 
and chewing betel nut are considered to be not only unhygienic and unclean but 
also sinful. Seventh Day Adventist followers, as their doctrine demands, no longer 
fish or work in their gardens on Saturdays along with everyone else.  Some follow 
the doctrine to the extent of not raising pigs or producing yams at all, considering 
such activities to be ‘un-spiritual’.  This is because yams, taro and pork are the 
ceremonial food for the houlaa, (kastom feast).46  Foregoing the planting of yams 
and taro and the raising of pigs means that one cannot participate in a houlaa.  
Given the cultural significance of houlaa, the potential for tension and conflict 
involving families and, indeed, whole villages and communities, is evident. 
 
The negative attitudes which the more recently introduced Christian churches hold 
towards kastom undermine – directly and indirectly – the traditional basis of 
Ulawa Island society. Incredibly, this is an issue that many people in Ulawa seem 
not to be aware of.  Indeed, some of these new Christian churches are headed by 
converted alaha (chiefs).  In Ulawa, an alaha cannot force members of his 
alahanga to join him and/or his immediate family in a new faith.  Thus, the arrival 
                                                 
46 Although kumara is the stable diet, it is not used as ceremonial food in the houlaa. 
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of new Christian churches has led not only to competition for members, but, more 
significantly, to the gradual undermining of the basis of Ulawa Island society, the 
alahanga.  A symptom of this is the now commonly heard complaint that people, 
young people in particular, no longer respect the alaha and elders in their villages 
and communities.  Indeed, in 2003, following the arrival of RAMSI in Solomon 
Islands, some concerned islanders noted that perhaps it was time to have a Police 
Post on the island.  This is a clear sign of the changes that have resulted from the 
undermining of kastom. 
 
When Christianity first arrived in Ulawa, it did much to pacify the islanders and 
end traditional feuding and animosity.  It acted as a unifying force. Today, 
however, the Christian Church has become a divisive and destabilising force.  
6.5.3  Modern state structures  
Historically, Ulawa Island existed as a separate political entity, the Ulawa Island 
Council, under the British colonial government.  In the broader administrative 
structure of the protectorate, though, it was part of the Eastern District.  The 
Eastern District had as its headquarters at Kira Kira in Makira but also included, 
apart from Makira Island itself, Ugi, Three Sisters, Ulawa, Santa Ana, Santa 
Catalina and the eastern outer islands.  The eastern outer islands included Santa 
Cruz, Reef Islands, Utupua, Vanikoro, Anuta and Tikopia.  However, during the 
reform programme, Plan of Operation 1974-77 (cited in Awao, n.d.), Ulawa was 
amalgamated with the Makira Island Council (Awao, n.d.). At that time, Ulawa 
Island was given the choice of joining either Malaita or Makira.  The political 
leaders, traditional elders and chiefs of Ulawa, chose, subject to two conditions, to 
join Makira.  The first condition was that the name of Ulawa should be included 
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in the council’s name, the new political entity being referred to as Makira/Ulawa 
Council (rather than Makira Council as had been the case).  The second condition 
was that Ulawa Island should have political representation at both Council and, 
later, provincial government level, as well as at a national parliamentary level.  
Having gained both these concessions from Makira, Ulawa Island became part of 
the former Makira Council, now the Makira/Ulawa Provincial Government.  Of 
the eighteen wards that together constitute the political constituency of the 
Makira/Ulawa Provincial Government Assembly, three are from Ulawa.  These 
provincial government assembly seats are known as Wards 1, 2 and 3.  Each of 
these seats is contested every four years.  
 
At the national or parliamentary level, Ulawa Island joins Ugi in forming the 
Ulawa/Ugi Constituency. This is one of fifty constituencies nationwide.  Thus, 
through the national constituency, both Ulawa and Ugi are directly represented in 
the national parliament of Solomon Islands.  The current Governor-General of 
Solomon Islands, Sir Nathaniel Waena47, won the Ulawa/Ugi constituency for the 
third time in a row during the general elections of December 2001, becoming only 
the third person (all three from Ulawa) to hold the parliamentary seat since 
independence.  Upon assuming the vice-regal post, Waena was replaced in a bye-
election in 2004 by James Tora who comes from Ugi and was Minister of 
National Unity and Reconciliation in the Kemakeza government that was in 
power from December 2001 to March 2006.     
 
                                                 
47 Sir Waena has been GG of Solomon Islands since 7 July 2004.  
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From a development point of view, having direct political representation in the 
national parliament is a huge bonus. In fact, much of the development 
infrastructure in Ulawa (the road, wharf, secondary school, clinic and copra 
buying point) was largely due to the efforts of Waena when he was the Ulawa/Ugi 
Member of Parliament.  As a former senior civil servant – Permanent Secretary in 
various government ministries – he was familiar with the way in which the 
bureaucracy operated and was able use this knowledge, along with stints as a 
Cabinet Minister, over many years to secure development projects for Ulawa 
Island.  In fact, believing that he had already done enough for Ulawa in his 
previous two terms, he intended to use his third term in parliament to seek 
development projects specifically for Ugi Island.  Although Waena was replaced, 
the fact that he was replaced by someone from Ugi, led many constituents to 
believe, especially those from Ugi, that Waena’s intentions for his third term will 
be fulfilled notwithstanding his replacement.  However, since winning the bye-
election in 2004 and having been returned to Parliament in the 5 April 2006 
general elections, James Tora has yet to fulfil the development intentions 
envisaged by Waena for Ugi island.  Whether or not Tora will eventually do that 
during his second term in parliament remains to be seen.        
 
Perhaps one of the biggest advantages Ulawa has gained by sharing the same 
constituency as Ugi is that it has access to the Constituency Development Fund, 
currently known as Rural Constituency Development Fund (RCDF). The RCDF is 
a sum of money allocated by the national/central government to each of the fifty 
constituencies nationwide for development projects.  As the current member of 
parliament of the constituency, the national MP administers the fund, something 
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that leads to considerable controversy between Members of Parliament and their 
electorate.  Some commentators argue that the way in which the money is 
allocated, and the manner in which it is dispensed, leaves much to be desired.  In 
the case of Ulawa, the CDF has been used thus far for projects such as rural water 
supplies, church buildings, outboard motors and chainsaws, school fees and 
musical instruments for youth groups. In addition, many people receive individual 
help from the Member of Parliament for transportation and other miscellaneous 
expenses. 
 
John Roughan48, who regularly offers critical insights on government 
development policies and activities, especially regarding rural development, 
recently made this observation about the RCDF (Roughan, 20 July, 2005):  
 
From its first days in 1993, Solomon Islands parliamentarians were handed 
over SB$100,000 (US$13,580) supposedly for the needs of the people in a 
constituency.  
 
Over the years, however, as the fund increased to SB$400,000 
(US$54,320) its major purpose of bringing development to people of the 
nation turned into a slush fund for everything and anything.  
 
The worst thing about the fund is not that it is abused, misused and causes 
serious social friction. Much more seriously, it has changed the nature of 
politics in the Solomons.  
 
                                                 
48 For example, here are just two of his numerous critical opinions: (1) Opinion: The quick, easy 
fix; (2) Opinion: The dollar rules! Both can be found in 
http://www.peoplefirst.net.sb/news/news_summary.asp.  
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It turned elected members from governing the nation to dispensers of 
funds. Our elected leaders, in the process, lost the understanding of their 
work.  
 
Basically, the fund focused parliamentarians’ attention away from their 
primary role as law makers to fill their time up as dispensers of funds for 
projects, school fees, ship fares, medical expenses, traditional feasts, and 
(sic) so forth.  
 
It is sad to see and hear about so many Solomon Islanders hanging around 
their members’ home, waiting for the handout, help in financial difficulty, 
hearing the good word on a submitted project, and such.  
 
The typical MP’s life is difficult enough trying to care for his immediate 
family than have more often than not, a dozen others from the 
constituency waiting at his home for a handout.  
 
Much of today’s criticism about the RCDF centres on the misuse of funds. 
But more importantly, many parliamentarians have lost their 
understanding that law making is their primary work.  
 
That’s the very reason why they have been voted into parliament. They are 
expected to study carefully proposed new legislation and to critically 
review national trends; to think about alternative ways of making the 
nation hum, to work out ways to better direct the country.  
 
Their primary job is not to dispense money as if they were walking ATMs 
– Automatic Teller Machines.  
 
Unfortunately, so much of the typical member’s attention, energy and 
work are used up in working out, dispensing of and checking the RCDF.  
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As Roughan further observes, RCDF monies which should be allocated for “truly 
developmental purposes” are, instead, being used as a “slush fund for anything 
and everything”.  More importantly, as Roughan notes, the availability of the fund 
has distracted MPs from their proper role and functions. Instead of focusing on 
their primary role, that of legislation, they have been side-tracked into 
administering development funds.  As Roughan observes, “boat’s fare, medical 
prescription, school fee, traditional feast, donation, etc. do not qualify as 
developmental work but charity”.  I can vouch for this from personal experience.  
 
However valid Roughan’s criticisms of policy gone wrong are, the fact that the 
national government has centralised control over development policy and 
planning gives the process a semblance of order and coherence.  So far as the 
RCDF is concerned, each constituency is given the same amount of money for the 
MP to administer to the electorate.  This equal distribution of the fund may be 
contested since not all the fifty constituencies are of the same size, nor are their 
needs the same.  Nevertheless, so far as Ulawa is concerned, it could be argued 
that the manner in which the policy is being implemented is influenced by kastom 
or culture.  
 
It is important to distinguish between the political dimension of development at a 
national level and the cultural dimension of development at the constituency or 
rural area level.  Thus, for example, when Waena was the MP for the Ulawa/Ugi 
constituency, in the national parliament of Solomon Islands, he was perceived as a 
national politician, a member of a political party (Alliance), and a cabinet minister 
of the Crown.  However, so far as his relationship with his constituency is 
 
-185- 
concerned, he is regarded as a local.  He was elected because of his credentials as 
a local.  Thus, he is not only a wantok to his electorate, but a modern alaha.  The 
relationship between an MP and his constituency may appear political and 
bureaucratic, but its essence is based on Ulawa Island kastom.  Therefore, one of 
the defining characteristics the electorate looks for in those aspiring to be a 
Member of Parliament is whether they are attuned to kastom. Personality counts 
for more than work experience and academic qualifications.  This is one reason 
why many candidates who have had a higher Western education have failed to 
unseat Waena in three consecutive national elections.  Whether this will continue 
to be the case in the future, only time will tell.  However, in the case of Nathaniel 
Waena before him and now James Tora (current MP for Ulawa/Ugi) the electorate 
simply did not ‘know’ the other candidates well enough either because they had 
not spent enough time travelling to, and living in, the islands (Ulawa and Ugi) for 
people to know them, or they had tended to be seen as ‘individualistic’ in their 
lives away from the islands.  
 
So, although Ulawa society may appear distant from the national government or 
modern state (located in Honiara on Guadalcanal), it is nevertheless the case that  
national government exerts considerable influence over rural Ulawa Island society 
through the RCDF.  The nuances of the relationship, conceived in the context of 
development, can be understood through the relationship between the 
constituency and its elected Member of Parliament, a relationship which is 
underpinned by important cultural principles and values.  Thus, the modern state 
operates as an outer husk to the inner core, which is kastom.        
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6.6  Development activities in Ulawa  
For purposes of convenience, development activities in Ulawa are be sub-divided 
here into two parts.  The first part deals with development activities in Ulawa 
before independence, the second part deals with development activities after 
independence.  
6.6.1 Before independence   
The concept of development was introduced into Solomon Islands by the British. 
In fact, however, very little development activity took place in Ulawa during 
British rule apart from the building of a clinic at Hadja, which is still there today, 
and two boarding primary schools.  Both schools catered for classes from cellar 
class (one class below class one) up to class seven49.  One boarding primary 
school intended for the people on the western side of Ulawa Island was built at 
Warowaro (near Ripo village), the other, intended for those on the eastern side of 
Ulawa Island, was built in Arona.  Neither of these schools now exists in its 
original location.  The primary school at Warowaro has been relocated to Ripo 
village; the one at Arona has moved to Piru Piru and is now Ulawa’s Community 
High School. 
 
There is little oral evidence of the introduction of modern development to Ulawa 
apart from stories about the few Ulawa people who have had overseas adventures 
through ‘Blackbirding’.  One such story concerns a person from Ahia village who 
went to Queensland, Australia as an indentured labourer and returned with 
                                                 
49 In those early years, there was no kindergarten and so children went to school quite late. It was 
not unusual for children to start primary school (in Standard One) at either seven or eight years 
old, sometimes older.  
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nothing in his possession except a gun.  The paucity of labour recruitment in 
Ulawa Island is due to the fact that labour recruiting boats hardly ever called at 
Ulawa, the other, larger islands like Malaita being more easily accessible.     
 
The only other modern development activities in Ulawa Island have been Church-
related. In particular, the first Christian missionary, Father Martin Marau of the 
Anglican Church in Mwadjo’a, was responsible for overseeing the building of the 
first permanent Church building in Ulawa (St Barnabas Church in Mwadjo’a 
village).  The money used to buy materials for the roof of the building was 
collected through fundraising that was organised by Fr Martin Marau in Norfolk 
Island (see for example, Roger Neich (2001), Fig.3, pp. 11-12).  For a long time, 
in Ulawa, the only buildings made of permanent material were the Anglican 
Church buildings and the Ulawa Island Council clinic at Hadja (referred to 
earlier).  Also, through missionary work and activity, a few other people from 
Ulawa were able to move around and experience other parts of the Solomons.               
   
Perhaps the event that had the most impact on the lives of Ulawa Island people 
was World War II. Because of the war, many people went to work in Lunga, 
Guadalcanal as labour corps for the Americans.  Experiences both during and after 
the war gave people new perceptions of whites and Europeans and exposed them 
to Western goods.  I remember, as I was growing up, seeing some of the utensils 
brought back by former members of labour corps.  More importantly (see Chapter 
4), the Maasina Rule movement was brought to Ulawa by those who went to 
Guadalcanal and became acquainted with the leaders and organisers of the 
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movement, most of whom were from Malaita.  The centre of the Maasina Rule 
movement in Ulawa was in Su’uholo village.50  
 
Ulawa islanders were affected both directly and indirectly by the aftermath of 
World War II.  After the war, many Ulawa Islanders, mostly young men, went to 
work in coconut plantations located on other islands in the Solomons. In Su’uholo 
village, my father was one of the first few people to start planting a coconut 
plantation specifically for the production of copra.  However, because of land 
limitations, the plot of land he cleared for coconuts was not sufficiently big.  Nor 
was the soil good enough for coconuts.  Although the family still use the coconuts 
planted by my father for copra, they now use it mainly for domestic consumption.  
Other people in Su’uholo village who followed my father into coconut plantation 
were more fortunate, some of them now making a reasonable amount of money 
from copra.  
 
After the war, some people from Ulawa went to work in Honiara and other urban 
centres throughout the country, many of them attracted by the availability of 
formal education for their children.  My own primary and secondary education 
took place in the 1970s and 1980s in Guadalcanal.              
6.6.2 After independence    
Modern development activities in Ulawa Island have been concerned largely with 
the implementation of national development policies formulated by central 
government with the assistance of provincial government organisations.  In 
                                                 
50 Two of my late uncles were the main leaders: Raddock Tapo’oa (my father’s cousin) and Luke 
Rohorua (my father’s elder brother).        
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relation to the policy initiative encouraging indigenous Solomon Islanders to 
engage in private sector activities, many individuals and families in Ulawa have 
tried to engage in various business activities.   
   
Today, in terms of modern development activities, there exist in Ulawa such 
things as coconut plantations and copra driers.  In some of the villages, there are 
village cooperatives as well as village stores and bakeries owned by individual 
families or groups of families.  An enterprising young man from Mwaradja village 
operates a successful vegetable garden.  During the mid-1980s, there was a 
promising community cocoa project at Ahia village.51  Unfortunately, however, as 
in the case of other ventures throughout the islands, it fell into disrepair after some 
years of operation.  The issue of business failure in the island is one I have 
addressed elsewhere (Rohorua, 1996).  Although many business ventures in 
Ulawa have failed, it remains the case that, in contrast to many other islands of the 
Solomons today, Ulawa is relatively well placed, having the physical 
infrastructure and community faculties and services discussed earlier.  Recently, a 
small fishing industry has been established.  So, too, has a weekly shipping 
service to the island from Honiara, a venture undertaken by an expatriate 
businessman who has connections with some people from Ripo village in Ulawa. 
 
                                                 
51 The cocoa project was initiated by one of my uncles (my mum’s cousin) from Ahia village, 
Michael Harara Poropaine, who had been working for the government as an agriculture field 
extension officer in both Makira and Ulawa.  Once he decided to start the cocoa project he 
resigned from the government.  However, when the cocoa project failed due to constant internal 
bickering over the income generated by the project, Michael and his family moved from Ahia 
village, where they now reside in their ancestral homeland in Arona.      
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As is the case for other people in Solomon Islands, the lives of Ulawa Islanders 
continue to revolve around the three major institutions of State, Church and 
Kastom.  Although, as in other rural areas of Solomon Islands, the State or 
national government has less direct effect than do the Church and Kastom, the 
idea of development nevertheless continues to ensure that the State has some 
presence in the minds of rural islanders, especially through the availability of the 
RDCF.  Even so, kastom, continues to be the backbone of Ulawa society, just as it 
does elsewhere in rural Solomon Islands.  
6.7  The concept of development in Ulawa      
6.7.1 Common views of development   
Certain experiences of development are shared by people in Ulawa and people in 
other parts of Solomon Islands.  There are, therefore, some shared views about 
development.  Thus, Kelloway (1998, p. 11) notes: 
 
Public officers and rural people revealed the presence of a consensus on 
what is viewed as development by rural people.  Without exception, 
development is seen to be material in nature. It is related inevitably to cash 
and access to the things cash can be converted into.  
 
This understanding of development in terms of cash or paper money should not 
come as a surprise.  After all, the colonial administration that had introduced the 
idea of national development into Solomon Islands had also played a significant 
role in introducing the widespread use of cash money.  So, for Solomon Islanders, 
development has always been associated, through the cost of labour, commodities, 
services and public infrastructure, with cash purchases as observed by Kelloway 
(1998, p. 11): 
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While development is seen as roads, clinics and water supply, it is also 
seen as the ability to purchase consumables – in their wide variety. 
Training was not seen to be development. . . .  [T]he educated voluntarily 
discerned the intangible dimensions of development, but typically as a 
second level of response.       
 
The association of development with cash money and consumption is undoubtedly 
related to the direct experience of rural Solomon Islanders who live in a 
predominantly subsistence economy.  In a subsistence economy, everyone is more 
or less self sufficient.  There is, therefore, little incentive to save.  Besides, since 
the technology to preserve consumable foods and commodities is not readily 
available, there is little sense of the value and use of paper money, something that 
is critical to a Western understanding of development especially in the context of 
a capitalist or market economy.  How, then, does this relate to a specific Ulawa 
Island concept of development?  
6.7.2 An Ulawa Island concept of development: mwa’ora or mwaora’nga  
Although there are shared experiences and understandings of development among 
Ulawa Island and other places in Solomon Islands, the diversity of cultures points 
to the fact that there are also likely to be differences in the ways in which 
development is conceptualised in different areas.  A concept of development that 
appears to be specific to Ulawa, one that is expressed in the words mwa’ora or 
mwa’oranga, is discussed below.      
6.7.2.1 Linguistic entry and organic usage    
Walter Ivens (1927), in an entry in his Sa’a & Ulawa Dictionary, defines 
mwa’ora as follows: “mwa’ora  v.i., to run, of vines” (p. 212).  This brief entry 
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captures only one use of the word in Ulawa. Mwa’ora is also used to refer to 
healthy crops, particularly healthy root crops such as yams and taros. Mwa’ora 
does not have the same meaning as `ine (abundance, applied to root crops) or 
hungu (abundance, applied to fruits on fruit trees).  Mwa’ora is applicable to all 
plants and vegetation, not just vines: it is applied to describe healthy growth and, 
only indirectly, and through implication, can it be said to apply (in a general 
organic sense) to an abundant harvest.  
6.7.2.2 Shades of meaning      
Like many other oral societies in the Pacific Islands, metaphor and rhetoric have a 
significant place in Ulawa Island culture, etiquette and social thought.  Thus, the 
indigenous concept of development of Ulawa Island articulated here is perceived 
also as an essential part of their indigenous epistemology (Gegeo, 1994) and an 
important contribution to the repertoire of indigenous culture, social thought and 
knowledge.  
 
Mwa’ora is a compound word which juxtaposes two contrary ideas.  The second 
word, ora, means, in one context, earth oven.  Its literal meaning is, however, 
‘light’ (in the sense of a fire, or a lit fire).  When a fire is alight and burning with 
flames leaping into the air that provide light to the areas around the fire or 
fireplace, it is said to be ora.  The emphasis here is not so much on the heat given 
out by the fire, but on the light provided.  So, both the lit fire and light that 
radiates from the fire are known as ora.  This is why I suggested that ora in the 
sense of an earth oven (a place for cooking food with the use of fire), is merely a 
derivative of ora meaning light or a lit fire.  The other uses of ora, uses which 
relate to the provision of light, refer to electricity and instruments such as torches 
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and lamps.  However, light dispensed by the sun, sunlight, is referred to as raa or 
raaraa.  This sense of light has religious connotations and is used only in 
metaphysial and religious contexts.  
 
In contrast to ora (light or lit fire), is the word mwa’a (off, out or dead). As does 
ora, mwa’a has additional meanings. Streams and rivers which are running low or 
have dried up are referred to as mwa’a (empty).  This sense of mwa’a is extended 
to include supplies of water or other liquid substances which are either running 
low or empty.  In a metaphorical sense, mwa’a is also used to refer to a situation 
in which vital supplies of food or resources are low, cut off, or disrupted (either at 
the source or in the supply chain).  So mwa’a, like ora, has different shades of 
meaning depending on the situation or context in which it is used.  By and large, 
however, although these words are generally treated as opposites, their 
combination (in mwa’ora or mwa’oranga) signifies, at least in the context of 
Ulawa Island, something basic to human livelihood and existence.                          
6.7.2.3  Conceptual formulation  
Development in Ulawea is described as mwa’ora or mwa’oranga, the meeting of 
light and its absence, the place where supplies (cut off or dried up) are 
replenished.  Thus, in this context, mwa’ora or mwa’oranga mean sustaining life 
itself, something that, in the wider context of Ulawa Island and Solomon Islands 
society more generally, necessarily involves the collaboration of all aspects of 
contemporary society, namely, kastom, church and the modern state.  In order to 
understand how development planning and processes could contribute most 
effectively to Ulawa Island, and to Solomon Islands more generally, it is  
necessary to fully appreciate the complementary roles of kastom, church and state 
 
-194- 
and the ways in which these complementary roles can contribute to the sustenance 
of life.  Central to such an understanding is mwa’ora or mwa’oranga as an 
expression of the cultural (as opposed to political) dimension of development. 
6.8  Implications   
The concept of development in Ulawa discussed above refers simply to sustaining 
life.  From a practical point of view, however, modern development activity 
inevitably involves the acquisition and use of paper money for trading and 
exchange purposes.  Certainly, as Roughan (1986) argues from a radical, critical 
perspective, development must mean more than dollars and cents.  Nevertheless, it 
is the dollars and cents that Solomon Islanders currently need in order to buy what 
they cannot produce and in order to support their efforts to establish businesses.  
In contemporary Solomon Islands, a subsistence economy cannot supply 
everything that is required to sustain life.  Durable home materials, utensils, 
implements and garden tools have to be bought with dollars and cents.  This is the 
predicament that modern Solomon Islanders, including those who live in rural 
areas, face.  Kastom can provide certain things; the church and government 
services can supply others.  However, not only the wants, but also the basic needs 
of rural Solomon Islanders are beyond what these institutions can afford.  It 
therefore falls to individuals and families themselves to find ways of making up 
the deficit.  Realistically, policy makers need to address the fundamental issue of 
how best to give Solomon Islanders, including rural Solomon Islanders such as 
those living in Ulawa, access to dollars and cents in a manner that respects their 
family values and supports their individual enterprise.  In other words, the means 
by which Solomon Islanders can be enabled to make sufficient money to sustain 
their individual, family and community lives should be built into a policy 
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framework that is supported by the three fundamental pillars of Ulawa Island 
society specifically and Solomon Islands society more generally: kastom, church 
and the state or government.   
 
Ulawa Island, indeed Solomon Islands generally, faces critical limits in relation to 
what can be added or taken on board.  If there is too much development activity 
over too short a period of time, the complete(d) house may collapse, the canoe 
may overturn.  Essentially, at this point in time, development in Ulawa 
specifically, and in Solomon Islands generally, should be seen in terms of 
sustaining the life of individuals, families, communities and the country as a 
whole.  
6.9  Overview   
I have discussed Ulawa Island in terms of its indigenous concept of development 
and its development experiences. I have not, however, claimed that there is any 
sense in which this represents an ‘ideal’ case study. Ulawa, like other areas of the 
Solomon Islands, has its own identity, its own unique ways of being.  It is, 
however, different from many other areas of the Solomon Islands in that it is 
relatively culturally and linguistically homogeneous.  This relative cultural and 
linguistic homogeneity means that it can be treated, for the purposes of this 
research project, as a single entity, something that would not be possible in the 
case of many other areas of the Solomon Islands.  Ulawa is, furthermore, the 
island on which I was born and spent my early years. It is therefore a place with 
which I am very familiar. For these reasons, and because my aim here is to 
illustrate some of the many ways in which development is conceptualised by 
Solomon Islanders (particularly by rural-dwelling Solomon Islanders), Ulawa 
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Island provides a convenient location for a case study.  It is important, however, 
to stress that I am not claiming any special status for Ulawa in relation to the 
study of development in the Solomon Islands.  The discussion of concepts of 
development in Ulawa and of the Ulawan experience of development are intended 
simply as examples of the ways in which rural-dwelling Solomon Islanders’ 
concepts of development and experiences of development activities may differ 
fundamentally from those that are highlighted in much of the literature on 
development theory and practice.  Even so, there are some areas in which Ulawa 
might be said to be typical of other areas of the Solomon Islands.  In particular, it 
shares one of the important characteristics of Solomon Islands society nationwide 
in that kastom, church and state all play important roles.   
 
As noted earlier (6.5.2), Ulawa Island is almost one-hundred percent Christian. 
The main denominations are Anglican, Roman Catholic and Seventh Day 
Adventist, only a few islanders belonging to other denominations, including the 
more evangelical and Pentecostal ones.  As for the presence of the state or 
government in Ulawa, this exists at three different levels. At the national level, 
Ulawa Island and Ugi make up a single constituency (Ulawa/Ugi Constituency) 
which is represented in the national parliament by a single Member of Parliament 
(elected every four years). At the regional level, Ulawa is part of one of the 
eighteen provinces – the Makira/Ulawa Province – and is divided into three 
Wards, each one electing three members to the provincial assembly. Members of 
the provincial assembly have to work within the bounds of an allocation of 
funding to the provincial government from central government. Unlike national 
MPs, they do not have access to a development fund designated for their own 
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Ward or electorate. At the local level, Ulawa Island has an area council with its 
headquarters (currently located in Hadja near Ripo Village on the western side of 
Ulawa).52 The operational funds available to area councils are determined by 
central government and channelled through provincial government.  Thus, 
funding in the Solomon Islands is, like the development agenda itself, largely top-
down, driven primarily by the national or central government headquartered in 
Honiara.  
 
In common with Solomon Islands society more generally, the third element of 
Ulawa society is kastom.  In examining Ulawa Island society, I use a number of 
metaphors – the house, the fish, the oven, the island and the canoe. It is possible to 
relate these metaphors to Solomon Islands society more generally. The island 
metaphor has already been discussed extensively in Chapter 1. I shall refer here to 
the metaphors of house, canoe, fish and oven. 
 
The concept of the complete(d) house referred to in discussions of Ulawa Island 
can be related to the wider concept of autonomy. As noted in Chapter 4 (4.8.3), 
concepts of kastom and autonomy are inter-related, something that has contributed 
to the fact that kastom has been used, particularly by the people of Malaita, as a 
rallying cry for opposition to central authority and control. Whether or not kastom 
is used in this specific sense, it necessarily involves a type of community identity 
which can conflict with those broader notions of identity that characterise national 
governments. 
                                                 
52 It has been suggested that the area council headquarters should be relocated to Kelimei at the 
northern end of Ulawa but this suggestion has not yet been acted on. 
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Another metaphor discussed in relation to Ulawa Island society is that of the 
canoe. A canoe is characterised by finitude, containment and accountability. How 
individuals and groups conduct themselves in a canoe is critical to the survival of 
others. A canoe is readily overturned, even in fine weather. Any disagreement 
represents a threat not only to the well-being, but also to the survival of others. 
Harmony and respect are, therefore, fundamental. Extending kastom-based 
concepts of harmony and respect to society as a whole is a challenge faced by all 
Solomon Islanders. 
 
The metaphors of fish and oven both relate to resources and sustenance. The fact 
that the resources (including natural resources) available in small island 
communities are limited and the fact that they are often communally owned 
means that they must be cared for and used sensibly. However, there is a growing 
tendency in Ulawa, as I know from personal experience, for people – families in 
particular – to fight over commonly owned resources. This is a tendency that is 
also growing in the Solomon Islands more generally. It is therefore important that 
people in Ulawa, and in other areas of the Solomon Islands, reflect on the 
important role that caring and sharing, respecting the space and place of others, 
play in kastom. The people of Ulawa should also reflect on one of their common 
sayings: “If you do not weep for your brother, who will?”  Both in Ulawa in 
particular and in the Solomon Islands more generally, it is important to bear in 
mind that resources are limited and that people depend on one another. An 
important aspect of kastom, both in Ulawa Island and in other parts of the 
Solomons, is ensuring that there is place and space for everyone and that everyone 
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(whether they live on the coast or the interior) has access to what they need to 
survive and prosper. This needs to be reinforced at both local and national levels.  
 
What a consideration of Ulawa Island reveals, something that is also applicable to 
the country more generally, is that national development efforts should be aimed 
at sustaining the people in a way that is culturally appropriate, not at meeting 
criteria and standards that have been established elsewhere. Mwa’ora or 
mwa’oranga (sustaining life) is a cultural dimension of development that has 
emerged in the context of a subsistence economy.  If development activities are to 
have real meaning in people’s lives, they must be conducted in ways that make 
sense within the cultural context in which these people operate.  The case for an 
institutional framework which upholds the three important pillars of Ulawa Island 
(and of Solomon Islands society more generally) - kastom, church and state - is 
discussed further below under the heading of State Reform.   
6.10  State reform: Introduction  
The issue of state reform is one of considerable interest and significance in 
Solomon Islands.  The National Parliament was expected to debate the State 
Reform Bill in August 2004 (see Chapter 1).  That debate was deferred until 
2005. However, that debate had not taken place in parliament prior to the 5 April 
2006 national general elections.  Discussion of state reform in Solomon Islands is 
however, not new.  Just before independence, the Western Province of Solomon 
Islands (which at the time also included the island of Choiseul), was threatening to 
break away from the rest of the country (Paia, 2003).  On Guadalcanal too there 
was talk of breaking away from the rest of the country at independence 
(Kabutaulaka, 1999).  However, much of the earlier debate surrounding state 
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reform revolved around the perception that the country was not prepared for 
political independence.  The issue of how best to distribute the wealth generated 
by the national economy after independence had not been sufficiently clarified.  
These were then, and still are, some of the important issues surrounding state 
reform.  
 
On the whole, although the need for state reform is not disputed, there is 
considerable controversy over what form the new state of Solomon Islands should 
take, some form of federal state system being generally preferred over other 
options.  However, the cost of running a federal state system appears to have 
always been of particular concern.  It is, in fact, a major stumbling block to the 
introduction of such a system.  Thus, although governments have always 
acknowledged the importance of state reform, they have to date been unable, or 
unwilling, to make any firm commitment to substantive change, except to the 
extent of making amendments to the existing provincial system of government 
which was an adaptation of the provincial government system adopted by Papua 
New Guinea at its time of independence in 1975. 
 
The current impetus for state reform arises from the perception that the ethnic 
conflict of December 1989 could have been better addressed through a federal 
state system of government and that, in fact, that conflict may actually have 
arisen, in part at least, as a result of earlier failures to address adequately the need 
for state reform.  Whether or not this is the case, controversy over which system 
of federal state government is best suited to Solomon Islands remains.  I discuss 
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below a proposed model of state reform in Solomon Islands, tentatively referred 
to as a Wantok State System.   
6.11 State reform and development  
Development is an ongoing process that is fundamental to human existence itself. 
So far as it relates to national development policy and planning, development in 
Solomon Islands has been described here as assuming political and bureaucratic 
characteristics (Chapter 5).  However, so far as Ulawa Islanders are concerned, 
development was discussed in cultural terms (preceding discussion).  Thus, there 
are different dimensions of development at different levels of society.  This very 
fact can lead to contradictory and conflicting outcomes.  Therefore, an attempt is 
made here, in the context of a discussion of state reform, to reconcile the 
differences between development at a national level and development at a local 
level.  
 
As noted earlier, state reform, like development, has been a recurring theme in 
Solomon Islands.  Why, then is it an issue that was not tackled at the time of 
political independence?  The usual response to this is that the country could ill 
afford the exercise.  State reform would require substantial resources, financial 
and human, and, therefore, could not be contemplated in the short to medium 
term.  Moreover, the fact that the country depended to such an extent on foreign 
aid meant that it was even more difficult to contemplate the investment required 
in the short to medium term.  On the other hand, state reform as a long-term 
option is unlikely unless moves are made in the short to medium term to facilitate 
it.  
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Following independence, the new nation of Solomon Islands needed to take its 
place in the regional and international arena amongst the family of nations as well 
as attending to domestic issues and, as Sanga (2001) notes, international relations 
tended to take precedence over such important domestic issues as rural 
development.  In such a context, it was probably inevitable that the issue of state 
reform would be deferred.  Even so, an equally significant barrier to state reform 
is what appears to amount to a mental blockage about the status quo, the 
provincial government system.  Furthermore, politicians, both national and 
provincial, stand to lose a great deal in the context of a state reform process and 
they are in a powerful position when it comes to blocking effective decision-
making on the issue (see discussion above of Roughan’s (2005) critique of the 
RDCF).  In connection with this, it is interesting to note that a high level 
government official has expressed the view that national leaders lack the skills 
necessary to deal realistically with the country’s problems.53  He also observed 
that although there are those outside of government, especially on the opposition 
benches in parliament, with the necessary skills, talents and abilities, they are not 
inclined to take the risks involved in playing a leadership role in this area while 
they lack the power to ensure that changes actually happen.  He also stated his 
belief that there were too few people involved in the upper levels of government 
bureaucracy with the innovative capacities required to assist politicians in this 
area, one reason for this being that the requirement to have regional representation 
from different parts of the country at the top levels of public service meant that 
local support, rather than ability and merit, could play a significant role in 
selection.  In addition, his view was that many national leaders, especially those in 
                                                 
53 Personal communication, 22 November 2002 
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the government’s parliamentary back benches, have compromised their leadership 
credibility to such an extent that they are no longer in a position to provide 
effective endorsement for state reform.  In such a context, it is unlikely that the 
issue of state reform can be addressed adequately in the near future.  
 
Quite apart from the issues referred to above, there are issues relating to the wider 
social dimensions of Solomon Islands society that have an inhibiting effect on 
state reform.  After all, whilst Solomon Islands as an independent sovereign 
country is a political entity, it is not a unified cultural and religious entity and 
there are cultural and religious issues (highlighted in this thesis) that necessarily 
impact on any attempt to engage in a state reform process (see Chapter 4).  
However, debate on state reform to date has generally focused on the political 
dimension, largely ignoring the realities of cultural and religious influences on 
peoples’ lives.  Regarding kastom or culture in the light of the diversity that exists 
in Solomon Islands, one public servant indicated to me that in his view many of 
the nation’s political leaders pay lip service to the significance of kastom, but do 
not take it seriously as a factor that must be taken into account in shaping the 
nation.54  
 
In seeking to establish a theoretical and conceptual basis for state reform in the 
discussion below, I consider the sociological foundations of contemporary 
Solomon Islands society.  
                                                 
54 Personal communication 
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6.12  Existing state structure   
Solomon Islands is basically a unitary nation-state although it is structured 
politically into two broad layers.  The first layer of government is known as the 
national or central government; the second layer, as the provincial government (or 
assemblies).    
6.12.1  National/central government  
The national and centralised government infrastructure is one inherited from the 
departing British colonialists.  Today, it is represented by the national parliament 
which is a single chamber made up of fifty parliamentarians from the fifty 
constituencies nationwide.  After the general elections every four years, a Prime 
Minister is elected by the members of parliament from amongst themselves.  
Although political parties play a role in the election of the prime minister, 
generally it is the individual’s personality that is the deciding factor in election. 
One only has to look at the previous Prime Ministers to conclude that personality 
has played at least as significant a role in their selection as has competence and 
skills.  Whoever is elected as Prime Minister has the opportunity to form the next 
government.55  At this point, political parties play a much greater role, building 
alliances to ensure a government can be formed.  As is the case in parliamentary 
democracies elsewhere, the opposition plays an important role.  In Solomon 
Islands, however, both the Speaker and the Attorney-General are public officials 
who are not elected Members of Parliament.  Should a serving Member of 
Parliament be elected as Speaker, that Member of Parliament resigns from his 
parliamentary seat and a bye-election is held to replace him.  While the Speaker 
                                                 
55 Unless they are prevented from doing so by a process of popular revolt as was the case 
following the April 2006 election. 
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and the Governor-General are elected by the national parliament, the Attorney-
General is appointed by the Judicial and Public Services Commissions.      
 
As is the practice in any other parliamentary democracy, the government of the 
day is led by the Prime Minister and cabinet who lead the government 
bureaucracy of ministries, departments and statutory bodies.  Independent of this 
are the judiciary and the Head of State, the Governor-General, who is the Queen 
of England’s representative in Solomon Islands.  In essence, then, what we have is 
a democratic nation state associated with a constitutional monarchy.  
 
The main legal institution in relation to the maintenance of law and order 
nationwide is the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF).  There is no 
standing army as such in Solomon Islands.  However, the RSIPF has a small naval 
and surveillance unit which is used primarily for maritime surveillance and sea 
rescue operations.  As well, the RSIPF has a bomb disposal unit which helps to 
detonate ordinances still left over from World War II.  Besides that, there is a 
paramilitary unit known as the Police Field Force (PFF)56 which was introduced 
in the 1980s to patrol the common border between Solomon Islands and Papua 
New Guinea at the time of the Bougainville crisis.  Paradoxically, during the 
height of the ethnic tensions in Solomon Islands, it was the PFF unit that 
overthrew the civilian government of Bartholomew Ulufa’alu in Honiara in June 
2000.    
 
                                                 
56 The PFF has since been disbanded since RAMSI arrived in Solomon Islands in July 2003.  
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One of the arguments forwarded for state reform is the need to disperse the 
government machinery throughout the country so that even if one centre of 
government is disrupted (as happened in 2000), the remainder of the country can 
continue to function normally (Paia, 2003).  In 2000, the entire country was 
crippled and held to ransom because of the break-down of law and order in 
Honiara and the rise in criminal activity that followed the fall of the legitimate 
government.  Even today, it is a commonly held view that in spite of the best 
efforts of RAMSI, the underlying issues which gave rise to the ethnic conflict in 
1998 have still not been addressed, as events in April 2006 demonstrated.  Some 
people believe that one of the best ways of addressing those issues is to hasten the 
process of state reform.  This is a particularly pressing issue in view of the fact 
that Rennell and Bellona have recently indicated the desire to secede from the rest 
of Solomon Islands, claiming that central government has been guilty of neglect 
of the area and of a failure to develop and implement appropriate development 
policies for the area (Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC), 6 
October 2005).  In fact, in November 2000, three provinces openly expressed a 
desire to secede from the rest of Solomon Islands, becoming independent 
sovereign states (Paia, 2003).  They, too, felt that they were not getting sufficient 
assistance from the central government of Solomon Islands.  The three provinces 
concerned were Temotu, Makira/Ulawa, and Rennell and Bellona.                              
6.12.2  Provincial assemblies  
As noted earlier, the provincial government system adopted at political 
independence was adapted from the provincial government system in nearby 
Papua New Guinea.  However, it had much in common with the system of 
districts created by the British prior to independence.  While the former districts 
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served the British well for administrative purposes, the underlying rationale for 
the establishment of district headquarters was a perceived need for continued 
pacification of the islanders.  The administrative centres set up by the British 
became the basis for the new urban centres and headquarters of the provincial 
governments.  However, the rationale for a provincial government system in 
independent Solomon Islands related primarily to a perceived need for 
decentralisation and devolution of political and economic power to the rural 
populace.  The rationale for the provincial government structure may have been 
sound.  However, in practice, centralised government is the order of the day.  The 
provincial governments or assemblies have become mere extensions of the 
Ministry of Provincial Government, providing services to the rural population but, 
in all other respects, simply duplicating much of what the national government is 
doing.  Being almost totally dependent upon the central government for funds, in 
the form of provincial grants which allow them to do their work, provincial 
governments were, and are, at the mercy of central government.  Thus, where 
government is disrupted (as happened during the ethnic tension in 2000), the 
entire government machinery, including provincial governments, is starved of the 
resources necessary to continue service delivery.  Furthermore, under such 
circumstances, the legal avenues required to exercise autonomous authority are 
significantly curtailed.  
 
The allocation of provincial grants is one area of controversy that has led to 
pressure for state reform (Paia, 2003).  Western Province and Guadalcanal, with 
some justification, believe that although they have been largely responsible for the 
development activities that have generated the country’s economic wealth, they 
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have not received, and are not receiving, a fair return for their contribution.  The 
present formula for provincial grants is based on population and Malaita Province, 
by far the biggest in terms of population, receives the largest proportion of grant 
allocations.  Even so, its people believe that what they receive is insufficient to 
meet their needs. In fairness to Malaita Province, although it has not been 
involved in many major development activities, it does, nevertheless, supply the 
majority of Solomon Islands labour force.  Thus, the proportion of women to men 
is 2:1 in Malaita Province, most of the men having gone to other islands in search 
of work and education. In fact, the people of Malaita could be described as 
amongst the most hardworking and enterprising of Solomon Islanders.  Their 
contribution to the national wealth is through their human capital (see Bennett 
(1987)). 
 
Currently there are nine provincial governments or assemblies in Solomon 
Islands.  These are: Choiseul, Western, Ysabel, Malaita, Guadalcanal, Central 
Islands, Rennell and Bellona (Renbel), Makira/Ulawa, and Temotu provinces.  
With the addition of the Honiara City Council, there are altogether ten assemblies.  
Politically, each province, including Honiara, is divided into wards.  After the 
provincial elections every four years, the elected members elect the Provincial 
Premier. Honiara, however, has a City Mayor who is elected from amongst the 
successful candidates after the Honiara City elections (also held every four years).  
To form the next executive or government in either the provinces or the City 
Council (in the case of Honiara), the provincial premiers and Honiara mayor, in 
turn, select from their own elected members those they trust and are able to work 
with.  In many respects, in terms of the politics involved, the provincial 
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assemblies and Honiara city council merely reflect what goes on in the national 
parliament.  Indeed, it is generally the case that those who miss out on election for 
national parliament eventually find themselves in the provincial assemblies or 
Honiara city council.  Some of them are merely biding their time in the provincial 
assemblies, eagerly waiting to have another opportunity to join the national 
parliament. 
 
On the whole, provincial governments and the Honiara City Council function in 
much the same way as does the national parliament, with personalities being more 
important that political party membership.  They have their own bureaucracies, 
paralleling those of central government.  Apart from the Honiara City Council 
(which has its own police constabulary to enforce the city bye-laws), the 
provinces are served by the RSIPF.  Since much of the work done by provincial 
governments involves simply implementing decisions taken centrally, provincial 
governments have almost no influence on the general direction of development 
activities in the country. 
6.12.3  Area councils/assemblies  
During the 1980s and 90s, because of the pressure for state reform coming 
especially from the provinces, there was an attempt to further decentralise 
government power, authority, and decision-making.  This involved an attempt to 
establish Area Councils or Assemblies and represented a recognition that, thus far, 
the government had been largely absent in the rural areas.  It was a response to the 
complaint that the presence of national politicians in local areas was largely 
confined to campaign meetings prior to national elections.  
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There is a widely held belief in Solomon Islands that Members of Parliament have 
both the financial resources and the political clout to make things happen in their 
constituencies if they choose to do so.  This belief is based on a general lack of 
understanding of the broader dynamics of parliamentary processes and 
procedures.  The technicalities of parliamentary democracy are not fully 
understood by the electorate, nor, in some cases, by aspiring politicians.  The 
result is that election promises are made that cannot be fulfilled.  This leads to 
disillusionment and charges of corruption and selfishness.  The fact that one third 
of parliamentarians generally find themselves out of office at each national 
general election does nothing to improve the situation.              
 
On the whole, the idea of area assemblies is similar to that of Island Councils 
which had been established previously by the British prior to political 
independence.  This was to be a third tier of government existing between the 
present provincial government and the rural populace.  Unfortunately, the idea 
was put on hold because of the political instabilities in the 1990s.  So far, it 
remains no more than an idea: it has not been developed to an extent that makes 
serious consideration possible.  
6.13  Basis of state reform  
State reform in Solomon Islands is a complex issue.  Underlying the concept of 
state reform is that of re-formation, that is, restructuring in a way that is intended 
to bring about better outcomes.  The call for state reform is therefore predicated 
on the belief that existing structures are deficient, something that will not 
necessarily have immediate appeal for those who benefit from these existing 
structures.  This is particularly the case where what is being discussed is a 
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complete overhaul rather than fine-tuning.  Furthermore, whilst state reform is 
essentially a political process, it inevitably has cultural dimensions.  
 
As indicated earlier, recent ethnic conflict in Solomon Islands has exposed a 
gaping deficiency in the operation of the Solomon Islands system of government 
and, in doing so, has created a social and political climate that requires issues of 
state reform to be addressed sooner rather than later.  However, since the 
malfunctioning of the state is, in part at least, attributable to the inadequacies of 
state officials, it follows that a reformation of state structures will not necessarily 
lead to significantly improved outcomes.  Since a government system is merely an 
institutional mechanism to enhance and facilitate certain ideals, principles and 
practices, the best system, from a development perspective, is one that can, all 
other things being equal, deliver the best results for  Solomon Islanders, including 
rural Solomon Islanders.  Such a system will be one that is attuned to the political 
and cultural dimensions of development within the broad framework of an island 
society characterised by kastom, church and the modern state.  
6.14  Churches and government  
The tripartite conception of contemporary Solomon Islands society articulated in 
this thesis raises the question of the nature of the relationship between churches 
and government.  In the state reform proposal outlined, the churches would 
provide, in terms of the betel nut metaphor to which reference has been made, the 
glue (the lime or lif) that binds kastom (the core of the betel nut) and state/ 
government (the husk of the betel nut). In order to do this, the churches would 
need to align themselves with kastom and with the goals of government. I believe 
that, so far as the major churches in the Solomon Islands are concerned, this 
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would not present a major stumbling block.  After all, the majority of churches 
represented in the Solomon Islands are not in conflict with kastom. Furthermore, 
in peace and reconciliation initiatives relating to recent ethnic conflict between 
militants from Malaita and Guadalcanal, the churches played a very significant 
role.  They continue to do so.  So too does the Solomon Islands Christian 
Association (SICA) which includes representatives from the major Christian 
churches in the Solomon Islands.  
 
In discussing a possible three tier system of government, Nanau (2002, p.19) 
proposes the abolition of the Office of the Governor General and the 
establishment of a republic in which a new body, a Congress of Governors, would 
play an important role.  Such a federal government structure would include 
provincial and local governments, the latter replacing existing Area Councils. 
Each level of government – federal, state, local – would have its own powers and 
a Congress of Governors would include “governors from all states, traditional 
leaders, and elder statesmen and women who are appointed by the president” (p. 
19). The Congress of Governors would be equivalent to the Senate in a bicameral 
system such as that of Fiji or Vanuatu.  
 
In the proposal for state reform outlined in Chapter 6, there would also be a need 
for a second house of parliament, one that would be more similar to the Senate in 
Fiji than to the Council of Chiefs in Vanuatu. In a two-tier government (one that 
has a national/central government and constituencies/`wantok’ states), chiefs and 
traditional elders (representing kastom) would be placed in the second tier along 
with representatives of the major churches and of other important stakeholders 
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such as Non-Government Organizations, the business community and other ethnic 
groups. These representatives could be nominated by members of the first house 
of parliament (government and opposition) and ratified by the head of state (as is 
the practice in Fiji).57 In particular, representatives of the major churches could be 
drawn from the membership of the Solomon Islands Christian Association 
(SICA).  
6.15  Kastom and government  
I referred earlier (see 4.8.3) to the fact that, in the context of contemporary 
societies, an essential aspect of kastom appears to be its implicit or explicit 
assertion of the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, including their right to 
resist interference from any perceived threat in the form of a competing source of 
authority (whatever that competing source of authority may be). Keesing (1982) 
notes, for example, that the Kwaio Fadanga movement in Kwaio on Malaita, “was 
an imitation of, as well as reaction against, Waiparo’s movement”58, noting that 
the ‘Are’are leaders of the Waiparo movement “apparently regarded the Kwaio to 
the north as violent and anarchic hill-billies – who could be persuaded to part with 
their valuables while enshrining ‘Are’are culture as the canonical form of Malaita 
kastom” (Keesing, 1982, p. 63). Thus, the Kwaio Fadanga movement was, in part, 
a Kwaio response to the perceived cultural threat of ‘Are’are. 
 
                                                 
57 The issue of whether the Office of Governor General should be retained or abolished is not 
directly addressed here since it would have no direct impact on the overall government structure 
proposed. 
58 The Waiparo movement originated from `Are’are who are also from Malaita. However, the 
people of ‘Are’are live to the south of the people of Kwaio in the southern end of Malaita Island. 
 
-214- 
Cultural and ethnic rivalries are enduring realities in the Solomon Islands.  Prior 
to the outbreak of violence on Guadalcanal in December 1998, a similar outbreak 
was narrowly averted in Makira/Ulawa province where the people of mainland 
Makira (the largest land mass and resource base in the province) felt that although 
they were contributing the most in terms of resources (including tax) towards the 
economy of the province and the country as a whole, they were receiving less in 
return than were people from the smaller islands in the province, especially 
Ulawa, Ugi and Santa Ana. Thus, for example, many of the top administration 
positions at the provincial headquarters in Kira Kira were held by people from 
Ulawa, Ugi or Santa Ana, who were often seconded from national or central 
government. When the provincial premier’s position was lost to a person from 
Ulawa (who actually resided on mainland Makira), it was the last straw. 
Currently, tensions in the Makira/Ulawa province are being held in check. 
However, either these tensions, or similar tensions in other areas, represent an 
ongoing threat to stability. In fact, Meffrey Awao (personal communication) 
asked Rence Sore, then Director of Small Business in the Ministry of Commerce, 
Employment & Trade, to write a cabinet paper proposing the development of an 
international seaport facility in Selwyn Bay on Ugi Island. He did this because he 
believed that the people of Makira might take control of the Makira/Ulawa 
Province’s resources and facilities (currently mainly located on Makira Island).59 
In such an event, the existence of a seaport facility on Ugi Island would provide 
the people of Ulawa and Ugi (who share the same constituency as the people of 
                                                 
59 Nathaniel Waena, a Government Minister at the time, was surprised not to have been consulted 
about a proposal relating to his own constituency, especially as he would normally have been 
responsible for introducing such a proposal.  
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Makira) with some protection in the form of a revenue generating infrastructure. 
Although the paper was approved in cabinet, the international seaport facility has 
not yet been built. Nor has a feasibility study been conducted. It is important, 
however, to note that this initiative represented an understanding of, and response 
to, the fact that intra-provincial conflict is a reality of life in Solomon Islands. 
 
I have provided a number of examples of the relationship between kastom and 
resistance to any threat to autonomy. These remain relevant notwithstanding the 
fact that I use the term kastom throughout this thesis to refer to indigenous 
cultures as such rather than to refer to movements which have opposed state 
authority (local or colonial) because they have seen it as being inimical to 
indigenous cultures.  The fact remains that kastom, in both senses, can represent a 
threat to national government. This is one of the reasons why I have suggested 
that there should be a special role for churches as the binding lime or lif in the 
government structure I have proposed (see 6.14). 
6.16  Some underlying principles of state reform in Solomon Islands 
In this section, five principles that are seen as fundamental to state reform in 
Solomon Islands are discussed.  These are:  
 
• the need to acknowledge the significance of cultural diversity within the 
context of national unity; 
• the need to recognise that a constitution embodies the concept of the state 
in the form of a type of discourse (rational-legal discourse) that has little 
meaning for the majority of Solomon Islanders notwithstanding the fact 
that it is important that they should approve any recommendations made; 
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• account needs to be taken of the institutions that make up the civil service 
bureaucracy (the public sector) as well as the private sector  churches, the 
non-government organizations, and society generally which are the 
tangible expression and manifestation of the sovereign state of Solomon 
Islands, gaining their formal authority and legitimacy through the state.60  
• people in Solomon Islands (politicians, civil servants, beneficiaries of 
government systems) have contributed, directly or indirectly, intentionally 
or inadvertently, to the present failings of that system; 
• the present state system, whatever changes have been made to it,  is not a 
home grown one but a product of British Imperial design and simply 
converting the current nine provinces into states is unlikely to be an 
adequate response to a situation in which there is no common philosophy 
underlying that design. 
 
Since independence, as was the case just prior to independence, national political 
discourse has been dominated by issues of legitimacy, irrespective of the changing 
circumstances and personnel.  This is an issue that needs to be addressed by all 
Solomon Islanders.  As David Gegeo has repeatedly stated, new ideas are needed 
if national leaders are to forge new visions and new missions for the nation and its 
people.  
                                                 
60 In the public service, for example, there is the General Orders (GO), and in the wider society, 
there are various other systems, practices, procedures and processes governed by different rules 
and regulations. 
 
-217- 
6.17  Home-grown solutions  
6.17.1 A home grown system  
In Solomon Islands, there is much talk of the need for a `home grown’ system of 
government.  According to Nathaniel Waena (now Sir Nathaniel Waena, 
Governor General (2002)), a home grown system of state government is one that 
is tailor made for Solomon Islands.61  Such a system can be constructed only by 
Solomon Islanders themselves and must, if it is to be both effective and 
acceptable, be based on a proper understanding of Solomon Islands social, 
cultural, economic, political, historical and geographical context.  What is needed 
is something much more than a replacement of the existing provinces by states to 
form a federal system of state government.  Such a response would be little more 
than cosmetic.  A possible solution is outlined below, one that is based on the 
analysis of Solomon Islands situation here and in previous chapters and one that 
places the need for effective development at the centre. 
 
Currently, provincial governments or assemblies do not enjoy significant 
sovereignty over land and sea resources.  These natural resources, necessary for 
production and hence development, continue to be in the hands of the rural 
dwellers in what is commonly termed ‘customary ownership’.  This means that 
these owners of natural resources need to be empowered to exercise judicial, 
political, economic, cultural, social and administrative authority in a holistic way 
that reflects the ways of thinking of Solomon Islanders, including rural-dwelling 
                                                 
61 Personal communication. 
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Solomon Islanders.  This empowerment must be perceived as relevant and must 
result in efficiency. 
6.17.2  Relevance   
A state system of government will be acceptable to Solomon Islanders only if it is 
perceived as being relevant to their particular situation. In order to be perceived as 
relevant, such a system must be responsive to the needs and interests of the 
majority of Solomon Islanders who live in rural areas.  All Solomon Islanders, 
including rural dwelling Solomon Islanders, must see themselves as major players 
in any new system of government if it is to be seen as relevant.  Such a system 
cannot be designed in such a way that it meets the needs of those who can read, 
write and travel and largely ignores all others.  
6.17.3  Effectiveness 
Any proposed model for state reform must be demonstrably effective.  It must 
actually work.62  This means that the following issues must be given careful 
consideration: 
 
• Solomon Islands is an `islands’ nation and the associated issues of 
communication and transport are especially important.  
• Solomon Islands is a rural-based nation and the associated issues of 
literacy, formal education, physical infrastructure and social services are 
extremely significant. 
                                                 
62 Issues of cost are, of course, extremely significant but are not taken directly into account in this 
discussion which is intended to be largely conceptual. 
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• According to the latest population census, Solomon Islands is a young 
nation, something that has huge implications for the future.  
• The latest statistics show that the vast majority of Solomon Islanders are 
Christians, something that has important implications for peoples’ 
perceptions of what constitutes good governance. 
• Currently, Solomon Islands has a subsistence economy which relies on 
marine and land-based resources rather than manufacturing and industry. 
• Solomon Islands is a kastom-based nation in which oral cultures play a 
very important role.  
• Solomon Islands is a distinctively diverse nation, but one which has a 
strong sense of affiliation and wholeness through the concept of wantok 
(see Chapter 4).  
 
In addition to all of the above, Solomon Islands is part of sub-regional Melanesia 
and of the wider Pacific Islands region and must contend with the inescapable 
presence and dominance of both Australia and New Zealand as the major powers, 
for the time being at least, in the region.  
 
At the global level, state reform must be sensitive to global trends in the 
fluctuating dynamics of global geo-politics and economic world order.  Attention 
to existing global realities and global trends must be seen as an important 
consideration in the context of state reform.  
 
In summary, any future state structure for Solomon Islands must be one that is 
responsive to local, national, regional, and global realities and trends and one that 
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Solomon Islanders themselves are comfortable with.  Above all, it must not create 
a greater sense of unfamiliarity and uncertainty than is already the case.  Bearing 
all this in mind, I believe what I refer to here as a `fifty-fifty proportionality’ 
system would effectively underpin the notion of unity in diversity.   
6.18 A ‘fifty-fifty’ proportionality system  
Solomon Islands has a central government and fifty constituencies. These are the 
two parts of the equation.  Currently, however, they are not in equilibrium.  A 
critical question so far as state reform is concerned is how they can be brought 
into equilibrium.  It is in consideration of this that I propose what I refer to as a 
‘fifty-fifty proportionality’ system. 
 
In a television programme broadcast in New Zealand in 2003, the head of the 
New Zealand Black Boats syndicate for the America’s Cup race in Auckland 
(Schnackenberg) discussed what he referred to as a `fifty-fifty proportionality’ 
principle in boat building (2003, TV NZ).  This principle involved the equal 
distribution in mass and weight between the two major parts of the boat: the mast, 
sails and riggings on the one hand; the hull and rudder on the other.  These two 
parts were designed to counterbalance one another so as to enhance the utility and 
the aesthetics of the boat.  The idea of balance between two parts – not necessarily 
identical parts – underlies the `fifty-fifty proportionality’ system that I propose for 
consideration here.  According to Schnackenberg, the immediate challenge facing 
the designers of the Black Boats was to create an appropriate design within 
specified limits and parameters.  These limits and parameters are clearly stipulated 
in the rules and regulations of the competition.  However, in the actual design 
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process, the Black Boat designers also had to take into account the physical 
conditions, including the probable weather conditions, of the race course.  
 
The Black Boat design team had many opportunities, in terms of time and money, 
to conceptualise and test various model designs before settling on the final design 
for the actual race. Solomon Islands has neither the luxury of controlled 
environments nor the time and money to experiment with different systems of 
state government.  For this very reason, a fifty-fifty proportionality system, one 
that builds upon what is already in place, seems worthy of consideration.  It would 
involve bringing the two existing parts of the federal system into equilibrium 
rather than replacing them with a provincial government structure.  This can be 
described as a ‘Federation of Wantok States’ or alternatively, a ‘Wantok State 
System’. 
6.19 Proposal: Federation of Wantok States 
The Centralised-Constituency model is based on a fixed vertical point (such as in 
the case of a swinging pendulum) – a fixed foundation upon which a pyramid 
structure rests.  The common philosophy or ideology is the fixed point which 
provides the legitimacy, the point of departure for the state apparatus.  
 
The present constituencies provide a starting point. Instead of a three tier system 
involving area assemblies which has been proposed, this model is based on a two 
tier system, with central government in its current form dealing directly with the 
populace at the constituency rather than provincial government level.  Such a 
model would represent a positive response to those who have suggested the 
addition of area assemblies to the current structure.  However, it would be built 
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upon existing resource and landowning units in Solomon Islands and would, 
therefore, also represent a direct response to the peculiarities of Solomon Islands 
society.  
 
In short, the basic building block for a new state system for Solomon Islands in 
the twenty-first century would be the land and resource owning units.  This would 
shift political and economic power away from the provincial governments, which, 
in fact, are themselves neither land nor resource owning entities.  Thus, the fixed 
vertical point would be that unity in diversity that is captured in the term 
‘wantok’.  
 
In such a state apparatus, each person in the country would belong to an 
operational social unit, a constituency, that constituency being a social, cultural, 
economic and political entity.  Thus, the constituency would become the `new’ 
state system of government in Solomon Islands.  Constituencies could be 
structured in such a way that they would integrate the public and private sectors.  
People of all walks of life could contribute to their state in ways that are 
consistent with both the constitution and kastom, both of which would have to be 
fully legitimised by the church.  In instances where differences may emerge 
between these three institutions, appropriate legislation should also be put in place 
to facilitate constructive dialogue for better understanding and cooperation 
between them.    
 
The application of a `fifty-fifty’ proportionality principle to a two-tier central and 
constituency state system would allow for an effective, rational interaction 
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between the two parts, neither having complete autonomy.  Thus, central 
government would constitute one half of a bipartite system in which 
constituencies made up the other half.  The role of members of parliament would, 
of course, change. Furthermore, Honiara City Council could be replaced by a 
structure that was organised along similar lines to other constituencies.  
 
The call for the abolition of provincial government is not an entirely novel idea. 
Fraser (1995, pp.105-06) discusses a previous attempt to abolish the provincial 
government system: 
 
There has been one attempt to abolish provincial government and to 
replace it with a structure based on Area Councils. This arose out of a 
review of the provincial government system which was set up by the 
Kenilorea Government in 1986. The Minister responsible for the review 
was the Minister for Home Affairs and Provincial Government, Andrew 
Nori, a politician representing the West ‘Are’are electorate of Malaita. He 
entered parliament as a member of the People’s Alliance Party (PAP) 
which at the time was the main opposition party in parliament. Nori left 
PAP soon after and formed his own party, the Nationalists’ Front for 
Progress (NPF). By then he was a (sic) outspoken critic of provincial 
government arguing for its abolition. The review committee reported in 
1987 but Nori did not release the report. Instead he appointed a new in-
house committee to examine its recommendations. This led to the 
preparation of the Provincial Government Review White Paper in which 
the main recommendation was that the system of provincial government 
established under the Provincial Government Act 1981, be abolished. It 
was proposed instead that the Area Councils should be upgraded and 
called Area Assemblies and that they become the second tier of 
government with legislative and policy making powers, and responsibility 
for services in their own area. . . .  
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The Provincial Government Review White Paper was tabled in the 
National Parliament and debated but that was as far as this attempt to 
abolish provincial government went. The proposal was put to a meeting of 
provincial premiers in August 1988. Only two provinces expressed a clear 
opinion about it. Western province opposed it, Malaita province supported 
it. Two provinces were not represented at the meeting, and the rest did not 
come out with a clear preference.  
 
 
The call to replace Area Councils by Area Assemblies referred to above is 
different from the current recommendation, that is, that both Provincial 
Governments and Area Councils be abolished.  Nevertheless, there are 
similarities. Why, then, should the current proposal be acceptable now when a 
similar proposal was not endorsed in 1988?  I believe that there are two important 
factors involved.  First, in 1988, only ten years after independence, a major 
political restructuring may have seemed premature.  Secondly, in the period since 
1988, the government has been repeatedly challenged about its failure, within the 
context of a provincial system, to address adequately issues of development policy 
and planning (especially as they relate to rural areas). 
 
The proposal to abolish provincial governments and area councils is partly 
predicated on the success, or at least partial success, of a number of constituency-
based initiatives or of initiatives which had important features in common with 
constituency-based initiatives. Some of these are outlined below. 
 
Prior to political independence in 1978, the people of Ulawa who were working in 
Honiara, including my father, started an organization called Ulawa Community 
Development Fund (UCDF). The idea was to have a community fund which could 
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be used to implement community projects either in Ulawa or in Honiara. After 
political independence, Ugi was included in the organisation although the initials 
remained as UCDF. By the 1980s, this organization had begun to make some 
tangible progress, at least in Honiara. The community secured a housing loan 
from the Development Bank of Solomon Islands (DBSI)63 and had two houses 
constructed in Vara Creek. These were meant to be rest houses for people from 
Ulawa and Ugi who, needing accommodation in Honiara could go to either of 
them. In fact, even while both houses were under construction, people from the 
two islands were already using the premises. In 1982, given the apparent success 
of the house building project, the community held a meeting in Honiara for people 
from Ulawa and Ugi. The purpose of that meeting was to reach agreement on 
another development project. At that time, the Solomon Islands government had 
decided to start up a new local tuna fishing company, the National Fishing 
Development (NFD)64 Company Limited – a joint venture between the Solomon 
Islands government and the only other major local fishing company, Solomon 
Taiyo Limited.65,66  During the meeting, my elder brother, Henry Judah Awao, 
who was working for NFD, suggested that the community might like to consider 
getting a catcher boat to fish for tuna and selling the catch to Solomon Taiyo Ltd 
(which has a cannery factory), or to NFD (to sell on to Japan or Levuka in Fiji). 
One of the advantages of this proposal, my brother argued, was that many young 
                                                 
63 DBSI is no longer in operation.    
64 NFD is now a much smaller operation than when it was in the 1980s and 90s.   
65 Solomon Taiyo was a joint venture between a Japanese tuna fishing company and the Solomon 
Islands government. During the ethnic tensions in the late 1990s, the Japanese withdrew and now 
the company is solely owned locally by the national/central government of Solomon Islands and 
the Western Province.     
66 When Solomon Taiyo Limited relocated to Noro in the Western Province, NFD took over the 
shore and port facilities that Solomon Taiyo limited had left behind in Tulagi. 
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men from Ulawa were already working on catcher boats as deckhands, skippers or 
fishing masters. Finding a crew to operate a catcher would not therefore be 
difficult. Furthermore, some of the young men from Ulawa who were experienced 
fishermen had already moved from Solomon Taiyo Ltd to NFD.67 At the 
community meeting in 1982, the majority did not favour the idea of a catcher 
boat. Instead, they voted for UCDF to charter a commercial boat to ferry inter-
island cargo between Honiara and Ulawa and Ugi and other ports, especially in 
Small Malaita and Makira.  
 
By the 1990s, both development initiatives had foundered. The two houses at 
Vara Creek were repossessed by DBSI for default on housing loan payments and 
the inter-island shipping venture had become unprofitable. There were rumours 
that the management team of the UCDF (overseeing both initiatives) had misused 
the money. To date, however, there have been no prosecutions.  Wherever the 
problem may have lain, the important point here is that these projects demonstrate 
the existence of constituency-based community action. In fact, although some of 
the pioneers of UCDF, including my father, are no longer alive, the concept 
remains. 
 
More recent developments in other constituencies also point to the viability of 
using the constituency as a central element in a reformed government structure. In 
discussing the development status of Ulawa Island in terms of the island’s 
infrastructure and facilities (Chapter 6), I referred to the fact that the MP for 
                                                 
67 A number of years later, my brother became base manager for NFD at its shore base in Tulagi. 
He resigned early in 2000 when the company relocated to Noro in the Western Province. 
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Ulawa/Ugi, Nathaniel Waena, played an important role. Rumour has it that at one 
point the people of Small Malaita were so envious of what Nathaniel Waena had 
been able to achieve for the people of Ulawa that they intended to ask him to 
contest the Small Malaita constituency in the hope that he could be equally 
successful in gaining tangible developments for that constituency. During the 
2001 general election, Waena indicated that this would be the last time (the third) 
that he would stand as MP for Ulawa and Ugi. He also indicated that, having 
focused on doing what he could for the people of Ulawa in his previous two terms 
in office, he intended to focus on developments in Ugi if he was reelected (see 
6.5.3). He won that election by a narrow margin, largely due to the support of the 
people of Ugi, many of those in Ulawa (where he was defeated) having deciding 
not to vote for him. When Waena became Governor-General in 2004, James Tora, 
from Ugi, was elected to parliament as his replacement in a by-election. Tora was 
later reelected in the national election in 2006. Whether James Tora will be able to 
achieve for Ugi anything equivalent to what Nathaniel Waena achieved for Ulawa 
remains to be seen. What really matters, so far as the discussion here is concerned, 
is the fact that Nathaniel Waena demonstrated, in his actions and in his stated 
intentions, that it is possible, as an MP in the Solomon Islands, not only to bring 
development benefits to constituents in rural areas, but also to attempt to do so in 
an even-handed way.  
 
Ulawa Island is the second largest island in the Makira/Ulawa province. Even so, 
there is little evidence in Ulawa of development facilities or infrastructure that 
have been provided at a provincial level.  Indeed, during my father’s term of 
office as a provincial member of the Makira/Ulawa legislative assembly in the 
mid-1980s, the only really tangible amenity that I can recall having been provided 
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from provincial resources was a health aid post near Su’uholo village. That health 
aid post lasted only for as long as my father was a member of the legislative 
assembly. Furthermore, although water supply is one of the essential services for 
which provincial governments are responsible, neither Su’uholo itself nor our 
family village settlement outside Su’uholo village (called Mana’o) has a piped 
water supply in spite of the fact that my father was a provincial politician for four 
years and president of the Ulawa Island local court for a number of years. What 
this indicates is that, whatever the efforts of some of their members, province-
based systems in Solomon Islands have difficulty (possibly because of competing 
interests) in delivering resources. So far as Ulawa is concerned, much that has 
occurred by way of development has come through the constituency and as a 
result of the actions of a national member of parliament. 
 
It is, of course, not only in Ulawa/Ugi that constituency-based activities have been 
successful. There have also been successful constituency-based activities in other 
parts of the Solomon Islands. Perhaps one of the most interesting is the opening of 
the first ever constituency office in the Solomon Islands by Fred Fono, MP for 
Central Kwara’ae. In opening a constituency office in Auki, Malaita, Fred Fono 
provided an important point of contact between himself, as MP, and members of 
his electorate. He also demonstrated that it is possible to set up constituency-based 
structures that encourage constituents to become involved in a collective and 
collaborative way in constituency-based political action.  Such initiatives could be 
even more effective in the context of the type of two-tiered political structure 
proposed here, a structure that could provide MPs with more opportunities than 
they currently have to work directly for the benefit of their constituents.   
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Another example of constituency-based action is the opening of a computer centre 
in his constituency by the Member of Parliament for East Honiara. Although one 
might have thought that responsibility for such an activity rested with Honiara 
City Council, the national MP’s initiative in this respect is testament to the 
viability of using the constituency as the political infrastructure for a new 
Solomon Islands society.  
 
Another example of constituency-based planning by a national MP, a particularly 
impressive example, is the recent announcement by the national MP for Malaita 
Outer Islands (i.e., the Polynesian outliers of Sikaiana and Ontong Java) that 
sixty-six families on the island of Sikaiana, an island on which there is at present 
no electricity, are to be provided with solar power. He has also indicated that he 
will follow this by attending to the power needs of the larger community in 
Ontong Java. What is notable, once again, is that this planning is taking place at 
constituency rather than provincial level. What is also notable is that the people of 
Sikaiana and Ontong Java, part of the Malaita Province, have received nothing in 
any way comparable as a result of the actions of provincial officials. The removal 
of the provincial layer of government would release more resources for operations 
at the constituency level. Since members of parliament, unlike most provincial 
officials, have to rely on their constituents for re-election, the way in which they 
made use of these resources would inevitably play an important role in their future 
prospects. In connection with this, it is important to note that the Rural 
Community Development Fund (RCDF), which is channeled through the 
constituency, has increased recently from $400,000.00 Solomon Islands dollars to 
$1million Solomon dollars (an increase of $600,000.00). This increase in funding 
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could usefully be accompanied by the setting up of administrative structures to 
facilitate rural development initiatives. This would have the advantage not only of 
ensuring that members of parliament had the necessary infrastructure to support 
their rural development plans and provide the necessary financial controls in 
relation to these plans, but also ensure that this level of planning did not occupy 
them to the extent that they could not attend fully to their other duties. Overall, it 
would help in the implementation of the type of bottom-up rural development 
approach to which the current Sogavare government has announced its 
commitment.68 I believe that this type of approach would be even more likely to 
succeed in the context of the type of government structure proposed here, one that 
would, in placing more emphasis on constituency-based action, acknowledge the 
significance of the fact that the majority of Solomon Islanders dwell in rural areas. 
It would also represent an acknowledgment of the fact that the circumstances and 
life-styles (including kastom) of these rural dwellers differ from area to area and 
need to be taken fully into account in development planning.  
 
Another advantage of a constituency-based system is that it would help to clarify 
issues relating to localised conflict. During the height of the ethnic tension on 
Guadalcanal (involving militants from Malaita and Guadalcanal), Harold Keke 
was represented in the media as being motivated by the grievances of the people 
                                                 
68 The Sogavare government has announced that by the end of February 2007 it will appoint 
suitable people into the public service to be posted out as Constituency Development Officers in 
all of the country’s fifty constituencies. The role of the Constituency Development Officers will be 
to coordinate activities between the central and provincial governments and rural communities in 
the implementation of the Government’s stated bottom-up, rural development approach  
(Government Communications Unit, Wednesday 10 January 2007 cited in 
http://www.peoplefirst.net.sb/news/News.asp?IDnews=7379).   
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of Guadalcanal (see 4.9). However, although Harold Keke69 may have claimed to 
have been championing the interests of Guadalcanal people, particularly in 
relation to issues relating to the land, the reality may have been very different. It is 
true that he is from the northern region of Guadalcanal (tasi-mate), where Honiara 
is also located. However, his mother is not from Guadalcanal but from 
Bougainville. Guadalcanal (in common with Ysabel, Choiseul and Western 
Province, and Bougainville) is a matrilineal society in which land is inherited 
through the female line. It is difficult, therefore, to see why Harold Keke, who has 
no direct involvement in land ownership in Guadalcanal, would have engaged in 
conflict in order to champion the interests of those with claims to land ownership 
in Guadalcanal. Furthermore, had he done so, he would not have been likely to 
have done so with the support of the people of Guadalcanal since he would not, in 
their view, have been able to do so legitimately. Furthermore, Keke and his 
henchmen were ruthless in their treatment of those people from the weather coast 
of Guadalcanal who did not share their militant approach to opposing the national 
government and the people of Malaita. At a constituency level, all of this would 
have been clearly understood; at provincial, national and international levels, it 
appears that it was not. Once again, this illustrates the importance of an 
understanding of kastom at a local level. In a constituency-centred system, this 
type of understanding would be likely to inform immediate responses to militant 
action which claimed a type of legitimacy that was not supported by kastom. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 This was before he was arrested and imprisoned by the police after the arrival of RAMSI. 
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Thus far, I have suggested that the present fifty constituencies remain.  However, 
it might be preferable to amalgamate some and to create some new ones. 
Individual constituencies would have ready access to central government and to 
other constituencies.  Finally, such a system would be likely to be both relevant 
and efficient.  
6.20 Overview  
There are four important aspects of the preceding discussions that should be 
highlighted.  First, state reform must be ideologically-based.  Second, the 
technicalities of constitutional reform must link back to the ideological basis of 
state reform.  Third, everyone, not only those who directly serve government, 
must benefit from state reform and constitutional reform.  Finally, state reform 
and constitutional reform must represent an effective response to the perceived 
weaknesses of the current system, an important aspect of which is the current 
inadequacy of national development policy and planning. 
 
In the final analysis, the institutional structure of the state must be considered in 
tandem with a conception of development thinking that would enhance 
development practice.  It is, after all, people who make up the state and it is 
people who can make effective development happen.  A real understanding of the 
social reality of Solomon Islands, of the ways in which people live their lives, 
must be fundamental to change.  Central to this is the interaction of state reform 
and development practice.  
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Chapter 7 
Overview and concluding statement  
  
7.1 Overview  
It is a commonly held view that the development problems characterising 
Solomon Islands are in large measure a consequence of the British colonial 
administration’s lack of adequate preparation for political independence.  In order 
to explore the extent to which that claim might be true, development processes 
and experiences in Solomon Islands in the period immediately preceding, and in 
the years following political independence in 1978 have been critically examined 
in the context of an exploration, from an insider’s perspective and using a 
constructivist-interpretative paradigm, of political and social aspects of 
contemporary Solomon Islands society.  In this critical examination, three 
metaphors (‘island space’, ‘betel nut’ and ‘wantok’) play a central role.  The 
approach adopted was underpinned by a broad postmodernist theoretical 
framework but also included aspects of structuralism, being firmly contextually 
grounded in Solomon Islands and, in particular, in Ulawa Island.   
 
A critical discussion and review of selected international literature on 
development sought to locate the philosophical and theoretical origins of the 
concept of development (with particular reference to what is often referred to as 
‘conventional’ or ‘mainstream’ development theory).  It was observed that the 
way in which ideas and belief systems develop in a general sense plays a 
significant role in their specific interpretation in local contexts in spite of the fact 
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that the cultures and economic circumstances specific to these contexts may be 
inconsistent with the general context in which these ideas and belief systems were 
initially developed. 
 
Contemporary Solomon Islands society was described and discussed in terms of 
three aspects of Solomon Islands society which are considered to be critical to 
social and economic development: kastom, church and government.  It was argued 
that an understanding of the roles that kastom, church and government play in 
contemporary Solomon Islands society should be considered fundamental to 
effective development policy and planning.  It was suggested that the political 
dimension of development (planning for development at a national government 
level) needs to be brought into line with religious and cultural dimensions of 
society, one aspect of the cultural dimension being the ways in which 
development is conceived at a local level.  An example of this was provided in a 
discussion of the mwa’ora or mwa’oranga development concept associated with 
Ulawa Island.  It was also argued that state reform is likely to be required if 
development activities are to be effective and a federal wantok state system (based 
on existing national constituencies) was proposed as being more consistent with 
the realities and requirements of Solomon Islanders than is the current 
government system. 
7.2  Conclusions  
In development terms, the departing British colonialists did little to prepare the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate for independence.  Their last two 
development plans have no clear focus or direction.  They are totally lacking in 
statistical information and analysis concerning the economic base of the country; 
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they include no measures by which the success (or otherwise) of the plans could 
be determined.  They make little attempt to address problems of infrastructure and 
unequal distribution of resources and economic opportunities.  They make no 
reference to the fact that many rural Solomon Islanders were progressively losing 
access to the land resources necessary to support themselves and their families.  
Above all, they take no account whatsoever of the realities of the society and 
culture of Solomon Islanders or of the ways in which they conceptualise 
development.  Overall, it is clear that, following World War II, British attention 
was almost exclusively focused on rebuilding the economy and infrastructure at 
home.  They were intent on removing themselves as quickly as possible from an 
area in which the people were becoming increasingly politicised, one in which 
resistance was spreading, one that offered no immediate prospect of economic or 
political gains.  The negative consequences of colonisation, particularly in relation 
to the disruption of the subsistence-based economy of the islands and the failure 
to respond appropriately to that disruption, were becoming increasingly apparent. 
Even so, successive governments of independent Solomon Islands might have 
been expected to perform better than the British in terms of national development 
policy and planning.  They did, after all, have the advantage of a more thorough 
understanding of the people, the society and the culture.  That they have not done 
so appears, in large measure, to be due to the fact that they have simply followed 
the British approach, an approach that is based on an understanding of 
development that is inconsistent with the realities of a Pacific island-based society 
made up largely of rural dwellers for whom kastom and church are at least as 
significant as national government.  The discussion of Solomon Islands society 
and culture provided here, along with the analysis of the concept of development 
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on one island (Ulawa Island), point to the fact that approaches to development that 
are derived from very different historical, geographical, political and social 
contexts are unlikely to be effective.  Both in terms of the overall structuring of 
national government and in terms of development policy and planning, Solomon 
Islands clearly needs an approach that is based on local realities.  Until this is 
fully understood, it seems unlikely that there will be any significant improvement 
in the lives of Solomon Islanders, particularly rural-dwelling Solomon Islanders.  
It is this argument that is, I believe, the central contribution that this thesis makes 
to debate about development policy and planning in Solomon Islands and, more 
generally, to debate about development policy and planning in ‘island’ nations 
more generally. 
 
Development policy and planning involve making conscious choices and 
decisions.  They involve taking advantage of existing opportunities and creating 
new ones in order to change people’s lives for the better.  Because they involve 
social change, they need to be viewed in the context of existing social structures 
and attitudes.  What works at one time and in one context may not work at another 
time in the same context or at the same time in a different context.  Thus, 
development is subjective and qualitative as well as quantitative.  Extrapolating 
from the concept of development of Ulawa islanders, it could be said that 
development activity currently in Solomon Islands should focus on sustaining life.  
In these early years of the twenty-first century, sustaining life will inevitably, 
however, involve more than ensuring adequate food and water supplies and health 
services.  If Solomon Islanders are to be active in determining the structure of 
national government and if they are to have a place in global society, they will 
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also require educational opportunities.  Development planning and development 
activities in Solomon Islands need to start from a vision that is firmly rooted in 
local realities, one that emerges from the current aspirations of the people, not 
from a vision that is imposed from outside.  It has been suggested here that this 
might be more readily achievable if the national government were to be 
restructured in a way that more adequately reflects the geographical, economic 
and social realities of the nation, one that could, for example, be based on a 
federal system of wantok states.  
 7.3  Weaknesses and limitations  
The first limitation of this research project – the fact that it contains very little 
discussion of state reform – arises out of problems relating to social and political 
unrest in Solomon Islands at the time when fieldwork was planned.  My original 
intention was to visit Solomon Islands on two separate occasions in order to 
conduct two series of semi-structured interviews – one series with those involved 
in national and regional politics, the other with people living in Ulawa Island.  
The first series of interviews – involving national and regional politicians – was to 
focus on the interaction between development and state reform; the second – 
involving Ulawa Islanders – was to focus on local people’s understanding of 
development and their aspirations for development.  In the event, only one visit to 
Solomon Islands was possible.  That visit took place in November/December 
2002.  During that visit, it was possible to interview a number of Ulawa islanders 
and a few politicians. However, because that visit coincided with significant 
political and social unrest, politicians, many of whom were concerned about 
investigations into their activities and, ultimately, their own fate, appeared 
suspicious of someone who purported to be interested in state reform.  They were 
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therefore reluctant to enter into discussions. I n the event, I was able to interview 
only a limited number of national leaders and politicians.  I interviewed only one 
government minister and four senior civil servants.  I also had the chance for a 
brief discussion with five other government officials but could not catch up with 
them later for further discussions.  Nor was I able to schedule interviews with 
another five other government officials who had indicated they would be willing 
to meet with me for an interview.  Ulawa Islanders, however, were more open to 
discussing development issues, but were clearly also concerned about entering 
into politically sensitive discussions.  For that reason, I confined myself to 
interviewing a number of close family members and friends.  These included my 
mother, three brothers (excluding Meffrey Awao), a brother-in-law, two uncles 
(one of them is from South Malaita), four cousins, a distant relative and three 
other Solomon Islands wantoks who are not from Ulawa Island.  In view of the 
possible dangers that might arise, for myself and others, were my motives to be 
misunderstood or misrepresented, I decided to cancel my second visit.  Although I 
felt that I had been able to gather sufficient information about the views of Ulawa 
Islanders in relation to development, I did not feel that I had been able to gather 
much useful information about the views of national and regional politicians on 
matters relating to state reform.  For this reason, I decided to place less emphasis 
on state reform than I had originally intended.  
 
A second limitation of the research project relates to what I perceive to be a 
somewhat uneasy balance between modern and post-modern perspectives.  As a 
student of sociology, my primary interest initially was cultural and I was 
predisposed towards postmodernity in general and the ideas of Max Weber in 
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particular (see Rohorua (1996)), believing that a post-modern paradigm provided 
an effective framework for the engagement and explication of development in the 
specific context of Solomon Islands and, in particular, Ulawa Island.  Examining 
development in the context of a range of locally relevant metaphors seemed to me 
to offer interesting possibilities.  Even so, it became clear to me that a modernist 
perspective also had something important to offer, and that the study therefore 
needed to be firmly grounded in terms of the historical and economic realities that 
have shaped contemporary Solomon Islands.  This approach appealed to me as a 
student of development studies whose ideas have been shaped, in part, by the 
radical Marxist perspective (Marx, 1970) which underpins dependency and 
underdevelopment theories and has provided a useful critique of modernisation 
theory without, however, proposing a plausible alternative development pathway 
for countries such as Solomon Islands.  The result is that I have drawn upon two 
paradigms which are often seen as being mutually exclusive.  It would have been 
interesting to explore the reasons why these paradigms appear to operate here in a 
complementary rather than contradictory way – with a radical Marxist approach 
providing a plausible explanation for the shortcomings of previous development 
activities in Solomon Islands and a poststructuralist approach offering a plausible 
way forward, one that may not be wholly inconsistent with post-development 
discourse.  
7.4 Possibilities for future research  
One focus of attention here has been on the way in which one group of Solomon 
Islanders, those living on Ulawa Island, view development.  However, Solomon 
Islands as a nation is socially and culturally diverse and there is a need for a more 
comprehensive understanding of that diversity and of its implications for 
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development activities.  Further studies that focus on different groups within 
Solomon Islands and that look more closely at the role of the church (and the 
potential for the church to play a role in development) would provide useful input 
into development thinking. 
 
The discussion of state reform in Solomon Islands that is provided here is not 
based on a detailed analysis of the shortcomings of the present system of national 
government in Solomon Islands.  Nor is it underpinned by a study of those 
approaches to national government structuring that might be appropriate in the 
case of Pacific islands nations that are characterised by uneven development or by 
a detailed sampling of the views of those involved in national and regional politics 
and those affected by national and regional politics.  Such a study could inform 
current discussions of state reform in Solomon Islands and, in doing so, could 
provide a further useful perspective on national development planning. 
 
Finally, Solomon Islands as a nation is made up of peoples who inhabit a group of 
islands.  Since the sixteenth century, both the islands themselves, and the peoples 
who inhabit them, have been affected by events elsewhere in the world which 
have impacted on them.  Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, they 
are inevitably a part of the phenomenon of globalisation.  Although there is a need 
for development activities that focus on the day-to-day realities of life in Solomon 
Islands, there is also a need to acknowledge the fact that globalisation will 
continue to impact on the Solomon Islanders and to plan in a way that seeks to 
ensure that that impact is as positive as possible.  Bearing this in mind, there is 
clearly a need for more historically focused studies of the political and social 
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development of Solomon Islands and of the impact of external forces on its 
peoples in the past and the likely impact of such forces in the future.  
7.5  Final word    
In August 2003, I took part in a seminar which focused on the Australian led 
mission to help restore law and order in Solomon Islands (RAMSI).  I ended my 
presentation as follows: 
 
Despite extensive negative media coverage of Solomon Islands in relation 
to ethnic conflict and the perceived failure of government, both generally 
and in relation to development activities in particular, it is still possible to 
believe that this island nation will find a way forward, that it will gain 
from its experiences so that, in time, it will be genuinely associated with 
both the wisdom and the wealth traditionally associated with King 
Solomon. 
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Appendix A:  Report on preliminary field research trip to Solomon Islands  
 
15th October – 5th December 2002  
 
1.0 Introduction  
In the social sciences, a field research component is very often included in 
postgraduate research.  However, the practicalities and unexpected in relation to 
the actual field research itself, especially for a novice researcher, are often not 
anticipated, prior to departure.  This is perhaps due to the variability, either in the 
particular discipline concerned, or the location and duration of the field research, 
and maybe depending also on the methodologies employed.  The following is a 
brief outline of my preliminary field research trip to Solomon Islands in October-
December 2002 as part of my doctoral studies.          
 
2.0 Purpose of the Trip  
The preliminary field trip to Solomon Islands was undertaken with the approval of 
my Chief Supervisor, Dr Eci Nabalarua, also Chairperson of the Department of 
Development Studies, School of Mäori & Pacific Development, at the University 
of Waikato The initial idea was for me to spend six months in Solomon Islands 
collecting relevant empirical data.  Financial considerations, however, rendered 
that untenable and so my Chief Supervisor and I decided that I would make two 
separate field trips, each lasting two months.  The first trip, 15th November–5th 
December 2002, was intended as a preliminary trip only, the primary purpose of 
that trip being to establish contacts and networks in Honiara (and collect whatever 
data was possible in the time available).  The plan was that I would conduct 
interviews in both Honiara and Ulawa during my second trip to Solomon Islands.  
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3.0 Duration: 15th October – 5th December 2002 
• Thursday 15th October - departed Auckland Airport at 7.10am via 
Brisbane for Solomon Islands arriving in Honiara at 3.30pm (local time) 
the same day.  That night was spent in discussion with Meffrey Awao of 
the Ministry of Provincial Government & Rural Development till 3.30am 
about various development issues and concepts of development in 
Solomon Islands but especially in Ulawa Island.  
• Thursday17th October - worked on correspondence to various Solomon 
Islands Government (SIG) Ministries and Departments, including a formal 
application for research permit.  
• Sunday 20th October (at night) - had another discussion with Meffrey 
Awao till 2.00am. From these discussions emerged the concept of 
`Backward Approach’70 to development. It was a concept Meffrey Awao 
came up with and one that I noted as it sounded interesting. I thought it 
was an idea which could be further developed in the future.     
• Monday 21st October - did some internet correspondence with New 
Zealand, including receiving an email indicating that my application for 
research funds from NZAID had been approved. It was late for me to 
access the funds because I was already in the field. The funds were later 
accessed in the form of reimbursement.  
• Tuesday 22nd October - had to hand-deliver my official correspondences to 
various SIG Ministries and Departments. This was because the General 
Post Office was no longer handling any government mail because of 
                                                 
70 The concept or idea, `backward approach to development’, is not discussed in the thesis.   
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overdue payments. Telephones in most Government offices were out of 
order due also to unpaid bills owing to Solomon Telekom.  
• Thursday 14th October - brainstorming exercise to conceptualise and 
contextually locate `Backward Approach’ to development in Solomon 
Islands and Ulawa.  
• Friday 25th October - visited the Honiara Public and University of the 
South Pacific (USP) Centre libraries.  
• Saturday 26th October - another brainstorming exercise to conceptualise 
`Backward Approach’ as an alternative development model for Solomon 
Islands.  
• Tuesday 29th October - went to the USP Centre library.  
• Wednesday 30th October - photocopied Research Information and Consent 
forms for distribution. Also went to Public Service Commission (PSC) 
Office.  
• Thursday 31st October – I worked from home.  
• Friday 1st November – I went to the Public Service Commission (PSC) 
Office. At 10.00am met with Emily Teaitala (Manager, Human resources, 
Public Service Commission). In the afternoon, I met with Ishmael Avui 
(Under-Secretary, Public Service Commission).     
• Tuesday 5th November - made computer entry updates on my Diary and 
Field notes.  
• Wednesday 6th November - At 11.00am, I went to the Rural Development 
Division (RDD) of the Ministry of Provincial Government & Rural 
Development. Met with Allan Agasi (Chief Rural Development Officer) 
who was also Acting-Director in the absence of Joe Rausi (Director) who 
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was on leave. At 2.10pm I went to the Prime Minister’s Office and met 
Tione Bugotu (Deputy-Secretary to Cabinet).    
• Thursday 7th November - went to the Honiara Public Library.  
• Friday 8th November (9-10am) - did an interview with Honourable 
Nathaniel Waena, Minister, Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation & 
Peace.  
• Monday 11th November - made computer entry updates on Diary and Field 
notes. Also started transcribing interview with Honourable Waena.  
• Wednesday 13th November – At 10.30am I went to the Rural Development 
Division (RDD), Ministry of Provincial Government & Rural 
Development. Obtained permission from the Officer-in-Charge (O-in-C), 
Meffrey Awao to use their library resources. Went to the Ministry of 
Education in the afternoon but was unable to meet anyone there..   
• Thursday 14th November - read Solomon Islands Human Development 
Report.71  
• Monday 18th November – At 9.30am I went again to Rural Development 
Division (RDD), Ministry of Provincial Government & Rural 
Development. Met the Director, Joe Rausi, who had returned from leave 
but only briefly. At 11.00am I went again to the Ministry of Education and 
met with Donald Malasa (Under-Secretary).   
• Tuesday 19th November - made computer entry update on my Diary notes.  
• Thursday 21st November - went to Ministry of Education and at 2.30pm 
had a chance meeting with John Moffat Fugui, who currently works in the 
                                                 
71 I did not refer directly to the Solomon Islands Human Development Report in the thesis.   
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PM’s Office. I arranged to have a meeting with him the following day. At 
10.00pm made computer entry updates on Diary and Field notes.  
• Friday 22nd November – At 1.10pm I went to the National Parliament to 
deliver correspondences requesting for a possible interview with the 
Speaker of Parliament, Sir Peter Kenilorea. At 3.50pm I met with John 
Moffat Fugui, a political adviser to the government, at the Cabinet Room 
in the Prime Minister’s Office.  On my way to the Prime Minister’s Office, 
for my meeting with John M. Fugui, I passed through the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) Office and met in passing Toswell Kaua (Secretary to 
Cabinet).   
• Monday 25th November – From 2.00 – 4.00pm I was at the Public library.  
• Wednesday 27th November – At 9.00am I went to the Rural Development 
Division (RDD), Ministry of Provincial Government & Rural 
Development to use their library resources. At 10.00am I went to the 
National Parliament to deliver a written questionnaire which I had 
prepared especially for the Speaker of Parliament, at his request, as he was 
unavailable to meet for a formal interview. At 11.30am I met with Joe 
Rausi (Director, Rural Development Division, Ministry of Provincial 
Government & Rural Development). At 3.15pm met with Fr George 
Takeli (an Anglican priest from Su’uholo village, Ulawa Island). He had 
also come over from New Zealand and was also doing his field work to 
completing a Masters in Theology at the St John’s Theological College in 
Auckland.     
• Thursday 28th November – At 9.00am I went to the Rural Development 
Division (RDD), Ministry of Provincial Government & Rural 
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Development to complete my readings and notes from their library 
resources. 
• Sunday 1st December - made computer entry updates for Diary and Field 
notes.  
• Monday 2nd–Wednesday 4th December – was in Tulagi. Went across by 
boat from Honiara. Went to visit my elder brother (Henry Judah Awao 
Poenjili) and his family. This was not only an opportunity to visit them but 
also discuss Henry Awao’s views on development in Ulawa and, indeed, 
the Solomon Islands more generally. We had some interesting discussions 
some of which were related to his former role as base manager in Tulagi 
for the local tuna fishing company, National Fisheries Development 
(NFD) Ltd. He resigned from the company when NFD relocated to Noro 
in the western Solomons in 2001.       
• Thursday 5th December - return from Tulagi to Honiara by out-board-
motor. 2.00am return flight to NZ (via Brisbane) arriving at Auckland 
Airport Friday 6th December at 10.50am.           
  
4.0 Field encounters  
My arrival in the country to do research was noted as being unexpected by the 
Public Service Commission (PSC). One of the reasons for this was that, because 
of the current circumstances in Solomon Islands, my supervisor and I had agreed 
that it was best for me to notify the relevant authorities and apply for a research 
permit after (rather than before) I arrived in the country, something that was in no 
way either illegal or, under normal circumstances, particularly unusual. Even so, 
many of those I knew in the Public Service were surprised at my arrival because 
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they thought I was still residing in Fiji and were unaware, particularly as I was not 
a scholarship-holder, that I was conducting research from a New Zealand base.  
 
To do research in Solomon Islands, researchers must first seek approval from the 
PSC. Once approval is granted by the PSC, the Ministry of Education will then 
issue a research permit upon receipt of the fee or payment for the permit. Solomon 
Islands nationals are usually exempt from paying for the research permit.      
Most, if not all, Solomon Islanders currently studying overseas, especially at 
postgraduate level, are on government scholarships. So when I applied for my 
research permit, someone I knew well in the Ministry of Education suggested that 
I pay for the permit. In fact, the Head of Department[2] in another Government 
Ministry (whom I thought I also knew well) told me I would have to pay for any 
office space and other facilities in his Department that I wished to use for my 
research. It was a sobering experience. Later, the person concerned advised me 
that he had not been serious. 
 
Secondly, the aftermath of the ethnic conflict rendered the public service virtually 
dysfunctional. Most government offices were either empty or left unattended and 
unswept. Civil servants just weren’t going to work at all because of salary arrears. 
As indicated earlier, the Public Service Postal Mail system and telephone lines 
were said to be inoperative because of huge outstanding bills owing to both the 
Postal Services and Telekom. Whenever I wanted to make contact with anyone in 
a government office, I had to walk there in the hope that someone would be there 
to receive me. My limited finances did not allow me to get to the Ministry of 
Planning & Development located in another part of Honiara. Nor did I receive any 
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response from them regarding my official correspondence in spite of the fact that I 
had been given the all clear to go ahead with my research from PSC.   
 
Thirdly, I know many of those in management positions either because we had 
been educated together or because they were good friends. Despite this, the 
overwhelming sense I felt amongst most of whom I encountered was an 
unwillingness to fully assist and cooperate in my research. In numerous instances 
verbal assurances were given, and in some cases Participant Consent Forms 
signed, but often the individuals concerned clearly had no real intention of 
becoming involved in the research. In hindsight, I was forewarned of such a 
possible reception by a fellow wantok who had already completed his doctoral 
studies also at the University of Waikato in 2002. But the actual experience itself 
in the field left me dumbfounded. I was deeply disillusioned given that the formal 
permission I received from the PSC (delayed though its arrival was) stated quite 
clearly that what I was doing – i.e., my doctoral studies and research topic – was 
extremely important for the country. Disappointing, to be sure, was an 
understatement. In fact, I began to believe what I had been told by a friend: 
foreigners or `strangers’ were more than welcome to do research in Solomon 
Islands itself, especially those involved in higher degree study. This lack of 
genuine enthusiasm and cooperation by those whom I thought I knew was much 
more than simply disappointing, especially as I had tried very hard to abide by the 
rules and regulations surrounding ethical research expected of me by Waikato 
University.         
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Finally, my return home after a very long absence raised expectations among 
family and friends that I could not fulfil in that I was a full-time student on a 
student loan, obliged to pay my own airfares and to attempt to meet research 
requirements. My personal experience in Honiara suggests that the rigorous 
conventions of academic planning and practice do not always sit well with the 
social realities of one’s own locality, especially for a novice researcher and naïve 
Solomon Islander with academic aspirations.     
 
5.0 Lessons learnt 
So what lessons were learnt from the trip? There were many but I wish to dwell 
on only two.  
 
Firstly, for a novice researcher, there has to be a greater awareness and 
appreciation of the `realities’ out there in the field or research location. My 
personal experiences notwithstanding, there are instances when one has to 
improvise in the `field’ in terms of maximising the opportunities available – both 
time and resources - to gather the empirical data one needs. 
 
Secondly, in the context of Solomon Islands, the dynamics of doing postgraduate 
research as a local in one’s own country are different from those of a 
foreigner/stranger coming to conduct research locally. I can still recall an 
anthropologist, his wife and child who had come to live on my home Island back 
in the 1970s. They were readily accepted into the community and supported 
throughout the time of their research. In fact, each family member was each given 
a local name. My experience was very different. However, in that it had much in 
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common with the experiences of two other Solomon Islands researchers of whom 
I am aware, it seems that it is not unusual. This is something that requires further 
investigation. The challenge for me is to accept that the unpleasant experience I 
had in Honiara is part of the social and political reality of Solomon Islands life. It 
is something that researchers must come to terms with.  
 
6.0 Conclusion  
From a personal point of view, the trip has been a major disappointment. In 
retrospect, however, it revealed an important dimension of the socio-political 
realities of life in the Solomons, a dimension that not only affects research 
possibilities, but also itself invites research.  
 
